YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ

Duygu Hıdıroğlu

EN

YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ

Öz

Birçok araştırmanın konusunun özellikle yüksek düzey yönetici ödenekleri ile ilgili yapılması ve akademi çevresinin genelde alt düzey yöneticilerden çok yüksek düzey yöneticilere odaklanmasının iki temel nedeni bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan birincisi; yüksek düzey yönetici ödeneklerinin veritabanın diğer yöneticilerin ödeneklerine oranla daha ulaşılabilir olması ve daha gerçekçi ve güncel verileri barındırmasıdır. Araştırmacıların yüksek düzey yöneticilere odaklanmasının ikinci temel nedeni ise; karar verici olarak bir firma da şirket sahibinden sonra en çok yüksek düzey yöneticilerin söz sahibi olmalarıdır. Dolayısıyla, yüksek düzey yönetici bir firmanın bütün kararları üzerinde en etkili kişidir. Çok bölümlü örgüt yapılarında yüksek düzey yöneticiler kendi endüstrilerindeki yatırım fırsatlarını araştırmak ve iş düzeyinde stratejiler geliştirmek gibi önemli sorumluluklara sahiptirler ve bu durum onların performanslarının şirket performansı ve başarısı üzerinde ne kadar etkili olduğunu kanıtlar niteliktedir. Bu çalışmada; yüksek düzey yönetici ödenek düzeyi ve yapısının başka bir deyişle, ücret ve teşvik sistemlerinin çok birimli firmaların performansı ile ilişkisi incelenmektedir. Ayrıca, çalışmada ödenekler kısa ve uzun vadeli olmak üzere sınıflandırılmıştır. Aktif karlılığı verileri çok birimli firma raporlarından alınarak elde edilen yüksek düzey yönetici ödenek bilgileri ile yapılan araştırmaların incelenmesinden sonra, yüksek düzey yöneticilere hisse bazında uzun vadeli ödenek ve teşviklerin sağlanması gerekliliği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Yüksek Düzey Yöneticiler, Ödenekler, CEO Ödenekleri, Ödenek Yapısı, Firma Performansı

Kaynakça

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Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil

İngilizce

Konular

İşletme

Bölüm

Konferans Bildirisi

Yazarlar

Duygu Hıdıroğlu ^*
0000-0003-2647-8750
Türkiye

Yayımlanma Tarihi

13 Kasım 2020

Gönderilme Tarihi

8 Temmuz 2020

Kabul Tarihi

16 Eylül 2020

Yayımlandığı Sayı

Yıl 2020 Cilt: 4 Sayı: Özel Sayı 1

IZ

https://izlik.org/JA98UZ29XG

APA

Hıdıroğlu, D. (2020). YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries, 4(Özel Sayı 1), 145-161. https://izlik.org/JA98UZ29XG

AMA

1.Hıdıroğlu D. YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries. 2020;4(Özel Sayı 1):145-161. https://izlik.org/JA98UZ29XG

Chicago

Hıdıroğlu, Duygu. 2020. “YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ”. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries 4 (Özel Sayı 1): 145-61. https://izlik.org/JA98UZ29XG.

EndNote

Hıdıroğlu D (01 Kasım 2020) YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries 4 Özel Sayı 1 145–161.

IEEE

[1]D. Hıdıroğlu, “YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ”, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries, c. 4, sy Özel Sayı 1, ss. 145–161, Kas. 2020, [çevrimiçi]. Erişim adresi: https://izlik.org/JA98UZ29XG

ISNAD

Hıdıroğlu, Duygu. “YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ”. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries 4/Özel Sayı 1 (01 Kasım 2020): 145-161. https://izlik.org/JA98UZ29XG.

JAMA

1.Hıdıroğlu D. YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries. 2020;4:145–161.

MLA

Hıdıroğlu, Duygu. “YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ”. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries, c. 4, sy Özel Sayı 1, Kasım 2020, ss. 145-61, https://izlik.org/JA98UZ29XG.

Vancouver

1.Duygu Hıdıroğlu. YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries [Internet]. 01 Kasım 2020;4(Özel Sayı 1):145-61. Erişim adresi: https://izlik.org/JA98UZ29XG

Öz

YÜKSEK DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ÖDENEKLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI İLİŞKİSİ

Öz

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kaynakça

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil

Konular

Bölüm

Yazarlar

Yayımlanma Tarihi

Gönderilme Tarihi

Kabul Tarihi

Yayımlandığı Sayı

IZ

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