Vietnam’s Policy over South China Sea: Potential for Conflict Escalation?

Öz

The South China Sea dispute is a major foreign policy issue for Vietnam with regard to its security and economic interests as well as its relations with other regional and major powers. Vietnam’s policy over the SCS creates significant implications for regional stability as Vietnam engages with China and the US. In recent years, it tends to move towards diversification of its diplomatic and military options with other non-claimant states such as Japan, India and Russia. These diversification attempts are also strongly associated with energy security matters. This article argues that potential risk for conflict escalation in the SCS is growing not only because of China’s growing influence in the region but also because of its increasing energy security concerns. In this regard, Vietnam’s concerns over security interests, but particularly energy security concerns, set limits for Vietnam-China cooperation. Thus, the newly adopted energy policy orientation presents potential risks for the future relations between the two countries. It is suggested that there is an urgent need to take certain actions to prevent potential conflict escalation in the SCS in the coming years. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Vietnam
• South China Sea
• China
• the United States
• policy diversification
• energy security
• conflict escalation

Vietnam’ın Güney Çin Denizi Politikası: Çatışma Tırmanma Potansiyeli

Öz

Güney Çin Denizi, Vietnam’ın güvenlik ve ekonomik çıkarları ile bölgesel ve büyük güçlerle ilişkileri açısından en önemli dış politika sorunudur. Çin ve ABD ile geliştirdiği ilişkilere bağlı olarak şekillenen Güney Çin Denizi politikası bölgesel istikrar üzerinde önemli etkiler doğurmaktadır. Son yıllarda Vietnam’ın bu politikası Güney Çin Denizi’nde hak iddiasında bulunmayan Japonya, Hindistan ve Rusya gibi devletlerle diplomatik ve askeri tercihlerinin çeşitlendirilmesi istikametinde ilerlemektedir. Bu politika çeşitlendirme çabaları aynı zamanda enerji güvenliği meseleleriyle yakından ilişkilidir. Bu makale çatışma tırmanmasına yönelik potansiyel riskin sadece Çin’in bölgede artan etkinliği sebebiyle değil aynı zamanda Vietnam’ın artan enerji güvenliği kaygıları nedeniyle büyüdüğünü iddia etmektedir. Vietnam’ın güvenlik çıkarlarına dönük kaygıları, ama özellikle enerji güvenliği kaygıları, Vietnam-Çin işbirliğini sınırlandırmaktadır. Dolayısıyla Vietnam’ın son yıllarda izlediği enerji politikaları yönelimi iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin geleceği açısından ciddi potansiyel risk oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda önümüzdeki yıllarda Güney Çin Denizi’nde ortaya çıkması muhtemel çatışma tırmanmasını önlemek için acilen gerekli adımların atılması önerilmiştir. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Vietnam
• Güney Çin Denizi
• Çin
• ABD
• politika çeşitlendirilmesi
• enerji güvenliği
• çatışma tırmanması

Kaynakça

1. Allen, K., Saunders, P. C. & Chen J. (2017), Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003-2016: Trends and Implications, Washington.
2. Anh, N. T. L. (2016), “The South China Sea Award: Legal Implications for Vietnam”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume. 38, Issue: 3, p. 369-374.
3. ASEAN, “ASEAN Leaders’ Vision Statement on a Cohesive and Responsive ASEAN: Rising Above Challenges and Sustainable Growth”, 26 June 2020.
4. “China and Vietnam in Stand-off over Chinese Survey Ship Mission to Disputed Reef in South China Sea”, South China Morning Post, 12 July 2019.
5. Do, T. T., (2017), “’Firm in Principles, Flexible in Strategy and Tactics’: Understanding the Logic of Vietnam’s China Policy”, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Volume: 2, Issue: 1, p. 24-39.
6. “Exclusive: Vietnam Moves New Rocket Launchers into Disputed South China Sea”, Reuters, 10 August 2016.
7. “Exclusive: As Rosneft’s Vietnam Unit Drills in Disputed Area of South China Sea, Beijing Issues Warning”, Reuters, 17 May 2018.
8. Goh, E. (2016), “Southeast Asian Strategies toward the Great Powers: Still Hedging after All These Years?”, Asan Forum, Volume: 4, Issues: 1, p. 18-37.

9. Grossman, D. (2018), “Can Vietnam’s Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?”, Asia Policy, Volume: 25, Issues: 1, p. 113-134.
10. Grossman, D. “What Does Vietnam Think About America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy?”, The Diplomat, 5 August 2020.
11. Hai, T. D. (2021), “Vietnam and China: Ideological Bedfellows, Strange Dreamers”, Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies, Volume: 10.
12. Hiep, L. H. “Secretary Pompeo’s Visit to Hanoi: What to Expect”, The Diplomat, 29 October 2020.
13. Hoang, V. “The Code of Conduct for the South China Sea: A Long and Bumby Road”, The Diplomat, 28 Sptember 2020.
14. “Japan, Vietnam Agree to Boost Defense Ties, Resume Flights”, Associated Press, 19 October 2020.
15. “India, Vietnam to Raise Ties in Defense Industry and Technology”, The Hindu, 1 July 2021.
16. “India Joins Hands with NZ, Vietnam, S. Korea to Combat Pandemic”, The Times of India, 21 March 2020.
17. “India Will Stand Firm on Oil and Gas Cooperation with Vietnam: Experts”, VnExpress, 24 October 2019.
18. India Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “India-Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People”, 21 December 2020.
19. International Crisis Group Report, “Competing Visions of International Order in the South China Sea”, 29 November 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/315-competing-visions-international-order-south-china-sea
20. International Crisis Group Report, “Vietnam Tacks Between Cooperation and and Struggle in the South China Sea”, 7 December 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/318-vietnam-tacks-between-cooperation-and-struggle-south-china-sea
21. Japan Ministry of Defence, “Japan-Vietnam Joint Statement ton the Establishment of Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia”, 18 March 2014.
22. Kuik, C. (2016), “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States’ Alignment Behavior towards China”, Journal of Contemporary China, Volume: 25, Issue: 100, p. 1-15.
23. Landler, M. “Offerinf to Aid Talk, US Challenges China on Disputed Islands”, New York Times, 23 July 2010.
24. Path, K. (2018), “The Duality of Vietnam’s Deference and Resistance to China”, Diplomacy&Statecraft, Volume: 29, Issue: 3, p. 499-521.
25. PetroVietnam, “2019 Annual Business Report”, January 2020.
26. Richardson, M. (2008), “A Southward Thrust for China’s Energy Diplomacy in the South China Sea”, China Brief, Volume: 8, Issue: 21. https://jamestown.org/program/a-southward-thrust-for-chinas-energy-diplomacy-in-the-south-china-sea/
27. Ross, R. S. (2020), “China-Vietnamese Relations in the Era of Rising China: Power, Resistance, and Maritime Conflict, Journal of Contemporary China, p. 613-629.
28. Shambaugh D. (2018), “US-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence?”, International Security, Volume: 42, Issue: 4, p. 85-127.
29. Thayer C. A. (2016), “Vietnam’s Strategy of ‘Cooeprating and Struggling’ with China over Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Volume: 3, Issue: 2, pp. 200-220.
30. Thayer C. A. “A Closer Look At the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct”, The Diplomat, 3 August 2018.
31. Tra, N. P. “Statement of Deputy Spokesperson of Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, 22 November 2018.
32. Tran, T. B. and Sato, Y. (2018), “Vietnam’s Post-Cold War Hedging Strategy: A Changing Mix of Realist and Liberal Ingredients”, Asian Politics and Policy, Volume: 10, Issue: 1, 2018, p. 73-99.
33. SIPRI (The Stocholm International Peace Research Institute), “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019”, March 2020.
34. Treglode B. (2016), “Maritime Boundary Delimitation and Sino-Vietnamese Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin (1994-2016)”, China Perspectives, Issue: 3.
35. Tüter, M. (2019), “China’s Infrastructure Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Explaining Asymmetric Bargaining with Four ASEAN Countries”, International Journal of Political Studies, Volume: 5, Issue: 2, p. 60.75.
36. “Vietnam Agrees $348 Million Japan Loan to Build Six Patrol Vessels”, Reuters, 28 July 2020.
37. Vietnam Ministry of Defence, “Vietnam National Defence White Paper 2019”.
38. “Vietnam PM Commemorates Marines Died in Gac Ma Battle”, Hanoi Times, 14 March 2022. https://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-pm-commemorates-marines-died-in-gac-ma-battle-320219.html
39. “Vietnam’s Strategy for Sustainable Development of Marine Economy”, Vietnamplus, 22 October 2018.
40. UN Document A/70/944, “Annex to the Letter Dated 13 June 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Vietnam to the United Nations adressed to the Secretary-General”, 13 June 2016.
41. White House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance”, March 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf
42. Womack, B. (2006), China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry, Cambridge University Press, New York.
43. Yen, P. T. (2020), “Strategic Use of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam’s External Relations with Major Powers”, Strategic Analysis.
44. Yılmaz Ş. and Liu, F. (2019), “The Evolving Geopolitical Landscape in the Post-Arbitration South China Sea”, Pacific Focus, Issue: 3, p. 317-344.
45. Zhou, F. (2016), “Between Assertiveness and Self-restraint: Understanding China’s South China Sea Policy”, International Affairs, Volume: 92, Issue: 4, p. 869-890.