The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: An Analysis of the Potential Impact of Autonomous Weapon Systems on International Humanitarian Law

Yıl 2022, Cilt: 24 Sayı: 2, 174 - 196, 29.12.2022

Berkant Akkuş

https://doi.org/10.54627/gcd.1112457

Cited By: 3

Öz

Autonomous weapon systems (AWS), also known as killer robots, are advanced technology weapons that use artificial intelligence and robotic technology to select targets and attack without any human intervention. Autonomous weapon systems provide many benefits on the battlefield. AWS is used as a preventative action in dangerous missions in order to prevent civilian and military losses. It radically changes the battlefield by acting completely independently of the weaknesses such as disappointment, revenge, anger, and fatigue that the soldiers have during the armed conflict.

Autonomous weapon systems, which act without meaningful human control, create problems in determining legal and criminal responsibility, and the decision of life and death by a machine opens up the inviolability of human dignity. This study will examine the problems created by autonomous weapon systems in international humanitarian law. In line with this purpose, the principle of distinction, the principle of proportionality, and the principle of precaution, which are the core principles of international humanitarian law, will be discussed. The weapon review process of autonomous weapon systems and whether it should be banned in line with the Martens Clause will be examined in line with the discussions in the international arena.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Autonomous Weapon Systems, International Law, Artificial Intelligence, The Martens Clause

Uluslararası İnsancıl Hukukun İnsandışılaştırılması: Otonom Silah Sistemlerinin Uluslararası İnsancıl Hukuk Üzerindeki Potansiyel Etkisi Üzerine Bir Analiz

Öz

Otonom silah sistemleri diğer bir adıyla katil robotlar, yapay zeka ve robotik teknolojisinden faydalanarak herhangi bir insan müdahalesine gerek duymadan hedefleri seçen ve saldırıda bulunan ileri teknoloji silahlardır. Otonom silah sistemleri savaş meydanında pek çok fayda sağlamaktadır. Tehlikeli görevlerde önleyici olarak kullanılarak sivillerin ve askeri kayıpların önüne geçmektedir. Askerlerin silahlı çatışma sırasında sahip olduğu hayal kırıklığı, intikam, öfke, yorgunluk gibi zaaflardan tamamen bağımsız hareket ederek savaşın gidişatını/seyrini kökten değiştirmektedir.

Anlamlı insan kontrolü bulunmadan harekete geçen otonom silah sistemleri ise hukuki ve cezai sorumluluğun belirlenmesinde problemler yaratmakta ve bir makine tarafından yaşam ve ölüm kararının verilmesi insan onurunun dokunulmazlığını tartışmaya açmaktadır. Bu çalışma, otonom silah sistemlerinin uluslararası insancıl hukukta yarattığı problemleri, günümüz silahlı çatışmalarından örneklerle inceleyecektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda; uluslararası insancıl hukuk prensipleri olan ayırt etme , ölçülülük ve önleme ilkeleri detaylı bir şekilde tartışılacaktır. Otonom silah sistemlerinin Martens kaydı doğrultusunda yasaklanıp yasaklanmaması gerekliliği hususu uluslararası arenadaki tartışmalar doğrultusunda incelenecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Otonom Silah Sistemleri, Uluslararası Hukuk, Martens Kaydı, Yapay Zeka

Kaynakça

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