WAR AND PEACE: RUSSIA, TURKEY, AND THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION OF CONFLICT PERPETUATION, CESSATION, AND RESOLUTION IN THE CAUCASUS

Yıl 2013, Cilt: 2 Sayı: 1, 1 - 37, 29.08.2013

James Warhola , Egemen Bezci

Öz

Kafkasya bölgesinin siyasi ilişkileri Dağlık-Karabağ sorununun ortaya çıktığı 1980’lerin sonu ve 1990’ların başından günümüze büyük ölçüde değişmiştir. Bu değişimlerin arasında önemli bir yer ise 2000’li yılların başından giderek artan Türkiye ile Rusya arasındaki yakınlaşma politikasıdır. Türkiye ve Rusya’yı DağlıkKarabağ sorununun çözümünde özellikli bir yere konumlandıran dinamikler ise bu iki ülkenin Azeri ve Ermeni siyasi liderliğini ve kamuoyunu Dağlık-Karabağ sorununun çözümü doğrultusunda etkileme güçleridir. Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan’ın iç siyasetinin içerisinde bulunduğu kör düğüm ve Dağlık-Karabağ sorunu etrafında gelişen hassasiyet nedeniyle soruna uzlaşmacı bir çözüm yolunu dış ülkelerin müdahalesine muhtaç hale getirmektedir. Tam da bu noktada Türkiye ve Rusya’nın ilişkilerinin gelişmesi ve Rusya’nın Ermenistan Türkiye’nin ise Azerbaycan üzerindeki etkin rölü bu iki ülkeyi geçmişin aksine çözüm sürecinde biricik bir konuma yerleştirmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Dağlık-Karabağ Sorunu, Rusya, Türkiye. Kafkasya, Minsk Grubu, AGIT.

WAR AND PEACE: RUSSIA, TURKEY, AND THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION OF CONFLICT PERPETUATION, CESSATION, AND RESOLUTION IN THE CAUCASUS

Öz

The political landscape of the Caucasus region has changed dramatically since the initial eruption of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the late 1980s-early1990s. Among other changes, Turkey and Russia have experienced a rapprochement in the 2000s that places them in a strong position to influence both the political leadership and the mass publics of Azerbaijan and Armenia to open negotiations with a new willingness to consider hitherto unacceptable solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Because of the domestic political tension-ratcheting knot within both Armenia and Azerbaijan that make concessionary approaches to N-K politically suicidal, external influence is essential. It is precisely here that Turkey and Russia are now – unlike earlier -- uniquely and fortuitously positioned: Turkey is arguably in as effectual a position to influence Azerbaijan as Russia is to influence Armenia. Again, the Russian-Turkish rapprochement has changed the calculus of prospective resolution decisively, if not inevitably

Anahtar Kelimeler

Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia, Turkey, conflict-resolution, Minsk Group, OSCE

Kaynakça

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