Gümrük Tarifeleri, Uluslararası Ticaret ve Ekonomik Büyüme ile Yolsuzluk Arasındaki İlişki: BRICS-T Ülkeleri Üzerine Ampirik Bir Araştırma

Öz

Küreselleşme süreciyle birlikte ülkeler arasındaki ekonomik ve ticari ilişkiler giderek artmaktadır. Bu süreçte ülkeler için yolsuzluk problemi hem ekonomik hem de ticari kayıplar yaşamasına neden olan önemli bir sorun haline gelmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, çalışma kapsamında gümrük tarifeleri, uluslararası ticaret ve ekonomik büyümenin yükselen ekonomilerden oluşan BRICS-T ülkelerinde yolsuzluk üzerindeki etkileri analiz edilmiştir. Değişkenler arasındaki uzun dönemli ilişkiler Westerlund panel eşbütünleşme testleri ile test edilmiştir. Analiz sonuçlarına göre ihracat, ithalat, gümrük tarifeleri, gayrisafi yurtiçi hâsıla (GSYİH) ve yolsuzluk arasında uzun dönemli ilişkilerin olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Değişkenler arasındaki uzun dönemli ilişkiler tespit edildikten sonra bu ilişkilerin yönünü ortaya koymak için nedensellik analizleri gerçekleştirilmiştir. Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel nedensellik testi sonuçlarına göre gümrük tarifeleri, ithalat ve gayrisafi yurtiçi hasıladan yolsuzluk faaliyetlerine doğru tek yönlü nedensellik ilişkilerinin bulunduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Yolsuzluk
• Gümrük Tarifeleri
• Uluslararası Ticaret
• Ekonomik Büyüme

The Nexus Between Custom Tariffs, International Trade, Economic Growth and Corruption: An Empirical Investigation on BRICS-T Countries

Öz

Economic and commercial relations among the countries have increased associated with the globalization. In this process, the problem of corruption for countries has become an important problem that causes both economic and commercial losses. Accordingly, it is analyzed the effects of custom tariffs, international trade and economic growth on corruption in BRICS-T countries that are named emerging economies within the scope of the paper. The long-term relationships between the variables are analyzed with Westerlund panel cointegration tests. According to the results of the analysis, it is determined that there are long-term relationships between exports, imports, custom tariffs, gross domestic product (GDP) and corruption. After determining the long-term relationships between the variables, causality analyses have carried out in order to reveal the direction of these relationships. According to the Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel causality test results, it has been determined that there are unidirectional causality relationships from custom tariffs, imports and gross domestic product to corruption.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Corruption
• Custom Tariffs
• International Trade
• Economic Growth

Kaynakça

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