ENRON OLAYI’NI DOĞRU OKUMAK-I: BİR ÇÖZÜMLEME DENEMESİ

Öz

Enron’un çöküşünü bir dizi faktörün bileşik bir sonucu olarak değerlendirilmek gerekmektedir. Türkiye’de birEnron skandalı ile karşılaşmamak için olayın nedenleri doğru teşhis edilmek durumundadır. Enron’un hızlı yükseliş ve çöküşünde üst yöneticilerin kişisel özellikleri ile bağımsız denetim firmasının ihmâl ve yetersizlikleriön plana çıkarılmaktadır, ancak söz konusu kişilerin siyaset kurumu ile gereğinden çok yakın kişisel ve parasalilişkileri, düzenleyici kuruluşların mevcût şirket uygulamalarını onaylayıcı tutumları, medyanın Enron etrafındasanal bir başarı hikâyesi kurgulaması, Enron çalışanlarının şirketle ilgili olumsuz gelişmelere gözlerini kapatması, sürekli borçlanma gereksinimi içindeki Amerikan ekonomisinin tahvil ve hisse senedi piyasalarına daimave daha çok dış ve iç yatırımcı çekmek amacıyla Enron’a benzeyen şirket performansları görmek istemesi, analistlerin yanıltıcı şirket analizleri, akademyanın kamuyu eleştirmeyerek ve fakat genellikle överek olağanüstübaşarı hikayelerini öğretmesi, ihtiyatlı davranmayarak oluşturulan yapay finansal oyun zincirine katılmaktan çekinmeyen kredi ve finans kuruluşları ve yıldan yıla yükselen getirilere bakarak karar veren miyop yatırımcılargözden kaçırılmaktadır. Durum böyle kabul edilirse, kurumsal yönetimin hemen bütün mekanizmaları, finansalraporlama sürecinin bütün oyuncuları ve malî sistemin bütün unsurlarının Enron olayında az çok etkisinin olduğu teslim edilecek, çözüm önerilerinin bireysel değil, kurumsal ve sistemik temelde geliştirilmesi daha rasyonel olacak, hatta yönetici ve denetçilerin sorumlulukları bile bu bağlam içinde daha iyi anlaşılacaktır

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Enron olayı, kurumsal yönetim organları, muhasebe hileleri, bağımsız denetim, malî sistem

THE REAL ENRON SCANDAL-I : AN ATTEMPT TO ANALYZE THE ENRON SCANDAL

Öz

The collapse of Enron had better to be be evaluated as a resultant of a series of contributing factors. In order fornot facing with a Turkish Enron, the underlying causes of this event must be correctly detected. In the rapid rise and fall of Enron, the public usually put the blame on the personal characteristics of top Enron executivesand the inability and negligence of Arthur Andersen auditors, but the political relations of Enron executiveswhich cannot be regarded at arms’ length, regulatory agencies’ reluctance to object present Enron policies andpractices, the media’s construction of an imaginary Enron miracle, Enron employees’s indifference to adversefinancial information about the company, American economy’s increasing borrowing requirement and eagerness to attract more of investors from abroad and within the country to its markets with the help of Enron-likecorporate performances, financial analysts' misleading analyses regarding Enron, the academia’s teaching thecase of Enron by not criticising but by praising and investors’ appetite to have ever-growing rate of returns have usually been overlooked. If this is the case, it should be admitted that almost all corporate governance mechanisms, all components in the financial reporting process, and even all the players of the financial system have more or less an effect on the occurrence of the Enron debacle. Thus, the remedies should focus on overcoming not some individual weaknesses but the failures of the financial system; in fact the responsibilities of executives and auditors can better be unsterstood within this broader context

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Enron debacle, corporate governance mechanisms, accounting frauds, auditing, financial system

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