Shareholder Activism: Telecommunication Industry In Turkey
Öz
Shareholders began to play an active role in diminishing the growing agency costs due to recent
financial crisis, poor corporate governance and excessive executive compensations. They act as
individual and corporate forms in order to protect their investment and increase firm value.
Nowadays, social activities of the past have changed to replace the general manager, overcome the
duality problem, elect a board member other than the management candidates, vote for acquisition
or sale decisions, and dividend distribution. The ownership structure in Turkey is generally composed
of families or individuals who do not act aggressively as the hedge funds in USA. The sales of Turkish
companies’ shares to foreign shareholders, introduction of international investment funds in the local
market, and electronic general meeting system introduced a few years ago contribute to shareholder
activism in Turkey. Shareholder struggles are witnessed only in the Turkish stock market which is
quoted in the NYSE. In this study, the two publicly traded companies in the telecommunication
sector, namely Türk Telekom and Turkcell, are examined in terms of their financial situation, the
acceptance rate of the propositions of the management in the general meetings, and the behavior
of their share prices. Shareholder activism is not seen in the Telekom, whereas there have been
trials and regulation changes for Turkcell. In terms of accounting-based data, Türk Telekom has a
lower operational profitability and current ratio as compared to Turkcell. It is concluded that the
level of shareholder activism occurred in the general meetings does not affect the share prices. Both
companies’ shares moved in high correlation during the last three years. The share prices did not show
abnormal patterns during the days following the general meetings. The reasons might be the growth
of the telecommunication industry being above the national growth rate and the positive evaluations
of the shareholders’ decisions by the investors for the future of the firm.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynakça
- Activist Insight, Activist Investing Review, 2016, s. 9-10.
- ARMOUR, John and Cheffins, Brian, “The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds”, Journal of Alternative Investments, 14 (3), 2012, s. 17-27.
- BLACK, Josh, Activist Investing 2016, www.activistinsight.com
- BLACK, Josh, The Activist Investing Annual Review 2017, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Feb. 21, 2017.
- BLACK, Bernard S., “Shareholder activism and corporate governance in the United States”, In: Newman, Peter (Ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 3, 1998, s. 459-465.
- BRAV, Alon and Jiang, Wei and Kim, Hyunseob, “Hedge Fund Activism: A Review. Foundations and Trends in Finance”, 4 (3), 2009, s. 185-246.
- CHUNG, Huimin and Talaulicar, Till, “Forms and effects of shareholder activism”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18 (4), 2010, s. 253-257.
- COHN, Jonathan B. and Gillan, Stuart L. and Hartzell, Jay C., “On Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd-) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access, The Journal of Finance, 71 (4), 2016, s. 1623-1668.
Ayrıntılar
Birincil Dil
Türkçe
Konular
Ekonomi
Bölüm
Araştırma Makalesi
Yayımlanma Tarihi
19 Temmuz 2017
Gönderilme Tarihi
20 Temmuz 2017
Kabul Tarihi
-
Yayımlandığı Sayı
Yıl 2017 Cilt: 39 Sayı: 1
