Security of Submarine Communication Cables as Critical Infrastructure from the Perspective of International Law of the Sea Abstract

Öz

This study, which aims to uncover figuratively the Submarine Communication Cables (SCC), providing 99% of global communication, elucidate on the deficiencies and shortco-mings of the current International Law of the Sea codification in terms of ensuring the security of SCC from a legal perspective. Also it is presented with the aim of to benefit researchers in their further studies and to make a contribution to the literature. In pursuit of scientific and technological developments, the needs and lifestyles of human beings have drastically changed, and the transfer of digital data has become an indispensable part of our lives. Considering the most important needs of our age, one of the first things that come to mind is to be able to access communication channels and information as fast and safe as possible. So much so that; SCC is one of the most important infrastructure components even in matters such as conducting the scientific research required to write this study, accessing electricity and the internet. Therefore, the security of cables, which are global public goods, should be reconsidered on the grounds of both International Security and International Law. It is known that the first international legal regulation on cables was the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables of 1884, followed by the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 1958 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. However, it is understood that the issue is dealt with within the framework of the principle of freedom of the seas for territorial waters and the contiguous zone. It has been understood that descriptions of certain point such as how to ensure the security of the cables in international waters (open sea) is ambiguous, and that the Law of the Sea regulations on the SCC, which is at the heart of Ocean Governance from a security phenomena and geopolitical perspective, are insufficient.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Submarine Communication Cables
• Security
• International Maritime Law
• Critical Infrast-ructure
• Ocean Governance
• Geopolitics

ULUSLARARASI DENİZ HUKUKU PERSPEKTİFİNDEN KRİTİK ALTYAPI NİTELİĞİNDEKİ DENİZALTI İLETİŞİM KABLOLARININ GÜVENLİĞİ

Öz

Küresel iletişimin nerdeyse tamamını, %99’luk bir kısmını sağlayan Denizaltı İletişim Kablolarının (DİK) mecazi manada su yüzüne çıkarılmasını amaçlayan bu çalışma, mevcut Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku kodifikasyonunun DİK’in hukuki perspektiften güvenliğinin sağlanması hususunda eksik ve aksak yönlerine ışık tutmaktadır. İleri çalışmalarda araştırmacıların istifadesine sunulması, literatüre katkı sağlanması da bu çalışmanın amaçlarındandır. Bilimsel ve teknolojik gelişmeleri takiben insanoğlunun ihtiyaçları ile yaşam tarzı değişmiş, dijital verinin transferi hayatlarımızın olmazsa olmazı haline gelmiştir. Çağımızın en önemli ihtiyaçları düşünüldüğünde akla ilk gelenlerden biri; mümkün olan en hızlı ve güvenli şekilde iletişim kanallarına ulaşabilmek, bilgiye erişebilmektir. O kadar ki; DİK bu çalışmanın yazılabilmesi için gereken bilimsel araştırmanın yapılması, elektrik ve internete erişebilmek gibi konularda dahi en mühim altyapı bileşenlerindendir. Dolayısıyla, küresel kamu malı niteliğinde olan kabloların güvenliği hem Uluslararası Güvenlik hem de Uluslararası Hukuk zemininde yeniden düşünülmelidir. Kablolar özelindeki ilk uluslararası hukuk düzenlemesinin 1884 tarihli Denizaltı Kablolarını Koruma Konvansiyonu olduğu, akabinde 1958 Cenevre Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmeleri ve 1982 tarihli Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi’nde düzenlemelere yer verildiği bilinmektedir. Ancak konunun karasuları ve bitişik bölge için denizlerin serbestisi ilkesi çerçevesinde ele alındığı anlaşılmaktadır. Uluslararası sularda (açık deniz alanlarında) kabloların güvenliğinin nasıl sağlanacağının muğlaklık arz ettiği, bununla beraber güvenlik ve jeopolitik perspektifinden de Okyanus Yönetişimi’nin tam kalbinde yer alan DİK’e dair Deniz Hukuku düzenlemelerinin yetersiz olduğu düşünülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Denizaltı İletişim Kabloları
• Güvenlik
• Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku
• Kritik Altyapı
• Okyanus Yönetişimi
• Jeopolitik

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