Reviewing the Extended Mind Theory: Theoretical Insights and the Role of Experimental Philosophy in Understanding Cognitive Boundaries

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 8 Sayı: 1, 1 - 24, 30.06.2025

Necmıye Yuksel

https://doi.org/10.51404/metazihin.1692629

Öz

This study proposes a theoretical account of the evolution of the extended mind hypothesis by using experimental philosophy (x-phi) in the study of the concept of intrinsic content. Building on Clark's (1998) argument on behalf of extended cognition and Adams and Aizawa's (2001) neural-centric process argument, it considers how cognitive boundary judgments relying on intuition can illuminate the use of external devices, such as notebooks or mobile phones, in mental processes. The study concludes that x-phi's methods, which explore folk intuitions, offer a practical means of figuring out whether intrinsic content is contained in the brain or distributed across external systems. By considering factors like socioeconomic status that may affect intuitions, it highlights x-phi's ability to provide empirical insights to discussions in philosophy of mind (Knobe & Nichols, 2008). Drawing on inter-disciplinary methods across several disciplines (Yüksel, 2021), this research links philosophy and cognitive science and offers an addition to debates around 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive). The proposed method is aimed at making the theoretical and intuitive components of extended mind theory more transparent and providing a gateway towards future empirical investigations.

Anahtar Kelimeler

extended mind theory , experimental philosophy , folk intuition , intrinsic content , socio-economic status , 4E cognition

Genişletilmiş Zihin Kuramı Üzerine: Bilişsel Sınırları Anlamada Kuramsal Yaklaşımlar ve Deneysel Felsefenin Rolü

Öz

Bu çalışma, içsel içerik (intrinsic content) kavramının araştırılmasında deneysel felsefe (experimental philosophy/x-phi) yöntemlerinden yararlanarak, genişletilmiş zihin teorisinin (extended mind theory) kuramsal gelişimine yönelik bir değerlendirme sunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, Clark’ın (1998) genişletilmiş biliş (extended cognition) yaklaşımı ile Adams ve Aizawa’nın (2001) sinir-merkezli süreç (neural-centric process) savı temel alınarak, bireylerin dışsal araçlar—örneğin cep telefonları ya da not defterleri—ile zihinsel süreçleri ilişkilendirme biçimleri, verdikleri felsefi yargılar (philosophical judgments) üzerinden ele alınmaktadır. Araştırma, felsefi yargılara odaklanan deneysel felsefe yöntemlerinin, içsel içeriğin yalnızca beyin merkezli (brain-centred) olarak mı bulunduğunu yoksa zihinden dış dünyaya aktarılarak mı dağıldığını (distributed) anlamanın işlevsel bir araç sunduğunu öne sürmektedir. Ayrıca, bu tür felsefi yargıları etkileyebilecek sosyo-ekonomik durum (socioeconomic status) gibi etmenler göz önünde bulundurularak, deneysel felsefenin zihin felsefesi tartışmalara ampirik katkı sağlayabileceği vurgulanmaktadır (Knobe & Nichols, 2008). Disiplinlerarası yöntemlerden (Yüksel, 2021) yararlanan bu araştırma, felsefe ile bilişsel arasında bir köprü kurmakta ve 4E biliş (4E cognition-embodied: bedenlenmiş, embedded: gömülü, extended: genişletilmiş, enactive: etkin/edimsel) çerçevesindeki tartışmalara katkı sunmaktadır. Önerilen yöntem, genişletilmiş zihin teorisinin hem kuramsal boyutlarını hem de felsefi yargıya dayalı yönlerini daha görünür kılmayı ve ileride gerçekleştirilecek ampirik araştırmalar için bir temel oluşturmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

genişletilmiş zihin teorisi , deneysel felsefe , halk yargısı , içsel içerik , sosyoekonomik durum , 4E biliş

Kaynakça

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