Vekâlet Kuramına Göre Türkiye’deki Otellerin Pazara Giriş Stratejilerinin Değerlendirilmesi

Yıl 2020, Sayı: 88, 145 - 168, 30.06.2020

Ece Zeybek Yılmaz , Göksel Ataman Berk

https://doi.org/10.26650/imj.2020.88.0006

Öz

Bu araştırmada işletmelerin pazara giriş stratejilerine göre yaşanan vekâlet sorunlarından ahlaki tehlike ve ters seçim riski ile karşılaşma olasılıkları arasındaki farklılık durumları incelenmiştir. Bu kapsamda Türkiye’de faaliyet gösteren 5 yıldızlı otel işletmelerinde yönetici pozisyonunda çalışan (asil ve vekil) 46 kişi ile derinlemesine mülakat gerçekleştirilmiştir. Elde edilen veriler NVivo 12 Pro paket programında analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma sonuçlarına göre ahlaki tehlike boyutu altında haksız kazanç, mevzuata uygunluk ve sözleşmenin feshine ilişkin üç temel kod belirlenirken, ters seçim riski boyutu ise bedavacılık ve güven kodları altında ele alınmıştır. Katılımcı ifadelerine göre seçilen pazara giriş stratejilerine göre yaşanan ahlaki tehlike ve ters seçim riskinin oranı arasında anlamlı bir fark olmadığı ortaya konulmuştur. Buna karşın otel işletmelerinin yapısı gereği gerçekleştirilen denetlemelerin özellikle zincir işletmelerde hem marka tarafından, hem de yasal olarak yapılmasının ahlaki tehlike ve ters seçim riskini azalttığı söylenebilir. Katılımcıların ifadelerine göre bazı otel işletmelerinde birden fazla pazara giriş şeklinin aynı anda tercih edildiği görülmektedir, bunun ekonomik nedenleri olduğu gibi vekâlet problemlerinin önlenmesinde yönelik de olduğu söylenebilir. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

Vekâlet Kuramı, Ahlaki Tehlike,, Ters Seçim Riski, Bilgi Asimetrisi, Pazara Giriş Stratejileri

Destekleyen Kurum

Yazarlar bu çalışma için finansal destek almadığını beyan etmiştir.

An Assessment of Market Entry Strategies of Hotels in Turkey Based on Agency Theory

Öz

This study evaluates the probability of encountering a moral hazard and risk of adverse selection, which are among agency problems originated from the market entry strategies of enterprises. In this context, we conducted in depth interviews with 46 people who were hotel managers (principal and agent) at five-star hotels operating in Turkey. The data of the study was analyzed in the NVivo 12 Pro package program. We determined three main codes for a “moral hazard” dimension, which were unfair earnings, compliance with the legislation and termination of the contract, and evaluated “risk of adverse selection” dimension via free-riding and trust codes. Our results revealed that according to reports of the participants, there was no difference in the rates of encountering a moral hazard or risk of adverse selection with regard to the market entry strategy. On the other hand, it can be concluded that conducting an audit that hotel management carries out routinely reduces the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection, especially in chain enterprises, both brand and legal audits should be performed. Reports of the participants demonstrated that some hotel enterprises chose to use more than one market entry strategy concurrently. Preventing agency problems as well as economizing may be the purpose of their choices.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Agency Theory, Moral Hazard, Information Asymmetry, Risk Of Adverse Selection, Information Asymmetry, Market Entry Strategies

Kaynakça

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