Araştırma Makalesi
BibTex RIS Kaynak Göster

EFFECTS OF BOARD AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON CEO TURNOVER: A STUDY ON THE FIRMS LISTED IN BIST MANUFACTURING INDEX

Yıl 2016, Cilt: 8 Sayı: 14, 366 - 383, 07.04.2016
https://doi.org/10.20875/sb.70539

Öz

In this study, it was aimed to determine the effects of board and ownership structure on CEO turnover at the firms listed in Borsa Istanbul (BIST). Data was gathered from 136 firms operating in manufacturing industry for the years between 2009-2013. For these years firms were divided into two groups as firms with CEO turnover and firms with no CEO turnover and thus management and ownership differences of those two groups were analysed. Logistic regression, correlation, t-test methods and exploratory statistics were used in empirical analysis. At the end of the analysis, A positive relationship between board size-the capital share of the blockholder and CEO turnover was found; by contrast with this, it was determined that there is a negative relationship between board and CEO ownership and CEO turnover. In addition to this, it was found that CEO duality decreases the possibility of CEO turnover.

Kaynakça

  • Adams, R. B. & Ferreira D. (2009), “Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.94, No.2, (291–309).
  • Adams, J. C., Mansi, S. A., & Nishikawa, T. (2013), “Public Versus Private Ownership and Fund Manager Turnover”, Financial Management, Vol.42, No.1, (127-154).
  • Arosa B., Iturralde T. & Maseda A. (2013), “The Board Structure and Firm Performance in Smes: Evidence from Spain”, Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa, Vol.19, (127– 135).
  • Aygün, M. & İç, S. (2010), “Genel Müdürün Aynı Zamanda Yönetim Kurulu Üyesi Olması Firma Performansını Etkiler mi?”, Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi, Sayı.47, (192- 201).
  • Bayrakdaroğlu, A. (2010), “Mülkiyet Yapısı ve Finansal Performans: İMKB Örneği”, Ekonomi Bilimleri Dergisi, Vol.2, No.2, (11- 20).
  • Berle, A. & Means, G. (1932), The Modern Corporate and Private Property, McMillian, New York, NY. Borokhovich, K.A., Parrino, R. & Trapani, T. (1996), “Outside Directors and CEO Selection”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.31, No.3, (337–355).
  • Brickley, J. &Van Horn, R.L. (2002), “Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.95, No.1, (227–250).
  • Brunello, G., Graziano, C. & Parigi, B. M. (2003), “CEO Turnover in Insider-Dominated Boards: The Italian Case”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol.27, No.6, (1027-1051).
  • Cavaco, S., Challe, E., Crifo, P., Reberioux, A. & Roudaut, G. (2013), “Board Independence and Operating Performance: Analysis On (French) Company and Individual Data”, Departement D'economie, Ecole Polytechnique Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique, http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/drmwpaper/2014-2.htm, 01.07.2014.
  • Chang, E. C. & Wong, S. M. (2009), “Governance with Multiple Objectives: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in China”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.15, No.2, (230-244).
  • Chatterjee, S. & Harrison, J. (2001), “Corporate Governance”, In: Hitt, M.A., Freeman, R.E., Harrison, J.S. (Eds.), Handbook of Strategic Management. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, MA.
  • Chen, L. (2012), “The Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance: Evidence from Non-financial Listed Companies in Scandinavia”, Msc in Finance & International Business, Aarhus School of Business. Aarhus University.
  • Cheng, J., Cummins, J. D. & Lin, T. (2015), “Organizational Form, Ownership Structure, and CEO Turnover: Evidence From the Property–Casualty Insurance Industry”, Journal of Risk and Insurance, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jori.12083/abstract, 20.01.2016.
  • Chi, W., & Wang, Y. (2009), “Ownership, Performance and Executive Turnover in China”, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol.20, No.4, (465-478).
  • Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D. & Naveen, L. (2008), “Boards: Does One Size Fit All?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.87, (329- 356).
  • Conyon, M.J. & Peck, S. (1998), “Board Control, Remuneration Committees, And Top Management Compensation”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol.4, (146– 157).
  • Coughlan, A.T., Schmidt, R.M. (1985), “Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, And Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.7, No.1, (43–66).
  • Cvelbar, Ljubica K. (2007), “Influence of the Company Performance and Ownership Structure on CEO Turnover the Evidence of Slovenia”, Organizacija Journal of Management, Informatics and Human Resources, Vol.40, No.1, (1-16).
  • Dahya, J., Lonie, A. & Power, D. M. (1998), “Ownership Structure, Firm Performance And Top Executive Change: An Analysis of UK Firms”, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, Vol.25, (1089–118).
  • Dalton, D.R., Daily, C., Ellstrand, A., Johnson, J. (1998), “Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol.19, (269– 290).
  • Davila, J. P. (2013), “Board Characteristics and Firm Value: Evidence from Colombia”, http://world-financeconference.com/papers_wfc2/329.pdf, 11.02.2014.
  • Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., & Sarin, A. (1997), “Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.45, (193–221).
  • Di Pietra, R., Grambovas, C., Raonic, V. & Riccaboni, A. (2008), “The Effects Of Board Size and ‘Busy’ Directors on The Market Value of Italian Companies”, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol.12, (73– 91).
  • Eldenburg, L. & Krishnan, R. (2003), “Public Versus Private Governance: A Study of İncentives and Operational Performance”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.35, No.3, (377–404).
  • Fama, Eugene F. (1980), “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.88, No.2, (288–307).
  • Fama, E. F. & Jensen M. C. (1983), “Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of Law and Economics Vol.26, No.2, (301-325).
  • Fan, D. K., Lau, C. M., & Young, M. (2007), “Is China's Corporate Governance Beginning to Come of Age? The Case of CEO Turnover”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol.15, No.2, (153–193).
  • Farrell, K.A. & Whidbee, D. (2000), The” Consequences of Forced CEO Succession for Outside Directors. Journal of Business, Vol.73, (597– 627).
  • Fauzi, F. & Locke, S. (2012), Board Structure, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: A Study of New Zealand Listed-Firms. Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance, Vol.8, No.2, (43– 67).
  • Firth, M., Fung, P. M. & Rui, O. M. (2006), “Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol.43, No.6, (1289-1330).
  • Forbes, D.P. & Milliken, F. (1999), “Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards Of Directors As Strategic Decision-Making Groups”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.24, (489– 505).
  • Goyal, V. K. & Park C. W. (2002), “Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.8, (49–66).
  • Gujarati, N. Damodar (1995), “Basic Econometrics”,3rd Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, ISBN 0-07-0252149.
  • Helmich, D. (1980), “Board Size, Variation, And Rates Of Succession İn The Corporate Presidency”, Journal of Business Research, Vol.8, (51– 63).
  • Hoetker, G. (2007), “The Use Of Logit And Probit Models İn Strategic Management Research: Critical İssues”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol.28, (331-343).
  • Horváth, R. & Spirollari, P. (2012), “Do the Board of Directors´ Characteristics Influence Firm´s Performance? The U.S.”, Evidence. Prague Economic Papers, Vol.4, (470- 486).
  • Hoskisson, R.E., Eden, L., Lau, C. & Wright, M. (2000), “Strategy in Emerging Economies”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol.43, (249– 267).
  • Huson, M., Parrino, R. & Starks, L. (2001), “Internal Monitoring Mechanisms And CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective”, Journal of Finance, Vol.56, (2265–2298).
  • Jensen, M.C. (1993), “The Modern İndustrial Revolution, Exit, And The Failure Of İnternal Control Systems”, Journal of Finance, Vol.48, (831– 880).
  • Kakani, K. Ram.-Saha, Biswatosh.-Reddy, N. V. (2001), “Determinants of Financial Performance of Indian Corporate Sector in the Post-Liberalization Era: An Exploratory Study. NSE Research Initiative Paper, No.5, (12-30).
  • Kalaycı, Şeref (2010), “SPSS Uygulamalı Çok Değişkenli İstatistik Teknikleri”, 5. Baskı, Asil Yayınevi, Ankara.
  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A. (1999), “Corporate Ownership Around The World”, Journal of Finance, Vol.54, (471– 517) Liargovas, G. Panagitios-Skandalis, Konstantinos (2008), “Factor affecting firms financial performance The Case of Greece”, Global Business and Management Research: An International Journal, University of Peloponnese.
  • Lindrianasari, J. H. (2012). Antecedent and consequence factors of CEO turnover in Indonesia. Management Research Review, Vol.35, No.3, (206 – 224).
  • Mura, R. (2007), “Do Non-Executive Directors and Institutional Investors Have Minds of Their Own? Evidence on Performance of UK Firms”, http://www.efmaefm.org/efma2005/papers/179-mura_paper.pdf, 02.03.2014. Nguyen, B. D. (2011), “Ownership Structure And Board Characteristics As Determinants Of CEO Turnover İn French-Listed Companies, Journal of Finance, Vol.32, No.2, (53-89).
  • Ocak, M. (2013), “Yönetim Kurulu ve Üst Yönetimde Yer Alan Kadınların Finansal Performansa Etkisi: Türkiye'ye İlişkin Bulgular”, Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi, Sayı.60, (107- 126).
  • O’Connell, V. & Cramer, N. (2010), “The Relationship Between Firm Performance and Board Characteristics In Ireland”, European Management Journal, Vol.28, (387– 399).
  • Perry, T. (2000), “Incentive compensation for outside directors and CEO turnover”, Working Paper (Arizona State University).
  • Reyna, J. M. S. M. & Encalada, J. A. D. (2012), “Ownership Structure, Firm Value and Investment Opportunities Set: Evidence from Mexican Firms”, Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovation (JEMI), Vol.8, No.3, (35- 57).
  • Ünlü, U., Bayrakdaroğlu, A. ve Şamiloğlu, F. (2011), “Yönetici Sahipliği ve Firma Değeri: İMKB İçin Ampirik Bir Uygulama”, Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, Sayı.66, No.2, (201- 214).
  • Vo, D. & Phan, T. (2013), “Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence From Vietnam”, http://www.murdoch.edu.au/School-of-Management-and-Governance/_document/Australian-Conference-ofEconomists/Corporate-governance-and-firm-performance.pdf, 03.12.2013.
  • Volpin, Paolo F. (2002), “Governance With Poor İnvestor Protection: Evidence From Top Executive Turnover İn Italy”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.64, (61–90).
  • Weisbach, Michael S. (1988), “Outside Directors And CEO Turnover”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20, (431–460).
  • Yermack, D. (1996), “Higher market Valuation Of Companies With A Small Board Of Directors”, Journal Of Financial Economics, Vol.40, No.2, (185-211).
  • Yu, M. (2008), “CEO Duality and Firm Performance for Chinese Shareholding Companies”, 19th Chinese Economic Association (UK) Annual Conference, http://www.ceauk.org.uk/2008-conference-papers/YU-meiCEO-duality-firm-performance-Chinese-shareholding-companies.pdf, 07.01.2014.
  • Zhou, H., Xiong, Y., & Ganguli, G. (2009), “Does The Adoption Of International Financial Reporting Standards Restrain Earnings Management? Evidence From An Emerging Market”, Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, Vol.13, (43-56).

YÖNETİM KURULU VE SAHİPLİK YAPISININ CEO DEĞİŞİMİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: BİST İMALAT ENDEKSİ’NDE FAALİYET GÖSTEREN FİRMALAR ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA

Yıl 2016, Cilt: 8 Sayı: 14, 366 - 383, 07.04.2016
https://doi.org/10.20875/sb.70539

Öz

Bu çalışmada Borsa İstanbul’da (BİST) işlem gören firmaların yönetim kurulu ve sahiplik yapısının CEO değişimi üzerindeki etkisinin tespit edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Araştırmada 2009-2013 yılları arasında BİST imalat sanayide işlem gören 136 firmanın verilerinden yararlanılmıştır. Söz konusu yıllar arasında CEO’su değişen firmalar ve değişmeyen firmalar olarak iki gruba ayrılmış ve böylelikle iki grubun yönetim ve sahiplik yapısında ne gibi farklılıklar olduğunu tespit edilmiştir. Ampirik analizlerde lojistik regresyon, korelasyon, t-testi yöntemlerine ve tanımlayıcı istatistiklere yer verilmiştir. Yapılan analizler sonucunda yönetim kurulu üye sayısı ve büyük hissedarın sermaye payı ile CEO değişimi arasında pozitif bir ilişki; buna karşın yönetim kurulu ve CEO sahipliği ile CEO değişimi arasında negatif bir ilişki tespit edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte CEO’nun aynı zamanda yönetim kurulu başkanı olması durumunda CEO değişme ihtimali azaldığı belirlenmiştir. 

Kaynakça

  • Adams, R. B. & Ferreira D. (2009), “Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.94, No.2, (291–309).
  • Adams, J. C., Mansi, S. A., & Nishikawa, T. (2013), “Public Versus Private Ownership and Fund Manager Turnover”, Financial Management, Vol.42, No.1, (127-154).
  • Arosa B., Iturralde T. & Maseda A. (2013), “The Board Structure and Firm Performance in Smes: Evidence from Spain”, Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa, Vol.19, (127– 135).
  • Aygün, M. & İç, S. (2010), “Genel Müdürün Aynı Zamanda Yönetim Kurulu Üyesi Olması Firma Performansını Etkiler mi?”, Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi, Sayı.47, (192- 201).
  • Bayrakdaroğlu, A. (2010), “Mülkiyet Yapısı ve Finansal Performans: İMKB Örneği”, Ekonomi Bilimleri Dergisi, Vol.2, No.2, (11- 20).
  • Berle, A. & Means, G. (1932), The Modern Corporate and Private Property, McMillian, New York, NY. Borokhovich, K.A., Parrino, R. & Trapani, T. (1996), “Outside Directors and CEO Selection”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.31, No.3, (337–355).
  • Brickley, J. &Van Horn, R.L. (2002), “Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.95, No.1, (227–250).
  • Brunello, G., Graziano, C. & Parigi, B. M. (2003), “CEO Turnover in Insider-Dominated Boards: The Italian Case”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol.27, No.6, (1027-1051).
  • Cavaco, S., Challe, E., Crifo, P., Reberioux, A. & Roudaut, G. (2013), “Board Independence and Operating Performance: Analysis On (French) Company and Individual Data”, Departement D'economie, Ecole Polytechnique Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique, http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/drmwpaper/2014-2.htm, 01.07.2014.
  • Chang, E. C. & Wong, S. M. (2009), “Governance with Multiple Objectives: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in China”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.15, No.2, (230-244).
  • Chatterjee, S. & Harrison, J. (2001), “Corporate Governance”, In: Hitt, M.A., Freeman, R.E., Harrison, J.S. (Eds.), Handbook of Strategic Management. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, MA.
  • Chen, L. (2012), “The Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance: Evidence from Non-financial Listed Companies in Scandinavia”, Msc in Finance & International Business, Aarhus School of Business. Aarhus University.
  • Cheng, J., Cummins, J. D. & Lin, T. (2015), “Organizational Form, Ownership Structure, and CEO Turnover: Evidence From the Property–Casualty Insurance Industry”, Journal of Risk and Insurance, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jori.12083/abstract, 20.01.2016.
  • Chi, W., & Wang, Y. (2009), “Ownership, Performance and Executive Turnover in China”, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol.20, No.4, (465-478).
  • Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D. & Naveen, L. (2008), “Boards: Does One Size Fit All?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.87, (329- 356).
  • Conyon, M.J. & Peck, S. (1998), “Board Control, Remuneration Committees, And Top Management Compensation”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol.4, (146– 157).
  • Coughlan, A.T., Schmidt, R.M. (1985), “Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, And Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.7, No.1, (43–66).
  • Cvelbar, Ljubica K. (2007), “Influence of the Company Performance and Ownership Structure on CEO Turnover the Evidence of Slovenia”, Organizacija Journal of Management, Informatics and Human Resources, Vol.40, No.1, (1-16).
  • Dahya, J., Lonie, A. & Power, D. M. (1998), “Ownership Structure, Firm Performance And Top Executive Change: An Analysis of UK Firms”, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, Vol.25, (1089–118).
  • Dalton, D.R., Daily, C., Ellstrand, A., Johnson, J. (1998), “Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol.19, (269– 290).
  • Davila, J. P. (2013), “Board Characteristics and Firm Value: Evidence from Colombia”, http://world-financeconference.com/papers_wfc2/329.pdf, 11.02.2014.
  • Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., & Sarin, A. (1997), “Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.45, (193–221).
  • Di Pietra, R., Grambovas, C., Raonic, V. & Riccaboni, A. (2008), “The Effects Of Board Size and ‘Busy’ Directors on The Market Value of Italian Companies”, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol.12, (73– 91).
  • Eldenburg, L. & Krishnan, R. (2003), “Public Versus Private Governance: A Study of İncentives and Operational Performance”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.35, No.3, (377–404).
  • Fama, Eugene F. (1980), “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.88, No.2, (288–307).
  • Fama, E. F. & Jensen M. C. (1983), “Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of Law and Economics Vol.26, No.2, (301-325).
  • Fan, D. K., Lau, C. M., & Young, M. (2007), “Is China's Corporate Governance Beginning to Come of Age? The Case of CEO Turnover”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol.15, No.2, (153–193).
  • Farrell, K.A. & Whidbee, D. (2000), The” Consequences of Forced CEO Succession for Outside Directors. Journal of Business, Vol.73, (597– 627).
  • Fauzi, F. & Locke, S. (2012), Board Structure, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: A Study of New Zealand Listed-Firms. Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance, Vol.8, No.2, (43– 67).
  • Firth, M., Fung, P. M. & Rui, O. M. (2006), “Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol.43, No.6, (1289-1330).
  • Forbes, D.P. & Milliken, F. (1999), “Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards Of Directors As Strategic Decision-Making Groups”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.24, (489– 505).
  • Goyal, V. K. & Park C. W. (2002), “Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.8, (49–66).
  • Gujarati, N. Damodar (1995), “Basic Econometrics”,3rd Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, ISBN 0-07-0252149.
  • Helmich, D. (1980), “Board Size, Variation, And Rates Of Succession İn The Corporate Presidency”, Journal of Business Research, Vol.8, (51– 63).
  • Hoetker, G. (2007), “The Use Of Logit And Probit Models İn Strategic Management Research: Critical İssues”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol.28, (331-343).
  • Horváth, R. & Spirollari, P. (2012), “Do the Board of Directors´ Characteristics Influence Firm´s Performance? The U.S.”, Evidence. Prague Economic Papers, Vol.4, (470- 486).
  • Hoskisson, R.E., Eden, L., Lau, C. & Wright, M. (2000), “Strategy in Emerging Economies”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol.43, (249– 267).
  • Huson, M., Parrino, R. & Starks, L. (2001), “Internal Monitoring Mechanisms And CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective”, Journal of Finance, Vol.56, (2265–2298).
  • Jensen, M.C. (1993), “The Modern İndustrial Revolution, Exit, And The Failure Of İnternal Control Systems”, Journal of Finance, Vol.48, (831– 880).
  • Kakani, K. Ram.-Saha, Biswatosh.-Reddy, N. V. (2001), “Determinants of Financial Performance of Indian Corporate Sector in the Post-Liberalization Era: An Exploratory Study. NSE Research Initiative Paper, No.5, (12-30).
  • Kalaycı, Şeref (2010), “SPSS Uygulamalı Çok Değişkenli İstatistik Teknikleri”, 5. Baskı, Asil Yayınevi, Ankara.
  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A. (1999), “Corporate Ownership Around The World”, Journal of Finance, Vol.54, (471– 517) Liargovas, G. Panagitios-Skandalis, Konstantinos (2008), “Factor affecting firms financial performance The Case of Greece”, Global Business and Management Research: An International Journal, University of Peloponnese.
  • Lindrianasari, J. H. (2012). Antecedent and consequence factors of CEO turnover in Indonesia. Management Research Review, Vol.35, No.3, (206 – 224).
  • Mura, R. (2007), “Do Non-Executive Directors and Institutional Investors Have Minds of Their Own? Evidence on Performance of UK Firms”, http://www.efmaefm.org/efma2005/papers/179-mura_paper.pdf, 02.03.2014. Nguyen, B. D. (2011), “Ownership Structure And Board Characteristics As Determinants Of CEO Turnover İn French-Listed Companies, Journal of Finance, Vol.32, No.2, (53-89).
  • Ocak, M. (2013), “Yönetim Kurulu ve Üst Yönetimde Yer Alan Kadınların Finansal Performansa Etkisi: Türkiye'ye İlişkin Bulgular”, Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi, Sayı.60, (107- 126).
  • O’Connell, V. & Cramer, N. (2010), “The Relationship Between Firm Performance and Board Characteristics In Ireland”, European Management Journal, Vol.28, (387– 399).
  • Perry, T. (2000), “Incentive compensation for outside directors and CEO turnover”, Working Paper (Arizona State University).
  • Reyna, J. M. S. M. & Encalada, J. A. D. (2012), “Ownership Structure, Firm Value and Investment Opportunities Set: Evidence from Mexican Firms”, Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovation (JEMI), Vol.8, No.3, (35- 57).
  • Ünlü, U., Bayrakdaroğlu, A. ve Şamiloğlu, F. (2011), “Yönetici Sahipliği ve Firma Değeri: İMKB İçin Ampirik Bir Uygulama”, Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, Sayı.66, No.2, (201- 214).
  • Vo, D. & Phan, T. (2013), “Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence From Vietnam”, http://www.murdoch.edu.au/School-of-Management-and-Governance/_document/Australian-Conference-ofEconomists/Corporate-governance-and-firm-performance.pdf, 03.12.2013.
  • Volpin, Paolo F. (2002), “Governance With Poor İnvestor Protection: Evidence From Top Executive Turnover İn Italy”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.64, (61–90).
  • Weisbach, Michael S. (1988), “Outside Directors And CEO Turnover”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20, (431–460).
  • Yermack, D. (1996), “Higher market Valuation Of Companies With A Small Board Of Directors”, Journal Of Financial Economics, Vol.40, No.2, (185-211).
  • Yu, M. (2008), “CEO Duality and Firm Performance for Chinese Shareholding Companies”, 19th Chinese Economic Association (UK) Annual Conference, http://www.ceauk.org.uk/2008-conference-papers/YU-meiCEO-duality-firm-performance-Chinese-shareholding-companies.pdf, 07.01.2014.
  • Zhou, H., Xiong, Y., & Ganguli, G. (2009), “Does The Adoption Of International Financial Reporting Standards Restrain Earnings Management? Evidence From An Emerging Market”, Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, Vol.13, (43-56).
Toplam 55 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Bölüm Araştırma Makaleleri
Yazarlar

Mesut Doğan

Mete Karayel

Yayımlanma Tarihi 7 Nisan 2016
Gönderilme Tarihi 2 Şubat 2016
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2016 Cilt: 8 Sayı: 14

Kaynak Göster

APA Doğan, M., & Karayel, M. (2016). YÖNETİM KURULU VE SAHİPLİK YAPISININ CEO DEĞİŞİMİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: BİST İMALAT ENDEKSİ’NDE FAALİYET GÖSTEREN FİRMALAR ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA. Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 8(14), 366-383. https://doi.org/10.20875/sb.70539