Hibrit Savaş Perspektifinden Rusya’nın 2022 Yılı Ukrayna Müdahalesi

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 2 Sayı: 43, 331 - 356, 03.11.2023

Hasan Arslan

https://doi.org/10.17134/khosbd.1309029

Cited By: 1

Öz

Bu çalışmada Rusya’nın 2022 yılında ikinci safhasına başladığı Ukrayna müdahalesi hibrit savaş perspektifinden incelenmiştir. Savaşın politika, askeri kuvvetler ve toplum çerçevesinde şekillenen, sabit ilkelerden müteşekkil doğasının diğer tarafında toplumsal gelişmelere bağlı olarak sürekli değişim halinde olan karakteri bulunur. Savaşın rahminde gelişen askeri stratejide olgunun bu iki boyutundan etkilenmektedir. Bir diğer ifade ile askeri stratejinin doğası geçmiş tecrübeler ışığında şekillenen değişmez ilke ve prensipleri, karakteri ise cari stratejik çevreyi tanımlar. Bu kapsamda Hibrit Savaş, Soğuk Savaş sonrası değişen stratejik çevreyi vurgulamak üzere literatürde yer bulan kavramlardan birisidir. Literatürde hibrit savaş kavramı öncelikle devlet dışı aktörlerin stratejik yaklaşımları üzerinden kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Rusya’nın 2014 yılında Ukrayna gerçekleştirdiği müdahalenin ardından devletlerin stratejik yaklaşımlarını kapsayacak biçimde genişlemiştir. Rus perspektifine göre ise hibrit savaş batının kendisini çevreleme ve etki alanını kısıtlamak üzere uyguladığı temel stratejidir. Nitekim bu çabaya karşı koymak ve değişen stratejik çevreye uyum sağlamak üzere, Gerasimov Doktrini çerçevesinde yeni bir stratejik yaklaşım ortaya konmuştur. Hibrit savaş kavramının ortaya koyduğu analitik çerçevenin geçerliliği Ukrayna müdahalesinin 2022 yılındaki safhasının ardından tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu aşamada Rus ordusunun icra ettiği operasyonlarda konvansiyonel karakter ön plana çıkmıştır. Diğer taraftan Rusya’nın sahada kullandığı yöntemler ve araçlar incelendiğinde çatışmaların hızlandığı süreç öncesinden başlayarak konvansiyonel asimetrik unsurlar ve bilgi boyutundaki hibridizasyonunun stratejik ortamı şekillendirdiği görülmektedir. Özcesi, hibrit savaşın analitik çerçevesinin değişen stratejik çevreyi anlamlandırmak üzere halen geçerliliğini koruduğu değerlendirilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Stratejik çevrenin değişimi, Hibrit Savaş, Konvansiyonel Asimetri, Gerasimov Doktrini, Ukrayna Müdahalesi

Kaynakça

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