İRAN DESTEKLİ Şİİ MİLİSLERİN SURİYE İÇ SAVAŞINDAKİ ROLÜ

Öz

Mart 2011’de patlak veren Suriye iç savaşı, İran’ın bölgede nüfuzunu artırabilmesi için yeni bir alan yaratmıştır. 2012 yılı sonlarında muhaliflerin ülkenin büyük bölümünde elde ettikleri askeri kazanımları, Esad rejiminin devrilmenin eşiğine geldiğine ilişkin beklentilerin artmasına yol açmıştır. Ancak, beklenenin aksine, 2013 yılı rejimin ülkede yeniden kontrol kazanmaya başladığı bir yıl olmuştur. Çatışma dengelerindeki bu değişimde, İran’ın mezhepsel bir söylemle seferber ettiği Şii milisler kilit rol oynamıştır. Suriye’deki çatışmaya katılan İran destekli Şii milisler yalnızca Esad rejiminin bekasını sağlamakla kalmamış, ayrıca İran’ın Suriye’deki nüfuzunun uzun vadede sürdürülmesine hizmet etmeye başlamışlardır. Bu çalışma, Şii milis gruplar vasıtasıyla Suriye’de artan İran nüfuzunun ülkede kalıcı barış sağlanması ihtimalini zayıflatıcı bir etkiye yol açtığını ileri sürmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, çalışmanın ilk bölümünde, Tahran-Şam ilişkilerinin tarihsel geçmişi bağlamında İran’ın Suriye iç savaşına katılmasında rol oynayan temel dinamikler incelenmektedir. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü, Suriye’deki İran destekli Şii milisleri, Lübnanlı Hizbullah, Irak merkezli Şii milis gruplar, Afgan Fatimiyun Tugayı ve Pakistanlı Zeynebiyun Tugayı olmak üzere dört başlık altında ele almaktadır. Çalışmanın üçüncü ve son bölümünde, Şii milis gruplar vasıtasıyla Suriye’nin askeri, siyasi, ekonomik ve toplumsal düzeninde artan İran nüfuzunun ülkede kalıcı barışın tesis edilme ihtimali üzerindeki etkisi tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Suriye İç Savaşı
• İran
• Şii Seferberliği
• Milis Gruplar
• Lübnanlı Hizbullah

THE ROLE OF IRAN-BACKED SHIITE MILITIAS IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Öz

The Syrian civil war that erupted in March 2011 has created a new area for Iran to increase its influence in the region. At the end of 2012, the military gains of the opposition in most of the country led to increased expectations that the al-Assad regime was on the verge of being overthrown. However, contrary to expectations, 2013 was a year when the regime began to regain its control over the country. In this change in the balance of conflict, the Shiite militias mobilized by Iran with a sectarian discourse played a key role. Iran-backed Shiite militias involved in the Syrian conflict, not only ensured the survival of the regime, but also began to serve for the long-term continuation of Iranian influence in Syria. This study argues that increasing Iranian influence in Syria through the Shiite militia groups has a negative impact on the possibility of permanent peace in the country. Accordingly, the first part of the study analyzes the basic dynamics that play a role in Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil war within the context of the historical background of Tehran-Damascus relations. The second part of the study focuses on the Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Syria under four titles: Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq-based Shiite militia groups, Afghan Fatimiyoun Brigade and Pakistani Zainabiyoun Brigade. In the third and last part, the impact of increasing Iranian influence in Syria’s military, political, economic and social order through the Shiite militia groups on the possibility of permanent peace in the country is discussed.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Syrian Civil War
• Iran
• Shiite Mobilization
• Militia Groups
• Lebanese Hezbollah

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