Firma Yönetim Kurulu Cinsiyet Çeşitliliğinin Temsil Maliyetleri Üzerindeki Etkisi: Borsa İstanbul Örneği

Yıl 2022, , 37 - 58, 24.10.2022

Aysel Öztürkçü Akçay , Gamze Sevimli Örgün , Halil Cem Sayın

https://doi.org/10.25095/mufad.1113214

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, firma yönetim kurulundaki cinsiyet çeşitliliğinin ve kadın üye dağılımının temsil maliyetleri
üzerindeki etkisini incelemektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda çalışmada, Borsa İstanbul’a kayıtlı 202 finansal olmayan firmanın
2012-2020 dönemine ait verileri panel veri analiz yöntemiyle analize tabi tutularak, firmaların yönetim kurulunda kadın üye
bulunması ile temsil maliyetleri arasındaki ilişki belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Analiz sonuçları, yönetim kurulunda kadın
üyelerin varlığının temsil maliyetlerini anlamlı düzeyde azaltarak asil-vekil çatışmasını hafiflettiğini göstermiştir. Ayrıca,
kritik kitle teorisi ile tutarlı biçimde, üç veya daha fazla kadın üyeye sahip yönetim kurullarının daha az sayıda kadın üyeye
sahip yönetim kurullarına kıyasla temsil maliyetlerinin azaltılmasında daha güçlü bir etkiye sahip oldukları görülmüştür.
Çalışmanın sonuçları, kadın yöneticilerin firmada kurumsal yönetişimin yerleşmesinde, temsil sorununun çözümünde, temsil
maliyetlerinin azaltılmasında ve hissedarlar ile diğer paydaşların çıkarlarının korunmasında daha etkili olduklarına işaret
etmektedir. Dolayısıyla, firmaların yönetim kurullarında kadın üyelerin varlığını artırmaya yönelik düzenlemeler ve
çalışmalar yapılması önerilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Cinsiyet çeşitliliği, temsil maliyeti, kaynak bağımlılığı teorisi, kritik kitle teorisi, panel veri analizi.

Destekleyen Kurum

Yok

Proje Numarası

Yok

The Effect of Board Gender Diversity on Agency Costs: Evidence from Borsa Istanbul

Öz

This study aims to examine the effects of board gender diversity and female member composition on agency costs.
For this aim, the data of 202 non-financial companies listed in Borsa Istanbul for the period of 2012-2020 were analyzed by
panel data analysis method, and the relationship between female presence on the board and the agency cost was tried to be
determined. The results indicate that female presence on the board significantly reduces the agency cost and, hence,
mitigates the principal-agent conflict. Moreover, consistent with the critical mass theory, it was found that boards with three
or more female members have a stronger impact on reducing the agency cost, as compared to fewer female members on the
board. The results of the study indicate that female directors are more effective in establishing corporate governance in the
firm, solving the agency problem, reducing the agency cost and are in a better position to safeguard the interests of
stakeholders. Therefore, it is recommended that the policymakers focus on regulations and programs to increase the female
members presence on the boards of firms.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Gender diversity, agency cost, resource dependence theory, critical mass theory, panel data analysis.

Proje Numarası

Yok

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