Paradox and Protreptic in Plato’s Meno

Yıl 2017, Sayı: 29, 33 - 45, 30.10.2017

Geoffrey Bove

https://doi.org/10.20981/kaygi.341293

Öz

The Meno contains a host of puzzles and problems, not the least
of which is the status of the theory of recollection in the dialogue. This
essay aims to present both the theory of recollection and what has been called “Meno’s Paradox” not as epistemological issues, but as issues of eristic and protreptic.
I suggest that the true purpose of the Meno’s use of the theory of recollection is to be found in
the implicit and explicit caveats that Socrates uses to frame the theory. These
caveats, which indicate that we should not take the theory of recollection as
demonstrated or proven, ultimately justify interpreting Socrates’ claims about
the theory of recollection serving a protreptic rôle as definitive. This paper
has three sections. Section I offers some preliminary remarks on the nature of
philosophical protreptic as a literary genre of the fourth century in general
and its employment in Plato. Section II distinguishes the geometry problem used
to 'demonstrate' the theory of recollection is employed to solve from the problem
of inquiry into virtue that Socrates and Meno are facing. I show that the two
problem are disanalagous. I also discuss the character of Meno as susciptible
to a certain kind of persuasion, and how Socrates converts Meno's questions
about the possibility of philosophical enquiry into a sophistical paradox and
offers the theory of recollection as a solution to it. Finally, Section III
offers evidence that Plato provides us with a number of caveats and warnings
about taking the theory of recollection in the Meno as serious epistemology,
leading to the conclusion that Plato's primary purpose in employing it in the
Meno is as a protreptic device meant to keep Meno on the path of philosophical
inquiry.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Ancient Greek Philosophy, Plato, Meno, Epistemology, Protreptic

Kaynakça

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