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AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ

Yıl 2001, Cilt: 9 Sayı: 1, 115 - 135, 29.06.2001
https://doi.org/10.29228/mjes.269

Öz

Theoretically, there might exist at least four scenarios of the development of EU-Russia relations. These are confrontation, "cold peace", partnership, and integration. In real life though, this relationship is being shaped under the influence of two groups of factors: those hindering the mutually beneficial relations and those furthering it. The factors, which adversely affect the relations between EU and Russia include: mutual perceptions and stereotypes formed over a long period of time; concrete geo-political situation at the tum of the centuries - created, first and foremost, by the disintegration of the Soviet Union- in which EU-Russia relations are developing; and the specific features of Russia's postcommunist transformation.

Many influential policy-makers in the EU countries, to say nothing of the even larger numbers of ordinary Europeans, hold that Russia is an unEuropean nation, the Europe's Other. This view finds its mirror reflection in the political philosophy of some Russian politicians and some segments of the public. The collapse of the USSR has created a certain asymmetry in the development of Russia and EU. By the beginning of the 1990s the bipolar Europe was replaced by the mono-centric Europe: the affluent and democratic Western Europe has proved to be the only region of the continent which demonstrates stability and dynamism with EU and NATO being the key organisations in the spheres of economic cooperation and security. On the one hand, there is an ongoing enlargement of EU and NATO, on the other, there persists a strategically ill-defined situation in the post-Soviet space; whereas EU is using its economic might to strengthen its political influence, Russia's economic weakness significantly limits political
influence of Moscow. And, last but not least, there are problems stemming from Russia's troubled inner development. So far, the post-Soviet Russia, economically volatile and potentially unstable, is not perceived by EU bureaucrats as a mature partner. At the same time, there are important factors stimulating closer relations and cooperation between EU and Russia. First, it is a high level of social and political interdependence. Both EU and Russia need to join efforts in order to meet various global challenges, ranging from political extremism to illegal refugees to international crime.' Second, it is a need to strengthen European security in traditional, i.e. military, sense. And third, it is a complementary character of EU-Russia economic relations.

The programmatic documents, both signed by EU and Russia (PCA) and elaborated by Brussels as its own strategic blueprint (Common Strategy on Russia), describe the current stage of EU-Russia relations as partnership. However, partnership presupposes high level of mutual trust, general consensus with regard to basic values and principles of political democracy, compatibility of economic systems and close economic ties as well as unification of positions on foreign and security policies. Thus understood, partnership between EU and Russia can only be viewed today as a distant goal. Whether it is finally achieved will be determined by the combination of the possibilities and limits of two parties' interaction. It would seem that currently there is a conspicuous discrepancy between EU and Russia in their interpreting of the PCA. Of two main dimensions - political and economic - outlined in the PCA, Russia is mostly interested in the latter and believes that political dialog is of secondary importance. As for EU, it is the other way around: Brussels is mostly interested in political goals and displays a certain restraint in economic sphere. The EU countries' direct investment in Russian economy remains negligible. This does not bode particularly well for the EU-Russia relationship in the near future for Russia's interests in political realm are especially vulnerable: suffice it to mention human rights problem, position of mass media, war in Chechnya, policy toward former Soviet periphery, disagreement with NATO enlargement. With Brussels keeping on its pressure in political dimension and not making any concessions in economic sphere, the EU-Russia relations are likely to fluctuate between a nascent immature partnership and "cold peace".

Kaynakça

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AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ

Yıl 2001, Cilt: 9 Sayı: 1, 115 - 135, 29.06.2001
https://doi.org/10.29228/mjes.269

Öz

Kaynakça

  • -
Toplam 1 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Esra Hatipoğlu Bu kişi benim

Yayımlanma Tarihi 29 Haziran 2001
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2001 Cilt: 9 Sayı: 1

Kaynak Göster

APA Hatipoğlu, E. (2001). AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ. Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, 9(1), 115-135. https://doi.org/10.29228/mjes.269
AMA Hatipoğlu E. AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ. MJES. Haziran 2001;9(1):115-135. doi:10.29228/mjes.269
Chicago Hatipoğlu, Esra. “AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ”. Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi 9, sy. 1 (Haziran 2001): 115-35. https://doi.org/10.29228/mjes.269.
EndNote Hatipoğlu E (01 Haziran 2001) AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ. Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi 9 1 115–135.
IEEE E. Hatipoğlu, “AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ”, MJES, c. 9, sy. 1, ss. 115–135, 2001, doi: 10.29228/mjes.269.
ISNAD Hatipoğlu, Esra. “AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ”. Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi 9/1 (Haziran 2001), 115-135. https://doi.org/10.29228/mjes.269.
JAMA Hatipoğlu E. AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ. MJES. 2001;9:115–135.
MLA Hatipoğlu, Esra. “AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ”. Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, c. 9, sy. 1, 2001, ss. 115-3, doi:10.29228/mjes.269.
Vancouver Hatipoğlu E. AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ. MJES. 2001;9(1):115-3.