The Significance of Governance in Relationship to Economic Growth and Monetary Policy: An Analysis for Selected Countries

Yıl 2022, Cilt: 24 Sayı: 2, 453 - 473, 30.12.2022

Emin Efecan Aktaş

Öz

Institutionalization and its significance, which neoclassical economics has neglected for a while, have recently started to show themselves with the contributions of the institutional economics approach. Governance, an approach in which the public and private sectors, non-governmental organizations, and citizens interact with each other and participate in the decision-making processes, especially in the field of public economy, forms the basis of institutionalization. In this respect, the effect of monetary policy on economic growth has been investigated in the institutional framework for countries with different income levels in the study. Estimates made using the dynamic panel data method cover 35 high-income, 16 upper-middle-income, and 16 lower-middle-income countries and the period 2002-2020. Findings confirm that the effect of contractionary monetary policy on growth is negative in all country groups. On the other hand, it has been concluded that the effects of institutionalization are positive in high and upper-middle-income countries and the increase in institutional quality reduces the negative impact of contractionary monetary policy on growth. In terms of lower-middle-income countries, it has been deduced that the effects of institutionalization are statistically insignificant.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Economic growth, monetary policy, governance

Kurumsallaşmanın Ekonomik Büyüme Para Politikası İlişkisindeki Önemi: Seçili Ülkeler İçin Bir Analiz

Öz

Neoklasik iktisadın bir süredir ihmal ettiği kurumsallaşma ve önemi, son zamanlarda kurumsal iktisat yaklaşımının katkılarıyla kendini göstermeye başlamıştır. Kamu ve özel sektör ile sivil toplum kuruluşlarının ve vatandaşların birbirleriyle etkileşim içinde olduğu ve özellikle kamu ekonomisi alanında karar alma süreçlerine katıldığı bir yaklaşım olan yönetişim, kurumsallaşmanın temelini oluşturmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda çalışmada farklı gelir düzeyine sahip ülkeler için para politikasının ekonomik büyüme üzerindeki etkisi kurumsal çerçevede araştırılmıştır. Dinamik panel veri yöntemi kullanılarak yapılan tahminler, 35 yüksek gelirli, 16 üst orta gelirli ve 16 alt orta gelirli ülkeyi ve 2002-2020 dönemini kapsamaktadır. Bulgular, daraltıcı para politikasının büyüme üzerindeki etkisinin tüm ülke gruplarında negatif olduğunu teyit etmektedir. Öte yandan, yüksek ve üst orta gelirli ülkelerde kurumsallaşmanın etkilerinin olumlu olduğu ve kurumsal kalitedeki artışın daraltıcı para politikasının büyüme üzerindeki olumsuz etkisini azalttığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Alt orta gelirli ülkeler açısından ise kurumsallaşmanın etkilerinin istatistiksel olarak önemsiz olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Ekonomik büyüme, para politikası, kurumsallaşma, Economic growth, monetary policy, governance

Kaynakça

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