AN ATTEMPT TO CONSTRUCT FISCAL ILLUSION INDEX FOR TURKISH ECONOMY

Öz

Fiscal Illusion deals with the issue of tax payers’ perceptions devoted to the size of the public sector and tax revenues to finance public expenditures. Due to the factors as complexity of tax system, tax rates, governments preference between debt finance or increasing money supply instead of taxation, the share of indirect taxes in tax revenues, lack of confidence to government policy, etc. tax payers can underestimate the level of real tax burden and the size of the public sector . In this study we will evaluate the theoretical development, different approaches and evidences of empirical studies about fiscal illusion. On the basis of these information, we will assess fiscal illusion level of Turkish Economy by employing Factor Analysis as a Multivariate Statistical Method.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Fiscal Illusion,Factor Analysis,Turkish Economy

TÜRKİYE EKONOMİSİNDE MALİ YANILSAMA ENDEKSİ OLUŞTURMA ÜZERİNE BİR DENEME

Öz

Mali yanılsama, vergi ödeyenler tarafından kamu harcamalarının finansmanı amacıyla toplanan vergilerin ve kamu kesiminin büyüklüğü ile ilgili algıların ne derece gerçekçi olduğu ile ilgilenmektedir. Vergi sisteminin kolay anlaşılabilir bir yapıya sahip olmaması, uygulanan oran yapısı, vergileme yerine borçlanma veya para basmanın tercih edilmesi, vergi gelirleri içinde dolaylı vergi gelirlerinin dolaysız vergi gelirlerine oranla daha fazla olması, hükümet programlarına ilişkin duyulan güven gibi nedenlerle vergi ödeyenler gerçek vergi yüklerini ve kamu kesiminin büyüklüğünü tahmin etmekte zorlanabilirler. Bu çalışmada mali yanılsama kavramının teorik gelişimi, farklı mali yanılsama yaklaşımları ve ampirik çalışmalara dayalı bulgular yer almaktadır. Aynı zamanda bu bilgilerin ışığında, Türkiye ekonomisi için çeşitli göstergeler üzerinden mali yanılsama değerlendirmesi yapılarak, faktör analizi yöntemi ile endeks değeri elde edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Mali Yanılsama,Faktör Analizi Yöntemi,Türkiye Ekonomisi

Kaynakça

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