ACCEPTABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (İnsan Hakları Bağlamında Demokraside Yargı Denetiminin Kabul Edilebilirliği)

Yıl 2015, Sayı: 5, 589 - 604, 02.10.2015

Dr. Serkan Kızılyel

Öz

Human rights globally become an inarguable virtue and it requires the conviction that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity. According to the current dominant paradigm, the protection of human rights is one of the most important obligations of the state. In both national and international level, courts are primarily equipped to protect human rights in any circumstances. On the other hand, democracy representing by the elected parliaments traditionally means decisions by the majority. These two important merits, democracy or parliaments and human rights or courts, interact with each other. Usually the relationship between them is based on the fact that they support each other. However, over the years it is observed that there can be conflicts between them. In this case, the absolute power of majority and the rights of individuals or minorities in democracy may come into collision with each other. At this point the controversial question whether there is a rational and practical reason to give decision-making power to unelected judges rather than to democratic majority or not come to light. This essay focuses on the acceptability of judicial review in democracy and the sufficiency of democratic perspective of human rights

Anahtar Kelimeler

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İnsan Hakları Bağlamında Demokraside Yargı Denetiminin Kabul Edilebilirliği

Öz

Evrensel düzeyde insan hakları tartışmasız bir değer haline gelmiş ve tüm insanların onuruyla özgür ve eşit doğdukları kabulünü zorunlu hale getirmiştir. Günümüz egemen paradigmasına göre insan haklarının korunması devletin en temel görevlerinden biridir. Hem ulusal hem de uluslararası düzeyde mahkemeler, öncelikle insan haklarının her koşulda korunması için yetkilendirilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, seçilmiş parlamentolar tarafından temsil edilen demokrasi en eski anlamıyla çoğunluk tarafından alınan kararlar anlamına gelmektedir. Demokrasi ya da parlamentolar ile insan hakları ya da mahkemeler şeklindeki iki değer arasındaki bir etkileşim bulunmaktadır. Genelde bunlar arasındaki ilişki, bunların birbirilerini desteklemesi şeklindedir. Bununla birlikte, uzun yıllardır yapılan gözleme göre bunlar arasında bir çatışma olması da mümkündür. Bu halde, demokraside çoğunluğun mutlak gücü ile bireylerin ya da azınlığın hakları arasında bir çatışma hali yaşanabilir. Bu noktada, seçilmemiş olan hâkimlere karar verme yetkisi verilmesinin mantıksal ya da pratik bir nedeninin bulunup bulunmadığına ilişkin tartışmalı soru gündeme gelmektedir. Bu makale, demokrasilerde yargısal denetimin kabul edilebilirliği ve insan haklarında demokratik perspektif üzerinde durmaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

İnsan Hakları, Demokrasi, Yargısal Denetim, Parlamento, Mahkeme, Jeremy Waldron.

Kaynakça

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