BİLGİ EKONOMİSİNDE KAVRAMLAR, KURUMLAR VE POLİTİKALAR: OYUN TEORİSİ TEMELLİ BİR YAKLAŞIM

Yıl 2021, , 663 - 676, 29.12.2021

Erkan Gürpınar

https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.880553

Cited By: 1

Öz

Bu makalede bilgi ekonomisini oluşturan aktörler ve kurumlar arasındaki ilişkiler oyun teorisi kullanılarak incelenmektedir. Böylelikle hem bilgi ekonomisini oluşturan üniversiteler, firmalar, bireysel girişimciler, bilgi işçileri ve bilim insanları arasındaki koordinasyon ve çıkar çatışmaları analiz edilmekte hem de yeni bilgi üretimi biçimlerine ilişkin eşgüdüm ve iş birliği sorunları incelenmektedir. Günümüzde, bilgi ekonomisine ilişkin tartışmalar bilginin büyük ölçekli kodifikasyonu ve fikri mülkiyetine dayalı teknolojileri (büyük veri, YZ, nesnelerin interneti vb.) içermektedir. Bu bağlamda veri-bilgi arasındaki fark ve bu farkın üretim organizasyonu üzerindeki etkileri yeni üretim biçimlerinin anlaşılması için önemlidir. Makale, bu gelişmelerin hem bilgi işçileri hem de yeni üretim biçimleri açısından önemli etkileri olacağını ve bilgi işçilerinin öneminin artmasının kurumsal yapı ile doğrudan ilişkili olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

veri, bilgi, örtük bilgi, oyun teorisi, fikri mülkiyet hakları

CONCEPTS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH

Öz

This article examines the relationship between actors and institutions in the knowledge economy using game theory. By this way, both coordination and conflict between universities, firms, individual entrepreneurs, knowledge workers and scientists that form the knowledge economy, and cooperation regarding new forms of knowledge production are analyzed. Today, discussions regarding the knowledge economy include large-scale codification of information, and technologies based on intellectual property rights (big data, AI, internet of things etc.). In this context, the difference between data and information and the effects of this demarcation on the organization of production are crucial for understanding new forms of production. The article shows that these developments have important effects on both knowledge workers and new modes of production, and argue that increase in the importance of knowledge workers is directly related to the institutional environment.

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