EN
Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China
Abstract
Based on panel data of the listed companies in China’s stock market A during a period of year 2007-2010, we made an empirical study on what drives the investment cash flow sensitivity and the effect of management’s ownership and both their differences between the central state owned companies and the non-state owned companies as well. The sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow in China’s central state-owned companies can be explained by “hypothesis of free cash flow”. It is the cost of agency that causes over-investment behaviors, and the management’s ownership appears significant enhancement effect rather than entrenchment effect. However, the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow in China’s non-state owned companies supports the explanation of “hypothesis of financial constraints”. Asymmetrical information causes under-investment behaviors of the firms. In the mean while, the entrenchment effect of manages’ ownership dominates the enhancement effect in non-state owned companies.
Keywords
Ayrıntılar
Birincil Dil
İngilizce
Konular
-
Bölüm
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Yayımlanma Tarihi
1 Eylül 2014
Gönderilme Tarihi
1 Eylül 2014
Kabul Tarihi
-
Yayımlandığı Sayı
Yıl 2014 Cilt: 4 Sayı: 3
APA
Ding, Y., & Qian, X. (2014). Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 4(3), 449-456. https://izlik.org/JA58JH49EN
AMA
1.Ding Y, Qian X. Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China. IJEFI. 2014;4(3):449-456. https://izlik.org/JA58JH49EN
Chicago
Ding, Yuanyao, ve Xu Qian. 2014. “Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China”. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues 4 (3): 449-56. https://izlik.org/JA58JH49EN.
EndNote
Ding Y, Qian X (01 Eylül 2014) Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues 4 3 449–456.
IEEE
[1]Y. Ding ve X. Qian, “Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China”, IJEFI, c. 4, sy 3, ss. 449–456, Eyl. 2014, [çevrimiçi]. Erişim adresi: https://izlik.org/JA58JH49EN
ISNAD
Ding, Yuanyao - Qian, Xu. “Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China”. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues 4/3 (01 Eylül 2014): 449-456. https://izlik.org/JA58JH49EN.
JAMA
1.Ding Y, Qian X. Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China. IJEFI. 2014;4:449–456.
MLA
Ding, Yuanyao, ve Xu Qian. “Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China”. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, c. 4, sy 3, Eylül 2014, ss. 449-56, https://izlik.org/JA58JH49EN.
Vancouver
1.Yuanyao Ding, Xu Qian. Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Effect of Managers’ Ownership: Difference between Central Owned and Private Owned Companies in China. IJEFI [Internet]. 01 Eylül 2014;4(3):449-56. Erişim adresi: https://izlik.org/JA58JH49EN