İMKANSIZ ÜÇLEME’DEN İMKANSIZ İKİLEM’E: BRETTON WOODS DÖNEMİ VE SONRASI PARA POLİTİKASI

Yıl 2016, , 115 - 136, 31.03.2016

Hasan Cömert

https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.309287

Cited By: 2

Öz

İmkansız üçleme kavramı
Bretton Woods (BW) sistemi para politikasını anlamak için yararlı olabilir. Ancak,
BW sistemi sırasında görece bağımsız para politikası uygulanabilmesine, sermaye
hareketleri üzerindeki kontrollerin yanı sıra merkez bankası araç çeşitliliği
ve yurt içi piyasaların kontrol altında tutulması da katkı sunmuştur. BW
sistemi sonrası dönemde sermaye hareketleri tamamen serbest bırakılırken finansal
piyasalardaki kurallar gevşetilmiştir. Var olan kurallar ise
kullanılmamıştır.Kısa dönem faiz oranları merkez bankalarının yegane aracı
olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. Sermaye hareketleri ve finansal piyasalar çok büyük
boyutlara ulaşırken merkez bankalarının sadece gecelik faizlerle temel
maktoekonomik değişkenleri etkileme kapasitesi özellikle gelişmekte olan
ülkelerde aşınmıştır. Bu süreç bir anlamda zamanla imkansız üçlemeden imkansız
ikilemeye geçiş olarak da düşünülebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Bretton Woods Sistemi, İmkansız Üçleme, İmkansız İkileme, Sermaye Hareketleri, Para Politikası

From Trilemma to Dilemma: Monetary Policy During and After The Bretton Woods System

Öz

Trilemma can be a useful concept to understand
monetary policy during the Bretton Woods (BW) regime. Under this regime, beside
capital controls, regulated domestic financial markets and diversity in central
bank instruments contributed to existence of independent monetary policy.
However, after the collapse of the BW system, capital controls were lifted,
domestic financial markets were deregulated, existing regulations were not
implemented properly and short-term interest rates became the sole instrument of
central banks. The size of financial flows and financial markets have reached
unprecedented levels. During this process, the ability of central banks in both
developed and developing countries has weakened. Especially in developing
countries, main macroeconomic indicators have become very sensitive to the
developments in the movements of financial flows. In this sense, we argue that
this process can be considered a gradual transition from trilemma to dilemma
especially in developing countries. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

Bretton Woods System, Trilemma, Dilemma, Capital Flows, Monetary Policy

Kaynakça

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