DEVLETİN DÜZENLEYİCİ ROLÜ VE REGÜLASYON TEORİLERİ

Yıl 2005, Cilt: 6 Sayı: 23, 249 - 257, 10.01.2005

Savaş Çevik Murat Demir

Öz

Devletin ekonomik hayatta müdahaleci bir rol üstlenmesini kabul ve teşvik eden anlayış 1970’lerden itibaren ciddi bir şekilde eleştirilmeye başlanırken, bu süreçte devletin ekonomik yapı içerisindeki rolünde de bir dönüşüm söz konusu olmuştur. Söz konusu süreçte devlet müdahalesinin geleneksel teorik ve pratik nedenleri üzerinde önemli tartışmalar olmuş, devletin aktif rol aldığı bir takım sektörleri özel kesime devrederek ekonomik ve siyasal yaşamda oyunun kurallarım koyan ve denetleyen bir yapı içerisinde devletin düzenleyici bir rol üstlenmesini kabul eden bir yapılanma ve devlet anlayışı benimsenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, ekonomik alana kamu girişimciliği biçimindeki geleneksel devlet müdahaleciliği kısmen biçim değiştirmiş ve regülasyon uygulamaları devlet müdahalelerini şekillendirmeye başlamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Regülasyon, Regülasyoıı Teorileri, Düzenleyici Devlet

Kaynakça

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