POLITICAL TAX CYCLES: POLITICAL EFFECTS ON TAX REVENUES AND TAX BURDEN IN TURKEY (1945-2014)

Abstract

This study analyzes the effects of general elections on tax revenues and tax burden in Turkey. Approaches that have ignored the political decision mechanism, behaviors of political actors, and institutional structure have been insufficient in explaining the variation in taxation variables. In this context, this study asserts that politicians manipulate taxation in order to get re-elected. Incorporating the institutional structure into the analysis, the study develops hypotheses that can help better understand variations in fiscal and economic variables. The study tests its main hypothesis through a vector error correction (VEC) estimation on data that cover the period of 1945-2014. Having controlled for relevant factors, the study finds no significant relationship between 18 election years, tax revenues, and tax burden in Turkey. It can be argued that one of the main reasons for this finding is political instability that has been observed in the Turkish political system until the early 2000s. Despite having 18 elections, Turkey had 46 governmental changes between 1945 and 2014. Under such a politically unstable environment, politicians might not have stayed long enough in the office to establish their network and influence.

Keywords

• Election Economics,Political Decision Mechanism,Tax Burden,Behaviors Of Political Actors,Corporate Looseness,Political Tax Cycles

POLİTİK VERGİ ÇEVRİMLERİ: TÜRKİYE’DE VERGİ GELİRLERİ VE VERGİ YÜKÜ ÜZERİNDE POLİTİK ETKİLER (1945-2014)

Öz

            Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de seçimlerin vergileme üzerindeki etkilerini analiz etmektedir. Vergi değişkenlerindeki değişimlerin açıklanmasında, siyasal karar alma mekanizmasının işleyişini, bu mekanizmada rol alan aktörlerin davranışlarını ve kurumsal yapının bu mekanizmanın hem işleyişi hem de sonuçları üzerindeki etkilerini ihmal eden yaklaşımlar yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışmanın temel hipotezi politikacıların yeniden-seçilme güdüsüyle vergilemeyi manipüle edebileceğidir. Çalışmada, politikacının seçim kazanma ihtimalini maksimize edecek vergileme modellenmekte, kurumsal faktörler de analize dahil ederek ekonomik-mali olguların açıklanmasına yardımcı olacak varsayımlar geliştirilmektedir. 1945-2014 yıllarını kapsayan ampirik analizde vektör hata düzeltme yöntemi (VEC) kullanılmış ve seçim yılları ile vergi gelirleri arasında anlamlı bir ilişki tespit edilememiştir. Bunun en önemli nedenlerinden biri, çalışma döneminin büyük  çoğunluğunda gözlemlenen siyasal istikrarsızlık olabilir. Çalışma dönemine rastlayan yıllarda 18 seçim yapılmış olmasına rağmen 46 hükümet değişikliği gerçekleşmiştir. Bu nedenle, iktidardaki politikacılar vergileme değişkenlerini etkileyebilecek güç ve sürekliliği elde edememiş olabilirler

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Seçim ekonomisi,siyasal karar alma mekanizması,vergi yükü,politikacı davranışı,kurumsal gevşeklik,politik vergi çevrimleri

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