THE ORIGINAL INSTITUTIONALISM AS A SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMICS

Yıl 2019, , 591 - 610, 31.12.2019

Taner Akan

https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.466786

Öz

With the Great Recession of 2008-09, a
regulation-theoretic agenda, albeit ambigious, has come to the fore. In the
field of political economy, it is principally the original institutionalism
that bases its premises upon a constraint-theoretic regulation of economic
institutions. This paper, in this context, aims first to examine the
methodological and theoretical space of original institutionalism in the wider
discipline of political economy with particular reference to its points of
divergence from the new and rational choice institutionalism, and then to
investigate its rudiments in terms of the systemic interactions between the
building blocks of a politico-economic regime ranging from norm-contingent
economic development to business cycles and innovation.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Original/old/historical institutionalism, political economy

BİR POLİTİK İKTİSAT OKULU OLARAK ORİJİNAL KURUMSALCILIK

Öz

2008-09 Büyük
Resesyonu” ile birlikte devlet-piyasa ilişkilerinin kamu kesimi tarafından
uygulanacak kısıtlarla düzenlenmesinin gerekliliğini vurgulayan teorik ve
pratik bir gündem önplana çıkmıştır. Politik iktisat yazınında iktisadi
kurumların kısıt (constraint)
merkezli kamusal regülasyonunu formüle eden ana akım orjinal tarihselci
okuldur. Bu çalışma, bu anlamda, iki temel amacı gerçekleştirmeyi
hedeflemektedir. Birincisi orijinal tarihsel kurumsalcı okulun politik iktisat
okulları içerisindeki metodolojik ve teorik önemini yeni ve rasyonel tercih
kurumsalcılıklarından farklılılaşan yönlerini önplana çıkaran bir yaklaşımla
incelemektir. İkincisi ise orijinal kurumsalcı okulun temel politika
önermelerini norm-koşullu iktisadi kalkınmadan iş çevrimleri ve inovasyona
kadar uzanan bir kapsamda ve bir ekonomi politik yapının temel bileşenleri
arasındaki sistemik etkileşimler temelinde analiz etmektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Orijinal/eski/tarihsel kurumsalcılık, politik iktisat, yeni kurumsalcılık

Kaynakça

• Alston, L.J., B. Mueller (2008), ‘Property Rights and the State’, in Claude Menard and Mary M. Shirley (eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlin: Springer, 573-590.
• Arthur, B.W. (1994), Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Michigan: Michigan University Press.
• Ayres, C.E. (1962), The Theory of Economic Progress: A Study of the Fundamentals of Economic Development and Cultural Change, New York: Schocken Books.
• Banathy, B.H. (1996), Designing Social Systems in a Changing World, New York: Plenum Press.
• Buiter, W. (2009), ‘Establishing a New Macro-Economic Policy Regime’, in Anton Hemerijck, Ben Knapen, and Ellen van Doorne (eds.), After Shocks: Economic Crisis and Institutional Choice, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 122-132.
• Burlamaqui, L. (2000), ‘Evolutionary Economics and the Economic Role of the State’, in Leonardo Burlamaqui, Ana Celia Castro and Ha-Joon Chang (eds.), Institutions and the Role of the state, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 27-52.
• Commons, J.R. (1970[1950), The Economics of Collective Action, Madison: The University of Wisconsin University Press.
• Commons, J.R. (1959), Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
• Durkheim, E. (1994 [1893]), The Division of Labour in Society, Houndsmills: MacMillan.
• Fiorina, M. (1995), ‘Rational Choice and the New (?) Institutionalism’, Polity, 28(1), 107-115.
• Hall, P., C.R. Taylor (1996), ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Science, 44(5), 936-957.
• Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2004), The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism, London: Routledge.
• Jevons, Stanley (2005 [1888]), The Theory of Political Economy, Liberty Fund, http://oll.liberty fund.org/EBooks/Jevons0237.pdf.
• Kasper, W., Streit, Manfred E. (1998), Institutional Economics: Social Order and Public Policy, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.
• Keynes, J.M. (1964[1936]), General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, XIX, London: H.Hamilton.
• Knight, J. (2001), ‘Explaning the Rise of Neoliberalism: The Mechanisms of Institutional Change’, in John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen (eds.), The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 27-50.
• Lowndess, V. (1996), ‘Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical Appraisal’, Public Administration, 74, 181-197.
• Lucas, R. (1990), ‘Review of Trade Policy and Market Structure by E. Helpman and P. Krugman’, Journal of Political Economy, 98(3), 664-67.
• Marx, K. (2018 [1867]), Capital: The Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, Champaing: Modern Barbarian Press.
• Metcalfe, J. Stanley (2007), ‘Instituted Economic Processes, Increasing Returns and Endogenous Growth’, in Geoffrey M. Hodgson (ed.), The Evolution of Economic Institutions: A Critical Reader, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 98-119.
• Mill, J.S. [2004 (1848),] Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishin Company
• Mitchell, W.C. (1971[1941]), Business Cycles and Their Causes, Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Mitchell, W.C. (1969), Types of Economic Theory: From Mercantalism to Institutionalism, Volume II, New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers.
• North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: CUP.
• North, D. (2010), Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Peach, J.T. (1988), ‘Distribution and Economic Progress’, in Marc T. Tool (ed.), Evolutionary Economics: Institutional Theory and Policy, Volume II, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 77-112.
• Peters, G.B. (1999), Institutional Theory in Political Science, London: Pinter
• Pierson, P. (2004), Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Pierson, P., T. Skocpol (2002), ‘Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science’, In Katznelson I, Milner HV (eds.), Political Science: State of the Discipline, New York: W.W. Norton, 693-721.
• Ricardo, D. (2001 [1817]) On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Kitchener: Batoche Books.
• Rutherford, M. (1994), Institutions in Economics: The Old and New Institutionalism, Cambridge: CUP.
• Sanders, E. (2006), ‘Historical Institutionalism’, in James G. March and Johann P. Olsen Ulson, Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford: OUP, pp. 39-55.
• Scott, W.R., J.W. Meyer (1994), Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism, London: Sage.
• Smith, A. (1976 [1776]), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Volume I and II, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Sockice, D., P. Hall (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Steinmo, S. (2010), The Evolution of Modern States: Sweden, Japan, and the United States, Cambridge: CUP.
• Steinmo, S., K. Thelen (1992), ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, in Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen, and Longstreth, F. (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, Cambridge: CUP, 1-32.
• Stevenson, R.E. (1988), ‘Institutional Economics and the Theory of Production’, in in Evolutionary Economics: Institutional Theory and Policy, Marc T. Tool (ed.), Volume II, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 53-76.
• Stiglitz, J.E. (2010), ‘The Financial Crisis of 2007-8 and Its Macroeconomic Consequences’, in Stephany Griffith-Jones, Jose Antonio Ocampo, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Time for a Visible Hand, Oxford: OUP, 19-49.
• Streeck, W. (2009), Re-forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in German Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Streeck, W., K. Thelen (2005), ‘Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies’, Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Capitalism, Oxford: OUP, 1-39.
• Thelen, K. (1999), ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 369-404.
• Veblen, T. (1912 [1899] ), The Theory of Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, New York: The Macmillan Company.
• Veblen, T. (1909), ‘Fisher’s Rate of Interest’, Political Science Quarterly, 24(2): 296-303.
• Vogel, S.K. (2005), ‘Routine Adjustment and Bounded Rationality: The Changing Political Economy of Japan’, in Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 145-68.
• Wallerstein, Immanuel (2004), World Systems Analysis: An Introduction, Durham: Duke University Press.
• Williams, M. (2010), ‘Governing the Global Regulatory System’, in Stephany Griffith-Jones, Jose Antonio Ocampo, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Time for a Visible Hand, Oxford: OUP, 200-218.
• Williamson, O.E. (1979), ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’, Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233-261.
• Williamson, O.E. (2000), ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’, Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), 595-613.
• Wright, E.O.,‎ J. Rogers (2011), American Society: How It Really Works, New York: W W Norton & Company Incorporated.