AGENCY COSTS AND BOARD STRUCTURE: AN APPLICATION ON MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN BIST CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX

Yıl 2019, , 797 - 813, 01.10.2019

Aslı Yıkılmaz Erkol Turhan Korkmaz

https://doi.org/10.17130/ijmeb.2019355051

Öz

In this study, it is aimed to reveal the relationship between the agency cost and board structure of 18 manufacturing industry within the BİST corporate governance index firms between 2006 and 2016. Agency cost is represented with free cash flow and growth opportunity ratio, the board size, number of independent members and CEO duality are represented board structure. According to the empirical results, there is a negative relationship between the board size and agency costs, a positive relationship between the number of independent members and agency costs. However, there is no significant relationship between the CEO duality and the agency costs. The results revealed that the board structure has a significant impact on firms’ agency costs

Anahtar Kelimeler

Corporate Governance, Board Structure, Agency Cost

TEMSİL MALİYETLERİ VE YÖNETİM KURULU YAPISI: BIST KURUMSAL YÖNETİM ENDEKSİNDEKİ İMALAT SANAYİ FİRMALARI ÜZERİNE BİR UYGULAMA

Öz

Bu çalışmada BİST Kurumsal yönetim endeksinde yer alan 18 imalat sanayi firmasının 2006-2016 yılları arasındaki temsil maliyetleri ile yönetim kurulu yapısı arasındaki ilişkinin incelenmesi amaçlanmıştır. Temsil maliyetleri serbest nakit akımları ve büyüme fırsatları oranı ile temsil edilirken, yönetim kurulu büyüklüğü, bağımsız üye sayısı ve CEO ikiliği yönetim kurulu yapısına ilişkin değişkenler olarak belirlenmiştir. Ampirik sonuçlara göre yönetim kurulu büyüklüğü ile temsil maliyetleri arasında ters yönlü ilişki, bağımsız üye sayısı ile temsil maliyetleri arasına pozitif yönlü bir ilişki tespit edilmiştir. Ancak yönetim ve sahiplik ayrımını ifade eden CEO ikililiğiyle temsil maliyetleri arasında anlamlı bir ilişkiye rastlanmamıştır. Elde edilen sonuçlar yönetim kurulu yapısının temsil maliyetler üzerinde önemli bir etkiye sahip olduğunu ortaya koymuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kurumsal Yönetim, Yönetim Kurulu Yapısı, Temsil Maliyetleri

Kaynakça

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