Should we be modest? Dummett and McDowell on Theories of Meaning

Öz

In this paper I engage with a certain debate between Michael Dummett and John McDowell on the possibility of the full-blooded theories of meaning. This is a debate on what sort of semantic theories can be of use in giving an account of the speaker’s knowledge of a language. After defining modesty and full-bloodedness for a theory of meaning, I proceed to uncover Dummett’s reasons for his two central claims: Truth-conditional theories of meaning are modest and a theory of meaning must be full-blooded. Then I critically evaluate McDowell’s and Richard Kimberly Heck’s takes on the latter claim. I conclude that with the same descriptions of our linguistic competence it is impossible to characterize our language use as a rational activity and also give a full-blooded theory of meaning that can be used to study thought.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Davidson
• Dummett
• McDowell
• Truth-conditional Semantic Theories
• Theories of meaning

Mütevazi mi olmalıyız? Dummett ve McDowell Anlam Kuramları Üzerine

Öz

Bu makale Michael Dummett and John McDowell’ın güçlü anlam kuramlarının imkânı üzerine yürüttükleri tartışmayı incelemeyi hedefler. Bu tartışma, bir dilin kullanıcılarının o dile dair bilgisini açıklamakta ne tür semantik kuramların faydalı olacağına odaklanır. Bir anlam teorisini betimlemek için kullanılan mütevazı ve güçlü kavramları tanımlandıktan sonra, Dummett’ın, “Doğruluk koşullu anlam kuramları mütevazıdır” ve “Anlam kuramları güçlü olmalıdır” biçimindeki iki temel iddiasının dayandığı nedenler açıklanır. Ardından, McDowell ve Heck’in ikinci iddiaya ilişkin düşüncelerinin bir eleştirisi sunulur. İncelemenin sonunda ise, aynı betimleyicilere başvurarak hem dili kullanışımızı rasyonel bir eylem olarak tasvir etmenin hem de düşünceyi irdelemeye yetkin güçlü bir anlam kuramı inşa etmenin mümkün olmadığı sonucuna varılır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Davidson
• Dummett
• McDowell
• Doğruluk koşullu anlam kuramları

Kaynakça

1. Davidson, D. (2001a). Radical Interpretation. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 17–42.
2. Davidson, D. (2001b). Truth and Meaning. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 17–42.
3. Dummett, M. (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
4. Dummett, M. (1993). The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5. Dummett, M. (1993a). What Do I Know When I Know a Language? The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 94–105.
6. Dummett, M. (1993b). What is a Theory of Meaning? (I). The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1–33.
7. Dummett, M. (2007). Reply to McDowell. The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. (Ed. L. Hahn). Chicago: Open Court, 367-382.
8. Grice, H. (1989). Logic and Conversation. Studies in the Ways of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 22–40.

9. Heck, R. K. (2007). Use and Meaning. The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. (Ed. L. Hahn). Chicago: Open Court, 531-557 (originally published under the name “Richard G. Heck, Jr”).
10. McDowell, J. (1998a). Another Plea for Modesty. Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 108–31.
11. McDowell, J. (1998b). Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding. Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 314–43.
12. McDowell, J. (1998c). In Defence of Modesty. Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 87–107.
13. McDowell, J. (1998d). Meaning, Communication, and Knowledge. Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 29–50.
14. McDowell, J. (1998e). Truth-Conditions, Bivalence, and Verificationism. Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press., 3–28.
15. McDowell, J. (2007). Dummett on Truth Conditions and Meaning. The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. (Ed. L. Hahn). Chicago: Open Court, 351-366.
16. Özaltun, E. (2021). Dummett and Davidson on the Dependence of Thought on Language. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1), 47-74.