Araştırma Makalesi
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The Rise of “Independent Board Members” in TURKEY

Yıl 2017, , 249 - 272, 01.01.2017
https://doi.org/10.25095/mufad.396755

Öz

With regulations on corporate governance set forth by the Capital Markets Board, in line with the developments taking place worldwide, an obligation to have independent board members on the board of directors is born. While improving the corporate governance standards of a company, this regulation also positively contributes to the economy of the country as a whole through positively affecting its foreign direct investments. Since independent board members are expected to take influential roles in the key areas of a company such as strategy setting, performance evaluation, risk taking and human related issues; an effective independent board member should possess technical as well as interpersonal skills. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the significance of “independent board members” that has a substantial role in the implementation process of corporate governance rules in Emerging Markets like Turkey.

Kaynakça

  • 3 rd Annual Report, W oman on Board – Turkey (2015), Independent Women Directors Project, Sabancı University & Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey.
  • Adams, Renee – Ferreira, Daniel (2007), “A Theory of Friendly Boards”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 62 Issue 1, pp. 217- 250.
  • Barr att, Ruth - Kakabadse, Nada (2002), “Developing reflexive corporate leadership, The role of the non- executive director”, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, Vol.2, Issue 3, pp. 32- 36.
  • Brickey, Kathleen (2003), “From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes -Oxley”, Washington University in St. Louis – School of Law, Faculty Working Papers Series, Paper No. 03 -06- 01.
  • Cadbury, Adrian (1992), “The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance”, Burgess Science Press, Great Britain.
  • Capital Markets Board, www.spk.gov.tr
  • Cheffins, Brian (2012), “The History of Corporate Governance”, Law Working Paper No. 184, University of Cambridge and ECGI.
  • Dravis, Bruce (2007), The role of independent directors after Sarbanes -Oxley. American Bar Association, USA.
  • Eisenhardt, Kathleen (1989), “Agency theory: an assessment and review”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.14 no. 1, pp.57- 74.
  • Elson, Charles - Gyves, Christopher (2003), “The Enr on Failure and Corporate Governance Reform”, Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 855- 856.
  • Fama, Eugene – Jensen, Michael (1983), “The Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26 no.2, pp. 301- 325.
  • Forbes, Daniel - Mil liken, Frances (1999), “Cognition and corporate governance: understanding boards of directors as strategic decision- making groups”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.24 no.3, pp. 489- 505.
  • Geletkanycz, Marta- Hambrick, Donald (1997), “The external ties of top executives: implications for strategic choice performance”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.42 No.4, pp. 654- 681.
  • Gupta, Rupesh Kumar (2013), “Effects of Corporate Governance on Foreign Direct Investment”, International Journal of Management”, MIT College of Management, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 46- 51.
  • Higgs, D. (2003). Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non- Executive Directors. Department of Trade and Industry/HMSO, London.
  • Hoitash, Udi (2011), “Should Independent Board Members with Social Ties to Management Disqualify Themselves from Serving on the Board”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 99 Issue 3, pp. 399- 423.
  • Johnson, Rischard - Greening, Daniel. (1999), “The effects of corporate governance and institutional ownership types on corporate social per formance”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol.42 no.5, pp.564- 576.
  • Pass, Christopher (2004), “Corporate Governance and the role of non- executive directors in large UK companies: an empirical study”, Corporate Governance : The International Journal of Business in Society, Vol. 4 Issue 2, pp. 52- 63.
  • Porta, Rafael La - Lopez -de-Silanes, Florencio - Shleifer, Andrei - Vishny, Robert (2000), “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58 Issues 1 -2, pp. 3- 27.
  • Romano, Roberta (2004), “The Sarbanes –Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance”, Working paper, Yale University, NBER and ECGI.
  • Steele, M. (2008). The Business Case for Corporate Governance. Cambridge University Press. pp.55- 60
  • The Communiqué on Corporate Governance, Numbered 28871, 03.01.2014, Official Gazette, CMB of Turkey
  • The Communiqué Regarding the Designation and Application of Corporate Governance Rules, Serial: IV, No: 54, 11.10.2011, Official Gazette, CMB of T urkey
  • Wang, Jia - Dewhirst, Dudley (1992), “Boards of directors and business ethics”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 11 Issue 2, pp.115- 123.
  • Westphal, James (1999), “Collaboration in the Board Room: Behavioral and Performance Consequences on CEO Board Social Ties”, The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 42 no.1, pp.7- 24.
  • Zhang, Ivy Xiying (2007), “Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 44, Issues 1- 2, pp. 74- 115.

Türkiye’de “Bağımsız Yönetim Kurulu Üyeleri”nin Yükselişi

Yıl 2017, , 249 - 272, 01.01.2017
https://doi.org/10.25095/mufad.396755

Öz

Dünyada gerçekleşen gelişmelere paralel olarak, Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu’nun, kurumsal yönetim ile ilgili yürürlüğe koyduğu yönetmeliklerle birlikte, yönetim kurulunda bağımsız üyelerin bulunması zorunluluğu getirilmiştir. Bu yönetmelik, şirketlerin kurumsal yönetimlerini iyileştirdiği gibi, doğrudan yabancı yatırımları da pozitif bir şekilde etkileyerek ülkelerin bütününün ekonomisine de olumlu bir şekilde katkı sağlamaktadır. Bir şirketin kilit noktaları olan stratejisinin oluşturulması, performans değerlendirilmesi, risk alınması ve personel ile ilgili işlerde bağımsız yönetim kurulu üyelerinin önemli bir rol alması beklendiğinden, etkili bir bağımsız yönetim kurulu üyesinin hep teknik hem de kişiler arası yeteneklerinin olması gerekmektedir. Bu makalenin amacı Türkiye gibi gelişmekte olan ülkelerde kurumsal yönetim kurallarının uygulama sürecinde önemli bir görev alan “bağımsız yönetim kurulu üyelerinin” önemini analiz etmektir.

Kaynakça

  • 3 rd Annual Report, W oman on Board – Turkey (2015), Independent Women Directors Project, Sabancı University & Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey.
  • Adams, Renee – Ferreira, Daniel (2007), “A Theory of Friendly Boards”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 62 Issue 1, pp. 217- 250.
  • Barr att, Ruth - Kakabadse, Nada (2002), “Developing reflexive corporate leadership, The role of the non- executive director”, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, Vol.2, Issue 3, pp. 32- 36.
  • Brickey, Kathleen (2003), “From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes -Oxley”, Washington University in St. Louis – School of Law, Faculty Working Papers Series, Paper No. 03 -06- 01.
  • Cadbury, Adrian (1992), “The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance”, Burgess Science Press, Great Britain.
  • Capital Markets Board, www.spk.gov.tr
  • Cheffins, Brian (2012), “The History of Corporate Governance”, Law Working Paper No. 184, University of Cambridge and ECGI.
  • Dravis, Bruce (2007), The role of independent directors after Sarbanes -Oxley. American Bar Association, USA.
  • Eisenhardt, Kathleen (1989), “Agency theory: an assessment and review”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.14 no. 1, pp.57- 74.
  • Elson, Charles - Gyves, Christopher (2003), “The Enr on Failure and Corporate Governance Reform”, Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 855- 856.
  • Fama, Eugene – Jensen, Michael (1983), “The Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26 no.2, pp. 301- 325.
  • Forbes, Daniel - Mil liken, Frances (1999), “Cognition and corporate governance: understanding boards of directors as strategic decision- making groups”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.24 no.3, pp. 489- 505.
  • Geletkanycz, Marta- Hambrick, Donald (1997), “The external ties of top executives: implications for strategic choice performance”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.42 No.4, pp. 654- 681.
  • Gupta, Rupesh Kumar (2013), “Effects of Corporate Governance on Foreign Direct Investment”, International Journal of Management”, MIT College of Management, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 46- 51.
  • Higgs, D. (2003). Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non- Executive Directors. Department of Trade and Industry/HMSO, London.
  • Hoitash, Udi (2011), “Should Independent Board Members with Social Ties to Management Disqualify Themselves from Serving on the Board”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 99 Issue 3, pp. 399- 423.
  • Johnson, Rischard - Greening, Daniel. (1999), “The effects of corporate governance and institutional ownership types on corporate social per formance”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol.42 no.5, pp.564- 576.
  • Pass, Christopher (2004), “Corporate Governance and the role of non- executive directors in large UK companies: an empirical study”, Corporate Governance : The International Journal of Business in Society, Vol. 4 Issue 2, pp. 52- 63.
  • Porta, Rafael La - Lopez -de-Silanes, Florencio - Shleifer, Andrei - Vishny, Robert (2000), “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58 Issues 1 -2, pp. 3- 27.
  • Romano, Roberta (2004), “The Sarbanes –Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance”, Working paper, Yale University, NBER and ECGI.
  • Steele, M. (2008). The Business Case for Corporate Governance. Cambridge University Press. pp.55- 60
  • The Communiqué on Corporate Governance, Numbered 28871, 03.01.2014, Official Gazette, CMB of Turkey
  • The Communiqué Regarding the Designation and Application of Corporate Governance Rules, Serial: IV, No: 54, 11.10.2011, Official Gazette, CMB of T urkey
  • Wang, Jia - Dewhirst, Dudley (1992), “Boards of directors and business ethics”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 11 Issue 2, pp.115- 123.
  • Westphal, James (1999), “Collaboration in the Board Room: Behavioral and Performance Consequences on CEO Board Social Ties”, The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 42 no.1, pp.7- 24.
  • Zhang, Ivy Xiying (2007), “Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 44, Issues 1- 2, pp. 74- 115.
Toplam 26 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Konular İşletme
Diğer ID JA88ZY67YY
Bölüm Araştırma Makalesi
Yazarlar

Nur İrem Nuhoğlu Bu kişi benim

Seda Erdoğan Bu kişi benim

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Ocak 2017
Gönderilme Tarihi 1 Ocak 2017
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2017

Kaynak Göster

APA Nuhoğlu, N. İ., & Erdoğan, S. (2017). The Rise of “Independent Board Members” in TURKEY. Muhasebe Ve Finansman Dergisi(73), 249-272. https://doi.org/10.25095/mufad.396755
AMA Nuhoğlu Nİ, Erdoğan S. The Rise of “Independent Board Members” in TURKEY. Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi. Ocak 2017;(73):249-272. doi:10.25095/mufad.396755
Chicago Nuhoğlu, Nur İrem, ve Seda Erdoğan. “The Rise of ‘Independent Board Members’ in TURKEY”. Muhasebe Ve Finansman Dergisi, sy. 73 (Ocak 2017): 249-72. https://doi.org/10.25095/mufad.396755.
EndNote Nuhoğlu Nİ, Erdoğan S (01 Ocak 2017) The Rise of “Independent Board Members” in TURKEY. Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi 73 249–272.
IEEE N. İ. Nuhoğlu ve S. Erdoğan, “The Rise of ‘Independent Board Members’ in TURKEY”, Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi, sy. 73, ss. 249–272, Ocak 2017, doi: 10.25095/mufad.396755.
ISNAD Nuhoğlu, Nur İrem - Erdoğan, Seda. “The Rise of ‘Independent Board Members’ in TURKEY”. Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi 73 (Ocak 2017), 249-272. https://doi.org/10.25095/mufad.396755.
JAMA Nuhoğlu Nİ, Erdoğan S. The Rise of “Independent Board Members” in TURKEY. Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi. 2017;:249–272.
MLA Nuhoğlu, Nur İrem ve Seda Erdoğan. “The Rise of ‘Independent Board Members’ in TURKEY”. Muhasebe Ve Finansman Dergisi, sy. 73, 2017, ss. 249-72, doi:10.25095/mufad.396755.
Vancouver Nuhoğlu Nİ, Erdoğan S. The Rise of “Independent Board Members” in TURKEY. Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi. 2017(73):249-72.