#Darbeyehayir (Nocoup) Hashtag Altındaki Yanlış Bilgi Yayılımı ve Bot Hesapları Üzerine Yapılan Bir Analiz

Yıl 2022, Cilt: 15 Sayı: 2, 616 - 636, 15.10.2022

Semra Demirdiş

https://doi.org/10.18094/josc.1116659

Öz

Sosyal medyada yalan içerikle ilgili mevcut araştırmalar, Twitter'ın manipülatif içeriği (botlar ve diğer yollarla) yaymak için bir araç olarak kullanıldığını göstermektedir. Bu makale, #darbeyehayir (NoCoup) hashtag'i altındaki Twitter içeriğini incelemekte ve bu hashtag altında yayılmış olan manipüle edilmiş içeriğin ve sosyal bot hesaplarının özellikleri hakkında bilgi vermektedir. Çalışma, Türkiye'de 15 Temmuz 2016'da meydana gelen başarısız darbe girişimi sırasında Twitter aracılığıyla oluşturulan ve yayınlanan içeriği incelemektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, 'darbe' girişimi hakkında oluşturulan çevrimiçi sohbetleri etkilemek için atılan 10.953 tweet'teki yanlış bilgi içeriğini incelemektir. Çalışma toplanan verilerin analizi için, DiscoverText programını kullanarak nicel bir yaklaşım uygulamıştır. Twitter içeriği üzerine yapılan bu inceleme, darbe girişimini izleyen protestoların sıklıkla manipüle edilmiş ve yanlış içerik içeren bilgiler aracılığıyla rapor edildiğini göstermiştir. Çalışma, Twitter kullanıcılarının hiçbir kaynak veya açıklama olmaksızın olaylarla ilgili yanlış bilgi paylaştığını göstermiştir. Ayrıca yanlış bilgi içeren tweetler, diğer kullanıcılar tarafından gerçek olarak kabul edilip retweet edilmiştir. Twitter içerik üzerine yapılan bu analiz, bu hashtag altında Twitter kullanıcılarını manipüle etmek ve aldatmak için bot hesaplarının oluşturulduğu ve yanlış bilgi veya haberlerin yayıldığını ortaya koymuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Sosyal Medya, Bot Hesaplar, 15 Temmuz, Yanlış Bilgi, Twitter, Darbe

An Analysis of Disinformation and Bot Accounts Under the Hashtag #Darbeyehayir (Nocoup)

Öz

Existing research on fabricated content on social media demonstrates the use of Twitter as a means to disseminate manipulative content (through bots and other means). This article examines Twitter content under the hashtag #darbeyehayir (NoCoup) and provides information about the spread of online manipulated content, specifically related to disinformation and social bot accounts’ features under the hashtag. This study looks at the content created and posted through Twitter during the failed coup attempt that occurred on 15th July 2016 in Turkey The aim of the study is to examine disinformation content within 10,953 tweets that were disseminated to influence online conversations around the ‘coup’ attempt. The study applies a quantitative approach by using the software programme of Discover Text. Examination of Twitter content at that time showed that the protests following the coup attempt were often reported in the form of disinformation, which includes manipulated and fabricated content. Tweet content that included disinformation demonstrated that Twitter users shared information related to events with no sources or explanation. In addition, the tweets containing disinformation were retweeted by others who probably accepted the disinformation as real. The analysis of Twitter content suggested that bot accounts were likely created to manipulate and deceive Twitter users by spreading false information or news under the hashtag.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Social Media, Disinformation, Twitter, Bots Accounts, Coup, 15 July

Kaynakça

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