A COOPERATIVE GAME THEORETICAL MODEL IN TEMPORARY HOUSING FOR POST‐DISASTER SITUATIONS

Yıl 2019, , 779 - 786, 19.12.2019

Pinar Usta , Serap Ergün , Sırma Zeynep Alparslan Gök

https://doi.org/10.21923/jesd.456590

Cited By: 1

Öz

Turkey is among the
countries that are especially vulnerable to natural disasters. Throughout
history, many disasters have occurred in the geography where Turkey is located.
Turkey is known that a country that is connects the continents and cultures. It
is provide also interactions between several tectonic plates that including the
Eurasian, African, and Arabian plates through the Anatolian plate. Interactions
among the plates compose active seismic region that encompasses most of
Turkey.  As a result of this high
seismicity region, earthquake has been significant natural disaster for Turkey.
Numerous buildings collapse and have damage after the severe earthquakes and
the victims need to shelter to provide their needs. In this process, temporary
housing is using to solve this shelter needs hence temporary housing needing
urgent attention. But there is a problem about number of temporary housing
demand because it is not possible to say a certain number about temporary
housing needed.  In this study, game
theory is used to solve this problem. Our study shows that cooperative interval
game theory help us to define a fair cost allocation between private
organizations for supporting the housing problem by using facility location
games under uncertainty.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Temporary Housing, Earthquake, Cooperative Game Theory, Uncertainty

AFET SONRASI GEÇİCİ KONUTLAR İÇİN BİR KOOPERATİF OYUN TEORİSİ MODELİ

Öz

Türkiye, özellikle
doğal afetlere karşı savunmasız olan ülkeler arasındadır. Tarih boyunca,
Türkiye'nin bulunduğu coğrafyada birçok felaket meydana gelmiştir. Türkiye,
kıtaları ve kültürleri birbirine bağlayan bir ülke olduğu biliniyor. Anadolu
levhası üzerinden Avrasya, Afrika ve Arap levhalarını da içeren birçok tektonik
levha arasında etkileşimler sağlar. Plakalar arasındaki etkileşimler,
Türkiye'nin çoğunu kapsayan aktif sismik bölgeyi oluşturmaktadır. Bu yüksek
deprem bölgelerinin bir sonucu olarak, Türkiye için deprem önemli bir doğal
afet olmuştur. Çok sayıda bina, şiddetli depremlerin ardından çökmekte ve zarar
görmektedir ve mağdurların ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için barınmaları
gerekmektedir. Bu süreçte geçici barınak, bu barınak ihtiyacını çözmek için
kullanıyor, bu nedenle geçici dikkat gerektiren geçici konutlar. Ancak geçici
konut talebinin sayısı konusunda bir sorun var çünkü ihtiyaç duyulan geçici
konutlar hakkında belirli bir rakam söylemek mümkün değil. Bu çalışmada, bu
problemi çözmek için oyun teorisi kullanılmıştır. Çalışmamız, kooperatif
aralıklı oyun teorisinin belirsizlik altında tesis yeri oyunlarını kullanarak
konut sorununu desteklemek için özel kuruluşlar arasında adil bir maliyet
tahsisi tanımlamamıza yardımcı olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Geçici Konut, Deprem, Kooperatif Oyun Teorisi, Belirsizlik

Kaynakça

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