Hipersonik Füzeler ve Stratejik İstikrar: Rusya-ABD İlişkileri Üzerine Bir İnceleme

Öz

Hız ve yüksek manevra yeteneği gibi özellikleriyle hipersonik füzeler, devletler arasındaki askerî güç dengesini önemli şekilde etkileyebilecek silahlardır. Savunma ve güvenlik eksenli olarak öngörülemezlik riskini arttırmalarından dolayı hipersonik füzelerin stratejik sonuçlar doğurması azımsanmaması gereken bir ihtimaldir. Bu silahların özellikle büyük güçlerin envanterine girmeye başlaması, hipersonik füzelerin askerî güç dengesi üzerindeki olası etkilerine dair bir projeksiyon yapmayı gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu tespitten hareketle bu çalışma, Rusya ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) arasındaki stratejik denge üzerinde hipersonik füzelerin olası etkilerini incelemektedir. Bu iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiye odaklanmanın iki temel nedeni vardır. İlk olarak, yöntemsel bir açıdan bakıldığında, hipersonik füzelerin etkisini ölçmek için, bu silahların konvansiyonel veya nükleer başlık taşımaları durumunda nasıl etkiler yaratabileceğinin cevapları gereklidir. Bunun için, iki farklı vaka incelemesine ihtiyaç vardır. Rusya nükleer, ABD ise konvansiyonel vuruş kapasitesini geliştirmek için hipersonik füzelere yatırım yaptığı için, bu iki ülkenin birbirleriyle olan rekabetinde bu silahların kullanım amaçlarına bakılarak önemli ampirik çıkarsamalara ulaşılabilecektir. İkinci olarak, “büyük güç rekabeti” bağlamında tematik bir açıdan bakıldığında, hipersonik füzelerin Rusya-ABD ilişkilerine dönük olası etkileri incelenerek, uluslararası güvenlik üzerinde bu silahların ne gibi yansımalarının olabileceğine dair bir bakış açısı sunulabilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Hipersonik Füzeler
• Hipersonik Silahlar
• Rusya - Savunma
• ABD - Savunma
• Stratejik İstikrar
• Nükleer Strateji
• Konvansiyonel Strateji

Hypersonic Missiles and Strategic Stability: An Analysis of Russia-US Relations

Öz

Thanks to their speed and high maneuvering ability, hypersonic missiles qualify as weapons systems that can have a significant impact ıpon the balance of military power among states. As these missiles enhance unpredictability in the realm of security and defense, they are highly likely to generate strategic consequences. Given the fact that especially great powers have begun to incorporate hypersonic missiles into their arsenal, it is necessary to examine the potential impacts of this development on the balance of military power. This article concerns itself with this issue and seeks to assess the likely effects of hypersonic missiles by focusing on the strategic balance between the US and Russia. The reason for selecting these two countries is twofold. First, in a methodological context, two different case studies are required to assess the likely impacts of hypersonic missiles, which may be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads. As Russia and the US intend to arm hypersonic missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads respectively, one would be able to draw the necessary empirical inferences by examining the military rivalry between these two states in the light of hypersonic missiles. Second, in a thematic context based on great power rivalry, by examining the likely effects of hypersonic missiles on Russia-US relations, one would be able to offer a perspective on the impact of these weapons on international security.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Hypersonic Missiles
• Hypersonic Weapons
• Russia - Defense
• the US - Defense
• Strategic Stability
• Nuclear Strategy
• Conventional Strategy

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