NEW HORIZONS IN VOTER BEHAVIOR RESEARCH AND 2023 GENERAL ELECTION; STRATEGIC VOTER VERSUS SINCERE VOTER

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 3 Sayı: 3, 255 - 270, 01.09.2023

Necmettin Mutlu

Öz

For the healthy functioning of the electoral ecosystem, the voting behavior should be made sense. For this reason, the determination of the factors affecting voter behavior at the level of the individual and the system has been a matter of debate in political science for a long time. In this study; Unlike the dominant voter behavior studies in Turkey, In the presidential government system, in the elections to be held simultaneously in 2023, to the voters, the focus is on the predictions that will be made with the assumption that it will be affected by strategic and sincere voting. Since the researches in the international literature give important clues at the system and voter level, the study is limited to the content analysis of the literature. In the analysis, the comparisons of strategic voters and sincere voters and research on voting systems were examined under two main headings. As a result, the presidential government system is discussed in the context of the relationship between electoral alliance, electoral threshold, strategic and sincere voter characteristics and the electoral system. It was evaluated that in the new system, the mainstream assumptions about voter behavior would change and new research models should be designed.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Strategic Voting, Sincere Voting, Voting Systems, Voting Behavior, Presidential Government System.

SEÇMEN DAVRANIŞI ARAŞTIRMALARINDA YENİ UFUKLAR VE 2023 GENEL SEÇİMİ; STRATEJİK SEÇMEN VERSUS SAMİMİ SEÇMEN

Öz

Siyasal sistemlerin ve seçim ekosisteminin sağlıklı işleyişi için oylama davranışının anlamlandırılması kaçınılmazdır. Bunun için seçmen davranışına etki eden faktörlerin birey ve sistem düzeyinde tespiti siyaset biliminin uzunca bir süredir tartışma konusudur. Bu çalışmada; hâkim seçmen davranışı araştırmalarından farklı olarak, Cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sisteminde eş zamanlı yapılacak seçimde seçmenin göstereceği muhtemel çoğunlukçu ve çoğulcu eğilimlerin, stratejik ve samimi oylama çerçevesinde etkileneceği kabulünden yola çıkılarak yapılacak öngörülere odaklanılmıştır. Stratejik ve samimi seçmen davranışı üzerine yürütülen uluslararası yazındaki araştırmalar sistem ve seçmen düzeyinde önemli ipuçları verdiğinden çalışma alan yazınına dair içerik analizi ile sınırlandırılmıştır. Yürütülen analizde iki ana başlık belirlenmiş, stratejik seçmen ve samimi seçmen karşılaştırmaları ve farklı oylama sistemlerinde yapılan araştırmalar incelenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda parlamento ve başkanlık için oy verme davranışı korelasyonları, sistem değişikliği sonrası kurulan siyasi partiler ve kararsız seçmenler üzerine ilgili yazında varılan sonuçlara odaklanılmıştır. Sonuç olarak Cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sisteminde yapılacak milletvekilliği genel seçimi ve cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimini etkilemesi muhtemel faktörler seçim ittifakı, seçim barajı, stratejik- samimi seçmen özellikleri ile seçim sistemi ile olan ilişkisi bağlamında tartışılmıştır. Yeni sistemde seçmen davranışına dair ana akım varsayımların değişeceği ve yeni araştırma modellerinin tasarlanması gerektiği değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Stratejik Oy Verme, Samimi Oy Verme, Oylama Sistemleri, Oylama Davranışı, Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemi.

Kaynakça

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