Kurumsal Hırs, Yapısal Kısıt: Afrika Birliği’nin Güvenlik Rejiminin Sınırlarının Açıklanması

Öz

Bölgesel güvenlik kurumları, iddialı yetki ve görev tanımlarına ve sürdürülebilir dış desteğe rağmen neden sıklıkla yetersiz performans göstermektedir? Mevcut literatürün önemli bir kısmı kurumsal zayıflığı dış müdahaleye, kapasite eksikliklerine ya da asıl-vekil sorunlarına atfetmektedir. Ancak bu yaklaşımlar, tekrarlanan reformlara ve süregelen yatırımlara rağmen bu zayıflıkların neden devam ettiğini açıklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu makale, Afrika Birliği odağında yapısal bir alternatif ileri sürmektedir. Kurumsal yetersiz performansı açıklamak amacıyla üç sütunlu bir çerçeve geliştirmektedir: birincisi, zayıf yönetişim normlarını, egemenlik hassasiyetlerini ve rejim odaklı teşvikleri bölgesel kurumlara aktaran üye devletlerin iç siyasal düzenleri; ikincisi, karar alma tıkanıklığı, seçici uygulama ve uygulama eksiklikleri üreten kurumsal tasarım kısıtları; üçüncüsü ise, operasyonları sürdürürken aynı anda özerk reform kapasitesini ve siyasi sahipliği sınırlayan dış mali bağımlılık örüntüleridir. Yöntemsel olarak çalışma, nitel ve teori odaklı bir yaklaşım benimsemekte; Mali, Çad ve Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti örneklerinden yararlanarak bu dinamiklerin pratikte nasıl etkileşime girdiğini göstermektedir. Kurumsal işlevsizliği dönemsel ya da yönetsel bir sorun olarak ele almak yerine, bu makale zayıflığı söz konusu üç sütunun etkileşimi içinde yapısal olarak gömülü bir olgu olarak kavramsallaştırmaktadır. İç siyasal teşvikleri, kurumsal mimariyi ve dış bağımlılığı bütüncül bir analitik çerçevede birleştirerek, çalışma bölgesel güvenlik yönetişimi tartışmalarına katkı sunmakta ve kurumsal güçlendirme ile performansa ilişkin hâkim varsayımlara meydan okumaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Afrika Birliği
• Barış ve Güvenlik Kurumları
• Kurumsal Performans Yetersizliği
• Yapısal Teori
• Dış Bağımlılık

Institutional Ambition, Structural Constraint: Explaining the Limits of the African Union’s Security Regime

Öz

Why do regional security institutions frequently underperform despite ambitious mandates and sustained external support? Much of the existing literature attributes institutional weakness to external interference, capacity deficits, or principal–agent problems. However, these approaches remain limited in their ability to explain why such weaknesses persist despite repeated reforms and continued investment. This article advances a structural alternative focused on the African Union (AU). It develops a three-pillar framework to explain institutional underperformance: first, the domestic political orders of member states, which transmit weak governance norms, sovereignty sensitivities, and survival‑oriented incentives into regional institutions; second, institutional design constraints that generate decision‑making paralysis, selective enforcement, and implementation deficits; and third, patterns of external financial dependence, which sustain operations while simultaneously constraining autonomous reform and political ownership. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative, theorydriven approach, drawing on secondary literature and illustrative cases from Mali, Chad, and the Central African Republic to demonstrate how these dynamics interact in practice. Rather than treating dysfunction as episodic or managerial, the article conceptualizes weakness as structurally embedded in the interaction among these three pillars. By integrating domestic political incentives, institutional architecture, and external dependence into a unified analytical framework, the study contributes to broader debates on regional security governance and challenges prevailing assumptions about institutional strengthening and performance.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• African Union
• Peace and Security Institutions
• Institutional Underperformance
• Structural Theory
• External Dependence

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