WAS THE INDIAN MUTINY CONSEQUENCE OF THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BRITISH INFORMATION SYSTEM?

Abstract

The Indian Mutiny has an important place in British Colonial History. There were various causes of this rebellion but this research, which was based on the original historical documents, showed that the main reason was the breakdown of the British Information System. This study also considered other aspects which played role in the mutiny such as delay in construction of telegraphic system and railways. Thus, the British government realised that a controlled information line in Indian as well as between India and Great Britain was vital. There was some improvement in governmental communications between the two countries but existence of the electric telegraph line was still slow and unreliable. Over thirty thousand soldiers including Muslims and Hindus rebelled together against the British authority. It spread out to other regions in Northern India involving princes and peasants. If the British authorities had sufficient and accurate information before the revolt occurred, this would not happen as the Empire’s military power was strong enough to prevent such incident

Keywords

• Indian Mutiny,British Rule,Information System,Colonisation

WAS THE INDIAN MUTINY CONSEQUENCE OF THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BRITISH INFORMATION SYSTEM?

Öz

Hint Ayaklanması İngiliz Sömürgecilik Tarihi’nde önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bu
isyanın birçok sebebleri vardır ancak orijinal tarihi kaynaklara dayalı olarak
yapılan bu geniş çaplı araştırma isyanın asıl sebebinin İngiliz iletişim sisteminin
çöküşünden dolayı olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu araştırma aynı zamanda telegraf
ve tren hatlarının inşasının gecikmesi gibi isyanda rol oynayan diğer sebebleri
de değerlendirmiştir. Böylece İngiliz hükümeti Hindistan ve Büyük Britanya
arasındaki iletişim hattının yanısıra Hindistan içinde de kontrollü informasyon
hattının öneminin farkına varmıştır. İki ülke arasındaki resmi iletişimde
göze çarpan bir ilerleme görülsede o dönemde kullanımda olan telegraf hattı
yavaş ve güvenilmezdi. Otuz binin üzerinde Müslüman ve Hintlilerin de içinde
bulunduğu askerler hep birlikte İngiliz yönetimine karşı isyan ettiler. İsyan
Kuzey Hindistan’daki diğer bölgelere ve bu bölgelerde yaşayan prenses ve
köylüleri de içine alacak şekilde yayıldı. Eğer İngiliz yönetimi isyan öncesi
yeterli ve düzenli bilgiye sahip olsaydı, isyan çıkmayabilirdi ki İmparatorluğun
askeri birliği bu tür isyanları önleyebilecek bir güce sahibti. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Hindistan İsyanı, İngiliz Yönetimi, İnformasyon Sistemi, Sömürgecilik

Kaynakça

1. The other main centres of the rebellion were Allahabad, Mainpuru, Fatehgarh,
2. Bareilly, Agra, Aligarh, Bulandshahr, and Delhi.
3. “A telegraphic despatch received at Bombay from Meerut states that the 3d Bengal
4. cavalry were in open Mutiny. Several officers and men had been killed and wounded” The
5. Times, 8 June Monday 1857, p.9.
6. First Earl of Beaconsfield (1804-1881), statesman and man of letters. see for
7. more information: STEPHEN, Leslie (Sir) and LEE, Sidney (Sir). (1917), The
8. Dictionary of National Biography, vol. V, Oxford University Press, p.1006.

9. The Time’s Correspondent shared also same idea as Disraeli. He said, “The
10. Mutiny is not instigated by any religious feeling. Every mutiny that has ever occurred in
11. India has been apparently created by one of two causes a reduction of pay or an outrage on
12. caste prejudice. The reason for that fact is simple enough. No other cause would ever induce
13. three Sepoys to act together. They have no patriotism, for during 600 years they have had
14. no country. They have no sense of a common interest in the common weal…” The Times,
15. June Monday 1857, p.12.
16. According to him there was lack of understanding between ruler and ruled
17. and the British had failed to use Hindu-Muslim differences to ensure the loyalty
18. of the army.
19. Evidence to this, Sir George Digby Barker saying in his letter: “You may as well
20. direct my letters to me at Benares to be forwarded, but at present all postal communication
21. is cut off beyond Allahabad. The telegraph has been cut by these murderous hounds and
22. made into slings to fire at us”, Barker, Sir George Digby (General), Letters from
23. Persia ~ India 1857-1858, (edited by Lady Barker), G. Bell and Sons ltd., London
24. , p.46.
25. JAMES, Lawrance. (1997), Raj The Making and Unmaking of British India, Little
26. Brown and Company (UK), London, p.5.
27. Bayly , C. A. (Christopher Alan). (1997), An Empire of Information : Political
28. Intelligence and Social Communication in North India, 1780-1880, Cambridge University
29. Press, p.46.
30. Ibid., p.366.
31. Ibid., p.369.
32. Ibid., p.369.
33. Ibid., p.165.
34. Ibid., p.165.
35. BAIRD, J. G. A. (1911), Private Letters of the Marques of Dalhousie, William
36. Blackwood and Sons, Edingurgh and London, p.119.
37. He said that “In November last we began to lay the electric telegraph. Five
38. days ago I received a message from Agra, 800 miles distant, transmitted in 1 hour
39. and 50 minutes! And I have a few minutes ago read the heads of intelligence of
40. your mail of 24th February by way of Bombay. In short time we shall complete
41. the line to Bombay, and thus in a few months we shall reduced the period of communication with England from thirty-five to twenty-six days….We have
42. already so improved communications that our last letter from Umerapoora was
43. only nineteen days old. BAIRD, J.G.A. (1911), Private Letters of the Marques of
44. Dalhousie, William Blackwood and Sons, Edingurgh and London, p.293. (Government
45. House, March 30th 1854)
46. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd series, vol. CXLIV, 3 February 1857-21
47. March 1857), 2366.
48. Ibid., 2427.
49. BEKTAS, Yakup (2000), “The Sultan’s Messenger: Cultural Constructions
50. of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847-1880”, Technology and Culture 41.4, pp.669-696,
51. p.679.
52. Ibid., p.677.
53. In the present report, it is indeed hard to describe how useful the telegraph has
54. proved to the Punjab administration during the crisis of 1857!… It were superfluous to
55. mention the immense advantages which the Telegraph gave us over enemies. Suffice it to
56. note the instance at Lahore, when the Authorities were warned by the telegraph of the
57. Delhi disaster, disarmed the sepoys before they could obtain information by post. If there
58. had been a telegraph, an outbreak at Lahore might possibly not have been averted at that
59. moment. PRO 30/12/22, Supplement to the Overland Friend of India, General Report on
60. the Administration of the Punjab Territories, For the Years 1856-57 & 1857-58, Jan 22
61. , Section VI/Electric Telegraph/70, p.12.
62. HOSKINS, H.L. (1966), British Routes to India, London, p.91.
63. Barker, Sir George Digby (General). (1915), Letters from Persia ~ India
64. -1858, (edited by Lady Barker), G. Bell and Sons ltd., London, p.40.
65. TAYLOR, P.J.O. (1996), A Companion to the ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 1857, Oxford
66. University press, Oxford, p.91-92.
67. PRO 30/12/22, Supplement to the Overland Friend of India, General Report
68. on the Administration of the Punjab Territories, For the Years 1856-57 & 1857-58,
69. Jan 22 1859, Section IV/Railroads/61, p.11.
70. TAYLOR, P.J.O. (1996), A Companion to the ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 1857, Oxford
71. University press, Oxford, p.279, please also see for similar comment; MACMunn, Sir
72. George (Lieut-General). (1931), The Indian Mutiny in Perspective, London, p.22.
73. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd series, vol. CXLIV, 3 February 1857-21
74. March 1857), 934.
75. PRO 30/12/22, Supplement to the Overland Friend of India, General Report
76. on the Administration of the Punjab Territories, For the Years 1856-57 & 1857-58,
77. January 22, 1859, Section IV, Part I-Roads, 55, p.10.
78. TAYLOR, P.J.O. (1996), A Companion to the ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 1857, Oxford
79. University press, Oxford, p.91.
80. Bayly , C. A. (Christopher Alan). (1997), An Empire of Information: Political
81. Intelligence and Social Communication in North India, 1780-1880, Cambridge University
82. Press, p.372.
83. PRO 30/12/22, Extracts of a letter from the Secret Committee of the Court
84. of Directors of the East India Company to the Governor General of India in Council, dated 19th April 1858, relating to that “Proclamation” / 7th May 1858, p.4.
85. The Proclamations is addressed to the Chiefs and Inhabitants of Oudh.
86. The Delhi Gazette, Saturday, August 7, 1858, The founding; Ahmud Ally Khan’s
87. defence was a complete failure, he merely asserts that he has never been faithful to the
88. British Government, denies the correspondence with the king. See for more details about
89. the charges which were made against the Nawab, PRO 30/12/22.
90. PRO 30/29/23/10, Letter from Muttra, 9th June/320/321.
91. Bayly , C. A. (Christopher Alan). (1997), An Empire of Information: Political
92. Intelligence and Social Communication in North India, 1780-1880, Cambridge University
93. Press , 1997, p.336.
94. PRO 30/12/22, Her Majesty’s Proclamation Gazette, Governor-General’s
95. Camp Extraordinary, Published by authority, Allahabad, Monday, 1st November
96. , p.17. Under the heading of “The Right Honourable the Governor-General has
97. received the commands of Her Majesty the Queen to make known the following gracious
98. Proclamation of Her Majesty to the Princes, the Chiefs, and the People of India”.
99. TAYLOR, P.J.O. (1996), A Companion to the ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 1857, Oxford
100. University press, Oxford, p.91.
101. JAMES, Lawrence. (1997), Raj The Making and Unmaking of British India,
102. Little, Brown and Company (UK), London, p.240.
103. The Times, 15 June Monday 1857 (the Bengal Mutinies), p.12.
104. PALMER, J.A.B. (1966), The Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut in 1857, Cambridge
105. University press, p.26.
106. Ibid., p.129.
107. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd series, vol.CXLVI, 19th of June 1857 to
108. th of July 1857), 512-513.
109. Ibid., 512-513.
110. The Times, 10 June 1857, (Parliamentary Debates). The Earl of Ellenborough
111. “you must have looked with apprehension at similar appearances of mutiny in the Madras
112. and Bombay armies; but that which has most alarmed me, and which gives a more serious
113. character to all these appearances of insubordination is that which has only come to our
114. knowledge within the last few hours… I can not but think that there must have been some
115. strange misrepresentation and exaggeration in the accounts which we have received from
116. India… When the 19th Regiment was disbanded at Barrackpore there was a passage in
117. a long official paper emanating from the Governor General in Council, and read to the
118. soldiery, which was to the effect that no one could pretend that the Government had at
119. any time endeavoured to interfere with the religion of the people; but I can not find that
120. any notification has been made, as it should have been, at the quarters of every regiment
121. and throughout the country… I see no trace of there have been any general notification to
122. that effect. It has been left entirely to the officers at the different stations to make any such
123. notification as they should think fit under the circumstances… And what should the course
124. of the Governor General have been? Ought he not with his own hand in three sentences to
125. have communicated to the whole country… I am convinced that if the Governor General
126. had pursued that course we should have heard no more of the incendiary fires, nor of the
127. open mutiny at Meerut. But that course was not taken…”
128. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd series, vol. CXLVI, 19th of June 1857 to
129. th of July 1857), 512-513.
130. Ibid., 514.
131. Gower, Granville (2nd Earl Granville), 1815-1891, politician. He was born
132. to diplomacy (his father was British Ambassador in Paris in the 1830s). Look for
133. further information; GARDINER, Juliet (edit.). (2000), The History Today Who’s
134. Who in British History, London, p.363.
135. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd series, vol. CXLVI, 19th of June 1857
136. to 17th of July 1857), 520.
137. Sir Hugh Rose, He came from a line of politicians and diplomats, but was
138. commissioned into the 92nd Highlanders in 1821. On the outbreak of the Mutiny
139. he volunteered for service and was appointed to the Poona division. His campaign
140. had done was to destroy the organised rebel armies and to occupy their bases.
141. ROBSON, Brian (Edit.). (2000), Sir Hugh Rose and the Central India
142. Campaign, 1858, published by Alan Sutton for the Army Records Society, Stroud, p.20.
143. PRO 30/12/22, Letter / Calcutta, 22 September 1857, Mackey~Co.
144. PRO 30/12/22, The Indian Resolutions, Monday April 26 (The House of
145. Commons)-Resolutions to be proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on
146. the 30th of April, no: 11.
147. PRO 30/29/23/10, Granville Papers, p.609.
148. Bayly , C. A. (Christopher Alan). (1997), An Empire of Information: Political
149. Intelligence and Social Communication in North India, 1780-1880, Cambridge University
150. Press, p.97.