The Dynamics of Internationalization for the China in the Context of New Gramscianism

Öz

The former Soviet Union lost the tug-of-war against the capitalist western hegemon United States of America as it got dissolved in 1991. The international system shifted dramatically from bipolarity to unipolarity for the benefit of the Pax Americana, and history was assumed to be ended in favor of it as clearly as indicated by Fukuyama in a brief account. In International Relations literature, it could be observed that there are many scholars like offensive neorealist John Mearsheimer who produced seminal studies drawing our attention on the pros and cons of rising power, China. Our main argument is to make elaborations on what Cox theoretically put forward, upon which our assumption is that China wants to achieve what the former Soviet Union failed by using different, but not surprising, methodology: Not the war of movement based on the complete material power by disregarding other configurations of power as the former Soviet Union insisted on during the Cold War between 1945 up until its break down, but the war of position to achieve counter-hegemony against the West is the strategy of China. For penetrating the idea, read Communist ideology, into the Western sphere of influence in the Third World, and on the globe in general, China put in motion the strategy of passive revolution via eco-soft power that is to be defined as an outward investment for attraction and persuasion through the material capacity to obtain consent (legitimacy).

Anahtar Kelimeler

• China
• New Gramshianism
• internationalisation

Kaynakça

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