İtalyan Siyasetçilerin Seçim Kampanyası İçin Masal Modelini Kullanması: Instagram'da Göçmenlik Meselesinin Analizi

Öz

Eski Yunanlılardan bu yana anlatı ve siyaset, kamusal alanın bir parçası ve siyasetçilerle vatandaşlar arasında bir köprü olarak birbirleriyle her zaman sıkı bir ilişki içinde olmuştur. Günümüzde ise bu alan, yeni medya araçları aracılığıyla dijital dünyaya ve özellikle de sosyal ve siyasi tartışmaların sözcüsü hâline gelen sosyal medyaya taşınmıştır. Birçok araştırmacı, toplumun anlatılar tarafından kuşatıldığına ve bu anlatıların düşünme ve yaşama biçimimizi şekillendirmede rol oynadığına dikkat çekmektedir. (Zipes, 2006; Cmeciu, 2016; Postill, 2018). Masallar, özellikle çocukluk döneminde maruz kaldığımız ilk ve en önemli anlatı türlerinden biridir ancak sosyal medya siyasi bilgiler yayabilir. Bu nedenle masallar, ikna edilebilir bir kitle içinde önyargı yayabildiği için çok çeşitli sosyal, kültürel ve siyasi etkilere sahiptir. (Cmeciu, 2016). 21 Temmuz 2022'de Meclislerin erken feshedilmesinin ardından 25 Eylül 2022'de İtalyan halkına oy verme çağrısı yapıldı. Bu makalede, Enrico Letta PD (Partito Democartico), Silvio Berlusconi FI (Forza Italia), Giorgia Meloni FdI (Fratelli d'Italia), Matteo Salvini LN (Lega Nord) ve Giuseppe Conte M5S (Movimento 5 Stelle) olmak üzere beş İtalyan parti liderinin göç olgusuna ilişkin sosyal medya ve özellikle de Instagram’daki iletişim stratejilerine odaklanılmaktadır. Araştırma peri masalları modeline, özellikle de bu liderler tarafından aynı haberin farklı yaklaşım ve bakış açılarının altı çizilerek bir propaganda ve uzlaşma aracı olarak kullanılan Karpman (1968) drama üçgeni modeline odaklanmıştır. Araştırma, söylem analizleri yoluyla, kurban, zorba ve kurtarıcı üçgen modelini ters yüz ederek göç konusundaki argümanların ele alınışındaki farklı yaklaşımları ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• peri masalları
• sosyal medya
• İtalya seçimleri
• Instagram
• göç

Italian Politicians’ Usage of the Fairy Tale Model for the Electoral Campaign: An Analysis of the Immigration Issue on Instagram

Öz

The relationship between storytelling and politics is not new; it dates back to ancient Greece, where narratives served as vital tools for mediating the exchange between rulers and the ruled. As scholars have argued, our societies are saturated with stories that do more than entertain: They shape how we think, behave, and relate to the world. Fairy tales occupy a unique place within this narrative ecology. They are often the first stories people encounter in childhood, and thus subtly encode cultural values and ideological assumptions. In the digital age social media is now the central platform for political expression, identity formation, and public discourse: it has also widened the social, cultural, and political implications of fairy tales due to their potential to influence susceptible audiences with prejudice. No longer confined to the realm of childhood, fairy-tale motifs now circulate widely in political messaging, often repurposed to reinforce prejudices or sway opinion. This article focuses on the framework of fairy tales and political narratives, specifically how such narrative strategies were employed by five Italian political leaders during the campaign leading up to the general election of September 25, 2022. Through the issue of immigration, it analyzes how Enrico Letta (Partito Democratico), Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia), Giorgia Meloni (Fratelli d’Italia), Matteo Salvini (Lega Nord), and Giuseppe Conte (Movimento 5 Stelle) crafted and disseminated their messages via Instagram, using storytelling, implicitly or explicitly, to frame their political positions and appeal to voters.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Fairy Tales
• Social Media
• The Italian Election
• Instagram
• Immigration.

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