THE J-CURVE MODEL: AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE DISCONTENT IN TURKEY

Öz

The contemporary world is marked by deep collective discontent that is difficult to define. Various theories have been put forward to explain collective discontent. One of them is Davies's J-curve model. According to this model, collective discontent is most likely to occur when a prolonged period of economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The present study aims to explain widespread and deepening collective discontent in Turkey with the J-curve model by associating it with the social and political conditions of the country. The data used in the study were obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute. In the present study, data on gross national income per capita, cost of living, number of suicides, and unemployment rates between 2002 and 2021 were analyzed. All data clearly show that the period of 2002-2021 is graphically compatible with the J-curve. Accordingly, significant economic and social progress took place in Turkey between 2002 and 2012/2013. Since 2012/2013, this progress left its place to regression. The J-curve model has only been studied in an industrial context in Turkey. This study is the first to evaluate the J-curve model in relation to social and political events.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• J-Curve
• Davies
• Turkey
• Colective Discontent

J-EĞRİSİ MODELİ: TÜRKİYE’DEKİ KOLLEKTİF HOŞNUTSUZLUĞU ANLAMAK İÇİN ALTERNATİF BİR YOL

Öz

The contemporary world is marked by deep collective discontent that is difficult to define. Various theories have been put forward to explain collective discontent. One of them is Davies's J-curve model. According to this model, collective discontent is most likely to occur when a prolonged period of economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The present study aims to explain widespread and deepening collective discontent in Turkey with the J-curve model by associating it with the social and political conditions of the country. The data used in the study were obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute. In the present study, data on gross national income per capita, cost of living, number of suicides, and unemployment rates between 2002 and 2021 were analyzed. All data clearly show that the period of 2002-2021 is graphically compatible with the J-curve. Accordingly, significant economic and social progress took place in Turkey between 2002 and 2012/2013. Since 2012/2013, this progress left its place to regression. The J-curve model has only been studied in an industrial context in Turkey. This study is the first to evaluate the J-curve model in relation to social and political events.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• J-Curve
• Davies
• Turkey
• Collective Discontent

Kaynakça

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