The theorem presented in this paper implies the existence of cases where intransitive autonomous subunit preferences in a democratic federation lead to rational social preferences. Paradoxically, under the same conditions, autonomous subunits with transitive preferences could generate irrational social preferences.
Keywords : Individual Rationality Social Rationality Democracy Autonomy.
The theorem presented in this paper implies the existence of cases where intransitive autonomous subunit preferences in a democratic federation lead to rational social preferences. Paradoxically, under the same conditions, autonomous subunits with transitive preferences could generate irrational social preferences.
Keywords : Individual Rationality Social Rationality Democracy Autonomy.
| Birincil Dil | Türkçe |
|---|---|
| Bölüm | Makaleler |
| Yazarlar | |
| Yayımlanma Tarihi | 1 Haziran 2001 |
| Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2001 Cilt: 2 Sayı: 2 |