Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

Yıl 2021, , 230 - 250, 01.10.2021

Ahmet Ateş , Anıl Erkan

https://doi.org/10.53451/ijps.900302

Cited By: 1

Öz

Since intelligence is an essential part of national security, a high volume of cooperation in this area is not expected. An assessment of the literature shows that there are several obstacles to intelligence cooperation. More precisely, states are reluctant to involve in intelligence cooperation because of trust factors and other factors such as bureaucratic culture and resistance, regime type, lack of normative motivation and shared identities. Even if they are compelled to cooperate, they prefer bilateral intelligence cooperation. However, due to the globalization of national security threats in the last two decades, intelligence organizations are currently obliged to cooperate multilaterally even though they do not prefer to do so. Multilateral intelligence cooperation within the European Union is a unique example of relatively successful multilateral intelligence cooperation. On the one hand, official European intelligence agencies INTCEN and Europol provide the legal framework of intelligence cooperation among the Union. On the other hand, informal channels such as the Club of Berne are also proven useful for the EU’s intelligence cooperation. We argue that the relative success of European intelligence cooperation derives from at least three factors. These are institutionalized demand for intelligence governance, the delegated authority of the members of the EU’s (epistemic) intelligence community, and its ability to set the national security agenda of the EU.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Intelligence, Global Governance, Cooperation, European Union

Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

Öz

İstihbarat ulusal güvenliğin önemli bir parçası olduğu için bu alanda yüksek hacimde bir işbirliği beklenmemektedir. Literatürün değerlendirmesi sonucunda istihbarat işbirliğinin önünde engeller olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Daha doğrusu, devletlerin güven faktörleri, bürokratik kültür ve direniş, rejim türü, normatif motivasyon ve ortak kimlik eksikliği gibi faktörler nedeniyle istihbarat alanında işbirliğine isteksiz olduğu belirlenmiştir. İşbirliği konusunda bir mecburiyet doğduğunda ise istihbarat işbirliğinin ikili çerçevede tercih edildiği görülmüştür. Son yirmi yılda ulusal güvenlik tehditlerinin küreselleşmesi nedeniyle, istihbarat örgütleri bunu tercih etmeseler dahi çok taraflı işbirliği yapmakla yükümlü hale gelmişlerdir. Avrupa Birliği içindeki nispeten başarılı çok taraflı istihbarat işbirliği bu alanda eşsiz bir örnek oluşturmaktadır. Avrupa istihbarat teşkilatları INTCEN ve Europol, birlik arasındaki istihbarat işbirliğinin yasal çerçevesini sağlamaktadır. Bern Kulübü gibi gayri resmi kanalların da AB'nin istihbarat işbirliği için yararlı olduğu görülmüştür. Bu çalışmada, Avrupa istihbarat işbirliğinin göreceli bu başarısının en az üç faktörden kaynaklandığını iddia edilmektedir. Bunlar, istihbarat yönetişimi için kurumsallaşmış talep, AB'nin (epistemik) istihbarat topluluğu üyelerinin yetki türü ve AB'nin ulusal güvenlik gündemini belirleme yeteneğidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İstihbarat, Küresel Yönetişim, İş birliği, Avrupa Birliği

Kaynakça

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