ALACAK KARŞILIKLARININ FİNANSAL BİLGİ MANİPÜLASYONU AÇISINDAN İNCELENMESİ: İHTİYARİ TAHAKKUKLARIN TAHMİNİ İÇİN BİR MODEL ÖNERİSİ

Yıl 2023, , 420 - 444, 22.06.2023

Serdar Benligiray , Ahmet Onay

https://doi.org/10.17130/ijmeb.1266870

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, dönem içinde kaydedilen alacak karşılıklarının kazanç yönetimi için kullanılıp kullanılmadığını araştırmaktır. Muhasebe standartlarının, özellikle 2018 yılında TFRS 9’un yürürlüğe girmesiyle, yöneticilere sağladığı takdir alanını genişletmesi, alacak karşılıklarının araştırılmasının en önemli gerekçesidir. Bu çalışmada, kazanç yönetimi davranışlarını alacak karşılıkları üzerinden incelemek için ampirik literatüre yön veren ilk önemli araştırma olan McNichols & Wilson çalışmasında geliştirilen modeli referans alan modifiye bir model kurgulanmıştır. Çalışmada referans model ve modifiye model, panel veri analizinde havuzlanmış en küçük kareler ve sabit etkiler regresyon modelleriyle test edilmiştir. Modellerin çıktıları benzer ve her ikisi de anlamlı olmasına rağmen, modifiye modelin açıklayıcılık düzeyi daha yüksektir. Her iki modelin çıktısı, endeks dışı borsa şirketleri ve denetim raporunda olumlu görüş almayan şirketler için kazanç yönetimini ima eden değerlerin daha yüksek olduğuna işaret eder. Betimleyici analizler bu sonucu doğrulamaktadır. Bu çalışma, Borsa İstanbul özelinde kazanç yönetimini alacak karşılıkları üzerinden inceleyen ilk modelleme çalışmasıdır. Bu çalışmada sunulan model, alacak karşılıklarındaki aşırılıkları daha geniş çerçevede ele alan değişkenlerle araştıracak çalışmalara bir çerçeve oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kazanç yönetimi, Spesifik tahakkuklar, Alacak karşılık gideri, Panel veri analizi, Borsa İstanbul

Destekleyen Kurum

Eskişehir Teknik Üniversitesi

Proje Numarası

22ADP285 numaralı bilimsel araştırma projesi

Investigation of Bad Debt Provisions from the Perspective of Financial Information Manipulation: A Model Proposal for the Estimation of Discretionary Accruals

Öz

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether provisions for bad debts are used for earnings management. The main reason for investigating the provision for bad debts is the discretion provided to managers by accounting standards, especially with the adoption of TFRS 9 in 2018. In this study, a modified model was designed with reference to the McNichols & Wilson study, which is the first significant research that guides the empirical literature to investigate earnings management behavior through the provision for bad debts. The reference model and the modified model are tested using pooled ordinary least squares and fixed effects regression models in panel data analysis. Although the outputs of the models are similar and both are significant, the explanatory power of the modified model is higher. The output for both models marks higher values indicating earnings management for companies not listed in stock exchange indexes and those not receiving unqualified opinions in their audit reports. The descriptive analytics confirm this result. This study is the first modeling study that examines earnings management in terms of provisions for receivables in Borsa Istanbul. The model presented in this study forms a framework for future studies investigating excessive provisions with a broader range of variables.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Earnings management, Specific Accruals, Bad debt expense, Panel data analysis, Borsa Istanbul

Proje Numarası

22ADP285 numaralı bilimsel araştırma projesi

Kaynakça

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