Determination of Contract Duration: An Empirical Study on the Ground Handling Agreements with the View of Transaction Cost Theory

Öz

The contract duration is seen as an optimization process in which the benefits of the increase in service to be purchased in a buyer-seller relation are balanced between the costs that will arise accordingly (Crocker ve Reynolds, 1993). According to the transaction cost theory, contract duration is a control mechanism that will protect the parties against opportunistic behavior of the other party. According to the theory, when asset specificity or relational investment is increased, the duration of a commercial contract expands but becomes shorter as the uncertainty increases. In this study, it is aimed to explain the determinants of differences in contract duration of ground handling agreements between airlines and ground handling companies by using the variables of transaction cost theory. For this purpose, an empirical study was conducted using 41 ground handling contracts. The relationship between the variables in the research's model was tested with the partial least squares method using the Smartpls 3 program. As a result of the analysis, there was a positively statistically significant relationship between the duration of the contract and the dedicated assets, which is one of the asset specificity types. Unexpectedly, it is concluded that there is a positive relationship between demand uncertainty and contract duration. There was no statistically significant relationship between environmental uncertainty and contract duration. It is concluded that the variables of the transaction cost theory are limited explanatory power in explaining the differences in the duration of the ground handling agreements. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Transaction cost theory,Contract duration,Airline-ground handling relationship,Smartpls

Sözleşme Süresinin Belirlenmesi: İşlem Maliyeti Teorisi Bakışıyla Yer Hizmeti Sözleşmeleri Üzerine Ampirik Bir Araştırma

Öz

Sözleşme süresi bir alıcı-satıcı ilişkisinde alınacak hizmette meydana gelecek artışın avantajları ile buna bağlı olarak meydana gelecek maliyetler arasında dengenin sağlandığı bir optimizasyon süreci olarak görülmektedir (Crocker ve Reynolds, 1993). İşlem maliyeti teorisine göre sözleşme süresi, tarafları karşı tarafın fırsatçı davranışına karşı koruyacak bir kontrol mekanizmasıdır. Teoriye göre bir ticari sözleşmenin süresi işlemin varlık özgüllüğü veya ilişkiye özgü yatırımlar arttıkça uzamakta, belirsizlik arttıkça kısalmaktadır (Crocker ve Masten, 1988; Sausser, 1999). Bu araştırmada havacılık sektöründe faaliyet gösteren havayolu işletmeleri ve yer hizmeti işletmeleri arasında imzalanan sözleşmelerin sürelerindeki farklılığın nedenleri işlem maliyeti teorisi değişkenleri aracılığıyla açıklanması amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçla 41 yer hizmeti anlaşması üzerinden ampirik bir araştırma gerçekleştirilmiştir. Araştırmanın modelindeki değişkenler arasındaki ilişkileri test etmek için kısmi en küçük kareler yöntemi kullanılmış ve analizler Smartpls 3 programı kullanılarak yapılmıştır. Verilerin analizi sonucunda varlık özgüllüğü türlerinden biri olan adanmış varlıklar ile sözleşme süresi arasında istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir ilişki bulunmuştur. Araştırmada talep belirsizliği ile sözleşme süresi arasında ise negatif yönlü bir ilişki öngörülmüştür ancak talep belirsizliği arttıkça sözleşme süresinin uzadığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Çevresel belirsizlik ve sözleşme süresi arasında ise istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir ilişki bulunamamıştır. Araştırma modelinin analizi sonucunda işlem maliyeti teorisinin değişkenlerinin yer hizmeti sözleşmelerinin sürelerindeki farklılığı açıklamakta sınırlı bir açıklama gücü olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.  

Anahtar Kelimeler

• İşlem maliyeti teorisi,Sözleşme süresi,Havayolu-yer hizmeti işletmesi ilişkisi,, Smartpls

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