Aksa Tufanı Bağlamında Husilerin İran’la İlişkisini Yeniden Okumak: Sponsor-Vekil Modeline Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 9 Sayı: 1, 249 - 282, 24.06.2025

Talha İsmail Duman

https://doi.org/10.33201/iranian.1656783

Cited By: 1

Öz

İran ile Ensarullah (Husiler) arasındaki ilişki, medya ve siyaset söylemlerinde genellikle klasik bir sponsor-vekil bağımlılığı çerçevesinde ele alınmakta, bu yaklaşım Ensarullah’ı İran’ın doğrudan yönlendirdiği bir aktör olarak değerlendirmektedir. Ancak Aksa Tufanı süreciyle birlikte Ensarullah’ın bölgesel güvenlik dinamiklerinde daha belirgin bir aktör haline gelmesi, bu ilişkinin doğası üzerine akademik tartışmaları yoğunlaştırmıştır. Ensarullah’ın İsrail, ABD ve İngiltere hedeflerine yönelik saldırıları ile Kızıldeniz’deki deniz ticaretine müdahaleleri, hareketin karar alma süreçlerinde ne ölçüde bağımsız hareket ettiğini anlamak açısından kritik bir bağlam sunmaktadır. Bu makale, Ensarullah’ın İran’ın kontrolü altında hareket eden sıradan bir vekil mi yoksa ortak stratejik hedefleri doğrultusunda iş birliği yapan bir aktör mü olduğu sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Nitel vaka analizi yöntemini takip eden çalışma, Ensarullah’ın İran’dan askeri ve lojistik destek almasına rağmen, eylemlerini doğrudan İran’ın yönlendirmesiyle gerçekleştirmediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Aksine, Gazze Savaşı sırasında zaman zaman İran’ın kontrollü gerilim stratejisinden saparak daha agresif ve doğrudan müdahaleci bir çizgi izlediği gözlemlenmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Ensarullah’ın İran ile ilişkisini hiyerarşik bir vekâlet modeliyle açıklamak yerine, karşılıklı etkileşime ve bağımsız stratejik önceliklere dayalı daha karmaşık bir yapı olarak ele almak gerektiği savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İran , Ensarullah , Husiler , Sponsor-Vekil Modeli , Aksa Tufanı.

Rethinking the Houthi-Iran Relationship in the Context of the Al-Aqsa Flood: A Critical Assessment of the Sponsor-Proxy Model

Öz

The relationship between Iran and Ansar Allah (Houthis) is often framed in media and political discourse through a classical sponsor-proxy dependency, portraying Ansar Allah as a group operating under Iran’s direct control. However, with the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, Ansar Allah has become a more prominent actor in regional security dynamics, intensifying academic debates on the nature of this relationship. The group’s attacks on Israeli, American, and British targets, as well as its disruptions of maritime trade in the Red Sea, provide a crucial context for assessing its decision-making autonomy. This article examines whether Ansar Allah functions as an ordinary proxy under Iranian control or as an actor cooperating with Iran based on shared strategic objectives. Using a qualitative case study approach, the study finds that while Ansar Allah receives military and logistical support from Iran, its actions are not entirely dictated by Tehran. Instead, during the Gaza War, it occasionally diverged from Iran’s controlled escalation strategy, adopting a more aggressive and direct interventionist approach. In this context, the article argues that the Iran-Ansar Allah relationship should not be explained through a rigid hierarchical proxy model, but rather as a more complex interaction based on mutual influence and independent strategic priorities.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Iran , Ansar Allah , Houthis , Sponsor-Proxy Model , Al-Aqsa Flood

Kaynakça

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