CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING AS A COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN POST-CONFLICT PLACES: AFGHANISTAN

Öz

Since the military analysts, as well as peacebuilders, started to view democratization, rule of law, and economic reconstruction as the panacea to enable security and peace in post-conflict places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, it has been possible to assert that there is a structural symbiosis between the principles and goals of peacebuilding and counterinsurgency. The basic criticism of this symbiotic relationship is the use of peacebuilding as a justification to maintain political support for military sides of campaigns. However, these normative efforts of interveners mostly neglect local perceptions and structures of post-conflict states due to expectations for easy and early success, which lead them to pragmatic solutions. These pragmatic solutions cause deterioration in the social and economic situation of host nations. In this regard, the research herein tries to reveal how normative peacebuilding efforts as counterinsurgency could aggravate existing flawed social and political structures causing an inequality between ruling elites and ordinary citizens of post-conflict environments, using Afghanistan as a case study.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Peacebuilding,Statebuilding,Afghanistan,Counterinsurgency,Inequality

BİR KARŞI AYAKLANMA YÖNTEMİ OLARAK LİBERAL BARIŞ İNŞASININ ELEŞTİREL ANALİZİ: AFGANİSTAN

Öz

Barış inşası için çalışan uzmanlar kadar askerî analistlerin de demokratikleşme, hukukun üstünlüğü, ve ekonomik yapının yeniden inşasını barış ve güvenliğin tesisi için her derde deva bir çare olarak görmeye başladıklarından beri, esasları ve amaçları bakımından barış inşası ve karşı ayaklanma arasında simbiyotik bir ilişki olduğunu iddia etmek mümkündür. Bu simbiyotik ilişkiye yöneltilen en önemli ilişki barış inşasının yürütülen askerî faaliyetler için siyasi destek sağlamak adına kullanılmasıdır. Ancak, müdahalede bulunan ülkelerin izledikleri normatif çabalar büyük ölçüde yerel algıları ve çatışma sonrası ülkelerin yapılarını pragmatik bir bakış açısı ile kolay ve erken başarı elde etmek adına görmezden gelmektedirler.  Bu pragmatik yaklaşımlar, ev sahibi ülkenin sosyal ve ekonomik yapılarına zarar vermektedir. Bu bağlamda; bu çalışma, karşı ayaklanmanın bir parçası olarak normatif barış inşası çabalarının, Afganistan örneği üzerinden, yönetici elitler ile normal vatandaşlar arasında eşitsizliğe neden olarak zaten sorunlu olan sosyal ve politik yapıyı daha da kötüleştirebileceğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Barış İnşası,Devlet İnşası,Afganistan,Karşı Ayaklanma,Eşitsizlik

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