Mülkiyetin Yeniden Dağılımı: Şok Terapi Sonrası Polonya ve Rusya’da Özelleştirme Tasarımı ve Kapitalist Ayrışma

Öz

Bu makale, Polonya ve Rusya’nın komünizm sonrası izlediği farklılaşan gelişim yollarını makroekonomik istikrardan mülkiyet ve iktidarın dağıtımsal temellerine analitik odağı kaydırarak sorgulamaktadır. Her iki ülke de 1990’ların başında fiyat liberalizasyonu, mali disiplin ve kapsamlı özelleştirmeyi hızla uygulamak amacıyla radikal şok terapi programlarını kullanmıştır. Ancak kurumsal ve kalkınma sonuçları belirgin biçimde farklılaşmıştır: Polonya, toplumsal olarak gömülü bir piyasa kapitalizmi geliştirirken; Rusya, oligarşik ve daha sonra devlet tarafından hâkim olunan bir kapitalizme evrilmiştir. Bu makale, karşılaştırmalı siyasal ekonomi, devletin ele geçirilmesi teorisi ve kapitalizmin çeşitleri literatürlerini kullanarak, reform hızından ziyade özelleştirme tasarımının bu ayrışmanın belirleyici mekanizması olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Polonya’daki yönetici–çalışan satın almaları mülkiyeti yaygınlaştırmış, sınırlı içerden erişime izin vermiş ve düzenleyici çoğulculuğu desteklemiştir; Rusya’daki kupon özelleştirmesi ise mülkiyeti rant çekebilen, kurumları ele geçirebilen ve otoriter iktidarı pekiştirebilen elit gruplar arasında yoğunlaştırmıştır. Elit yapısı, ilk mülkiyet desenlerinin güçlendirici geri besleme döngüleri ve yol bağımlılığı üreterek aktarıldığı mekanizma işlevi görmüştür. Mülkiyet yoğunlaşması, doğrudan yabancı yatırım akışları ve yönetişim kalitesi gibi nicel veriler bu analizi desteklemektedir. Çalışma, şok terapiye ilişkin geleneksel yorumları sorgulamakta ve post-sosyalist Avrupa’daki kapitalist çeşitliliğin ideolojik farklılıklardan ziyade dağıtımsal farklılıklardan kaynaklandığını göstermektedir. Mülkiyetin erken dönemdeki biçimlenişinin, piyasa gelişiminin uzun vadeli yönünü, devletin gücünü ve rejim tipini belirlediğini ortaya koyarak post-komünist kapitalizmin siyasal temellerini görünür kılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Şok Terapi
• Komünizm Sonrası Kapitalizm
• Polonya
• Rusya
• Ekonomik Geçiş

Who Owned What After Shock Therapy? Privatization Design and Capitalist Divergence in Poland and Russia

Öz

This article questions the diverging paths for Poland and Russia after communism through shifting the analytical focus from macroeconomic stabilization to the distributive foundations of ownership and power. Both countries used radical shock therapy programs during the early 1990s to rapidly implement price liberalization, fiscal restraint, and massive privatization. Yet, the institutional and developmental outcomes differed significantly. Poland has developed a socially embedded market capitalism, while Russia evolved into oligarchic and later state-dominated capitalism. This article uses comparative political economy, state-capture theory, and varieties of capitalism to argue that the privatization design, not reform speed, was the decisive mechanism behind this divergence. Management-employee buyouts in Poland dispersed ownership while limited insider access, and supported regulatory pluralism; voucher privatization in Russia concentrated ownership among elite groups that could extract rents, capture institutions, and consolidate authoritarian rule. The elite structure served as the mechanism of transmission by which initial ownership patterns generated reinforcing feedback loops and path dependence. Quantitative data, such as ownership concentration, foreign direct investment inflows, and governance quality, further support this analysis. The study challenges traditional interpretations of shock therapy and demonstrates that capitalist diversity in post-socialist Europe is due to distributive variations rather than ideological ones. It shows that the early choice of ownership determines the longer-term development of markets, the strength of government, and the type of regime, revealing the political foundations of post-communist capitalism.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Shock Therapy
• Post-Communist Capitalism
• Poland
• Russia
• Economic Transition

Kaynakça

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