Devlet ve Mükellef Etkileşimi: Vergisel Yaptırım ve Kolaylıkların Yarattığı Mükellef Tipleri

Öz

Bireylerin tüm iktisadi eylemlerinde olduğu gibi vergiye uyum ya da uyumsuzluğu da toplumsal, kültürel ve psikolojik faktörlerle örülmüştür. Özellikle çıkarılan vergi politikalarının her zaman niyetlenilmemiş sonuçları olabildiği/olabileceği düşüncesinden hareketle vergisel veya diğer faktörlerin vergi dünyasında nasıl bir etki yarattığı önem taşır. Formel bir kural olarak, vergisel yaptırımlar veya kolaylıklar (VYK) da mükellef davranışları üzerinde benzer etkiler yaratarak sistem içinde farklı mükellef tipleri ortaya çıkarır. Bu çerçevede çalışmada mükelleflerin vergi ödeme ya da ödememe eğilimlerini belirleyen faktörlerin vergiye uyum sürecini nasıl etkilediği ve sürecin sonucunda ortaya çıkan mükellef tipleri sınıflandırılmaya çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Vergi Uyumu
• Toplumsal Etkileşim
• Güven
• Güç
• Mükellef Tipleri
• Mali Sosyoloji

Interaction of Government and Taxpayer: Types of Taxpayers Created Through Tax Sanctions and Incentives

Öz

The purpose of this study is to define the taxpayer types that are existing through determining the effects of tax sanctions and incentives (TSI) on taxpayer behaviors that are bonded with trust and power relations in the interaction of the society. TSIs existing in the tax system are tax policies that are used to regulate the tax world. These policies have the potential to change the relations and social interactions between government and taxpayers along with the increase in tax revenues. While the interaction derived from “clash” between government and taxpayer renders dominance and power as a prominent factor, a collaborative interaction provides more trust. In this context, establish tax compliance, together with taxpayers being homo economicus, the perspective of a social human setting forth the interaction and relations with its social environment should be taken into account as well. It could be seen that voluntarily compliant taxpayer type emerging in a modern tax system is a consequence of tax authority’s policy choices relying on relations with trust. Theoretically, the effects of new rules that TSIs’ have brought into the tax world on taxpayer behaviors presents the existence of taxpayer types that are; compulsorily compliant, compliant, and voluntarily compliant. It has been determined that strategic and compliant taxpayer types have emerged by relying on relationships with trust, while compulsorily compliant taxpayer types have emerged by relying heavily on relationships of power.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Tax Compliance
• Social Interaction
• Trust
• Power
• Taxpayer Type
• Fiscal Sociology

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