On the Robustness of Scientific Models

Yıl 2021, , 49 - 65, 31.12.2021

Ahmet Dinçer Çevik

https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp.1033984

Öz

Robustness analysis is an epistemic strategy by which different and independent procedures are utilized to reach the same conclusion. Because this strategy is related with the robustness and sensitivity of the models, it has an epistemic importance for both scientists and philosophers of sciences. This paper, first, in a historical context, evaluates the robustness analysis. Then, the functions and the classifications of the robustness analyses are evaluated. Finally, a distinction is made with respect to robustness analysis. According to this distinction, the object of robustness tests is whether a given model that helps in explanation is true. Robustness analysis is about determination of the truth of the explanans, that is, determination of the truth conditions of the conditional part of the model. This is reasoning about models. However, applicability is not about whether the model is true but whether the antecedent of the model is satisfied in the case at hand. This is reasoning with models..

Anahtar Kelimeler

Robustness, scientific models, de-idealization, scientific explanation, prediction

Bilimsel Modellerin Sağlamlığı Üzerine

Öz

Sağlamlık analizi (robustness analysis), çok sayıda birbirinden bağımsız prosedür aracılığıyla aynı sonucun elde edilmeye çalışıldığı epistemik bir stratejidir. Söz konusu strateji bilim pratiğinde açıklama verme ve öndeyi türetiminde başvurulan modellerde sıklıkla kullanılır. Bilimsel modellerin ne derece sağlam ve hassas olduğunun belirlenmesi ile ilgili bir yöntem olduğu için sağlamlık analizi hem bilim insanları hem de bilim felsefecileri açısından epistemik bir öneme sahiptir. Bu makalede öncelikle, sağlamlık analizleri tarihsel çerçevede ele alınmaktadır. Ardından literatürde yer alan farklı sağlamlık analizi sınıflandırmaları ve sağlamlık analizlerinin işlevleri tartışılıp, modeller sağlamlık analizleri ve model temelli açıklamalar arasındaki ilişki ile ilgili bir ayrım yapılmaktadır. Bu ayrım modeller hakkında akıl yürütme ile modeller ile akıl yürütme arasındaki farklılıklar ile ilgilidir. Bu ayrıma göre bilimsel açıklamalarda kullanılan modellerin doğruluğunun koşullarının belirlenmesi sağlamlık analizleri olarak değerlendirilirken, modellerin uygulanabilirliği modeller ile akıl yürütme ile ilgilidir..

Anahtar Kelimeler

Sağlamlık analizleri, bilimsel modeller, de-idealizasyon, bilimsel açıklama, öndeyi

Kaynakça

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