AUDIT FIRM ROTATION AND AUDIT QUALITY

Yıl 2019, , 703 - 719, 31.12.2019

Koray Tuan

https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.481665

Cited By: 2

Öz

The
debates on the effect of independent audit rotation on audit quality can be considered
as two sides of a coin. On the one side, the idea that auditor rotation would
increase audit quality as it would strengthen auditor independence; on the
other side, the idea that auditor rotation can lead to loss of client and
sectoral-specific knowledge and the quality of audit would decrease. In this
context, the aim of the study is to investigate whether rotation practice in
independent audit affects the audit quality. For this purpose, 1230 firm-year
data obtained from non-financial companies quoted at the Borsa Istanbul between
the years of 2010-2017 are tested with regression analysis. The amount of
abnormal working capital accruals are used as a proxy for audit quality. The
results of the study indicate that there is no statistically significant
association between audit rotation practice and independent audit quality. In
other words, the results of the research do not provide any evidence to support
the idea that the quality of audit may improve after audit firm rotation

Anahtar Kelimeler

Independent audit, rotation, audit quality

BAĞIMSIZ DENETİMDE ROTASYON DENETİM KALİTESİNİ NASIL ETKİLER?

Öz

Bağımsız denetimde rotasyon uygulamasının denetim
kalitesine etkisi üzerine yürütülen tartışmalar bir metal paranın iki yüzüne
benzetilebilir. Bir tarafta, denetçi rotasyonunun denetçinin bağımsızlığını
güçlendireceği ve denetim kalitesinin artacağı düşüncesi; diğer tarafta ise,
denetçi rotasyonu neticesinde denetçinin işletmeye ve sektöre özgü birikmiş
denetim bilgisini kaybedeceği ve denetim kalitesinin düşeceği düşüncesi yer
almaktadır. Bu çerçevede çalışmanın amacı, bağımsız denetimde rotasyon
uygulamasının denetim kalitesini nasıl etkilediğinin araştırılmasıdır. Bu amaç
doğrultusunda, 2010-2017 yılları arasında Borsa İstanbul’da işlem gören
finansal olmayan kuruluşlardan elde edilen 1230 şirket-yıl verisi regresyon
modeli ile analiz edilmiştir. Bağımsız denetim kalitesinin ölçülmesinde anormal
işletme sermayesi tahakkuklarından yararlanılmıştır. Araştırma sonuçları,
denetimde rotasyon uygulaması ile bağımsız denetim kalitesi arasında
istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir ilişki olmadığını göstermektedir. Denetim
rotasyonu ile ilgili olarak, farklı ülke uygulamalarının incelenmesinin
düzenleyici otoritelere yararlı bilgiler sağlayacağı düşünülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Bağımsız denetim, Denetim kalitesi

Kaynakça

• Balsam, S., J. Krishnan, J.S. Yang (2003), “Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 22(2), 71-97.
• BDS 200, Bağımsız Denetim Yönetmeliği (2012), Resmi Gazete Sayısı: 28509, 26.12.2012, http://www.kgk.gov.tr/, E.T.: 08.09.2018.
• Bell, T.B., M. Causholli, W.R. Knechel (2015), “Audit Firm Tenure, Non-Audit Services and Internal Assessments of Audit Quality”, Journal of Accounting Research, 53(3), 461-509.
• Brown, R.E. (2005), “Enron/Andersen: Crisis in U.S. Accounting and Lessons for Government”, Public Budgeting & Finance, 25(3), 20-32.
• Cameran, M., A. Prencipe, M. Trombetta (2016), “Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality”, European Accounting Review, 25(1), 35-58.
• Carcello, J.V., A.L. Nagy (2004), “Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting”, Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory, 23(2), 55-69.
• Carey, P., R. Simnett (2006), “Audit Partner Tenure and Audit Quality”, The Accounting Review, 81(3), 653-676.
• Chen, C., C. Lin, Y. Lin (2008), “Audit Partner Tenure, Audit Firm Tenure, and Discretionary Accruals: Does Long Auditor Tenure Impair Earnings Quality?”, Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(2), 415-445.
• Corbella, S., C. Florioa, G. Gotti, S.A. Mastrolia (2015), “Audit Firm Rotation, Audit Fees and Audit Quality: The Experience of Italian Public Companies”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 25, 46-66.
• Dang, L. (2004), “Assessing Actual Audit Quality”, Ph.D. Thesis, Drexel University, Philadelphia, USA.
• DeAngelo, L.E. (1981), “Auditor Independence, ‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3(August), 113-127.
• DeAngelo, L.E. (1986), “Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders”, The Accounting Review, 61(3), 400-420.
• DeBoskey, D.G., W. Jiang (2012), “Earnings Management and Auditor Specialization in The Post-Sox Era: An Examination of the Banking Industry”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 36, 613-623.
• Dechow, P., R. Sloan, A. Sweeney (1995), “Detecting Earnings Management”, The Accounting Review, 70(2), 193-225.
• DeFond, M.L., C.W. Park (2001), “The Reversal of Abnormal Accruals and the Market Valuation of Earnings Suprises”, The Accounting Review, 76(3), 375-404.
• DeFond, M.L., C.W. Park (2001), “The Reversal of Abnormal Accruals and the Market Valuation of Earnings Suprises”, The Accounting Review, 76(3), 375-404. DeFond, M.L., J.R. Francis (2005), “Audit Research after Sarbanes-Oxley”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 24(1), 5-30.
• Doğan, A. (2016), “Bağımsız Denetimde Zorunlu Rotasyon”, Muhasebe ve Denetim Dünyası, 28(1), 113-135.
• European Commission, EC. (2014), Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0537, E.T.: 08.09.2018.
• Fama, E.F., K.R. French (1992), “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns”, The Journal of Finance, 47(2), 427-465.
• Firth, M., O. M. Rui, X. Wu (2012), “How Do Various Forms of Auditor Rotation Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from China”, The International Journal of Accounting, 47(1), 109-138.
• Fitriany, U.S., D. Martani, H. Rossieta (2009), “Do Mandatory Audit Firm and Audit Partner Rotation Really Improve Audit Quality? Comparison Between Pre and Post Regulation Period in Indonesia”, The 12th Asian Academic Accounting Association, 8-12 October 2011, Bali-Indonesia.
• Geiger, M.A., K. Raghunandan (2002), “Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures”, Auditing:A Journal of Practice & Theory, 21(1), 67-78.
• Ghosh, A., D. Moon (2005), “Auditor Tenure and Perceptions of Audit Quality”, The Accounting Review, 80(2), 585-612.
• Gönen, S., M. Rasgen (2016), “Bağımsız Denetimde Zorunlu Denetçi Rotasyonu”, İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi, 5(7), 1809-1822.
• Healy, P. (1985), “The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions”, Journal of Accounting & Economics, 7(1-3), 85-107.
• Gujarati, D.N. (2004), “Basic Econometrics (4th ed.)”, USA, New York: McGraw Hill.
• Jackson, A.B., M. Moldrich, P. Roebuck (2008), “Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality”, Managerial Auditing Journal, 23(5), 420-437.
• Johnson, E., I.K. Khurana, J.K. Reynolds (2002), “Audit-Firm Tenure and the Quality of Financial Reports”, Contemporary Accounting Research, 19(4), 637-660.
• Jones, J. (1991), “Earnings Management during Important Relief Investigations”, Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 193-228.
• Kim, H., H. Lee, J.E. Lee (2015), “Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality”, Journal of Applied Business Research, 31(3), 1089-1106.
• Kwon, S.Y., Y. Lim, R. Simnett (2014), “The Effect of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation on Audit Quality and Audit Fees: Empirical Evidence from the Korean Audit Market”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 33, 167-195.
• Lennox, C.S., X. Wu, T. Zhang (2014), “Does Mandatory Rotation of Audit Partners Improve Audit Quality?”, The Accounting Review, 89, 1775-1803.
• Mohammed, D., M. Habib (2013), “Auditor Independence, Audit Quality and the Mandatory Auditor Rotation in Egypt”, Education, Business and Society: Contemporary Middle Eastern Issues, 6(2), 116-144.
• Myers, J.N., L.A. Myers, T.C. Omer (2003), “Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings”, The Accounting Review, 78, 779-799.
• Nagy, A. (2005), “Mandatory Audit Firm Turnover, Financial Reporting Quality, and Client Bargaining Power: The Case of Arthur Andersen”, Accounting Horizons, 19(2), 51-68.
• Postma, E. (2016), “The Effects of Audit Firm Rotation on Audit Quality: Does Audit Firm Rotation Improve Audit Quality?”, Master Thesis, MSc in Business Administration - Financial Management, Universiteit Twente.
• Ruiz-Barbadillo, E., N. Gomez-Aguilar, N. Carrera (2009), “Does Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Enhance Auditor Independence? Evidence from Spain”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 28(1), 113-135.
• Salama, M.D. (2017), “The Effect of Mandatory Audit Rotation on the Audit Quality: Evidence from Indonesia”, Master Thesis, Radboud University.
• Salleh, K., H. Jasmani (2014), “Audit Rotation and Audit Report: Empirical Evidence from Malaysian PLCs over the Period of Ten Years, Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences, 145, 40-50.
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX. (2002), Public Law 107-204, H.R. 3763, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-107publ204/pdf/PLAW-107publ204.pdf, E.T.: 08.09.2018.
• Sayyar, H., R. Basiruddin, R.S.Z. Abdul, L. Sayyar (2014), “Mandatory Audit Firm and Audit Partner Rotation”, European Journal of Business and Management, 6(26), 352-389. Şavlı, T. (2016), “Türkiye’de Bağımsız Denetimde Rotasyon: Düzenlemeler, Uygulamalar ve Öneriler”, Mali Çözüm Dergisi, 134, 37-57.
• Şenyiğit, Y.B., E. Zeytinoğlu (2014), “Zorunlu Denetçi Rotasyonunun Denetim Kalitesi Üzerindeki Etkileri”, İstanbul Üniversitesi İşletme Fakültesi İşletme İktisadı Enstitüsü Yönetim Dergisi, 25(77), 79-98.
• Stakebrand, B. (2016), “Auditor Rotation and Audit Quality in Europe”, Master Thesis, Department of Economics, Radboud University.
• Swart, A.J.F. (2012), “How Does Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from Australia”, Master Thesis, Department Accountancy Faculty of Economics and Business Studies, Tilburg University.
• Vanstraelen, A. (2000), “Impact of Renewable Long-term Audit Mandates on Audit Quality”, The European Accounting Review, 9(3), 419-442.
• Velte, P., M. Stiglbauer (2012), “Impact of Auditor and Audit Firm Rotation on Accounting and Audit Quality: A Critical Analysis of the EC Regulation Draft”, Journal of Governance and Regulation, 1(3), 7-13.