TÜRKİYE'DE YERLEŞTİRME ETKİSİ VE İLİŞKİLİ TARAF İŞLEMLERİ

Öz

Bu araştırmanın amacı, ilişkili taraf işlemleri (RPT) kararlarında önemli etkileyen yetkileri anlamayı amaçlamıştır. Sahipliği kontrol eden değişkenler, CEO'ların özellikleri ve bağımsız yönetim kurulu değişkenlerini içeren kurumsal mekanizmanın, RPT'lerin potansiyel çıkar çatışmalarına ilişkin kararları üzerindeki etkisini incelemek için vekalet teorisi bakışı kullandı. 2019 ve 2020 yıllarında Türk imalat şirketlerinin toplam 310 finansal raporu değerlendirildi. Daha sonra, kontrol eden hissedar ve CEO'ların özelliklerinin RPT'ler mekanizmasında önemli roller oynadığı keşfedilirken, bağımsız yönetim kurulu direktörü değişkeni en yüksek etkiye sahipti. Bağımsız yönetim kurulu direktörünün RPT kararları üzerindeki etkisinin gücü, kurumsal yönetim mekanizmalarının işlevini temsil eder. RPT'lerde sağlamlaştırma etkileri ortaya çıksa da, bağımsız yönetim kurulu yöneticilerinin reddi veya onayı azınlık payına bağlıydı. Nihai gücün kamulaştırılması, bağımsız yönetim kurulu direktörünün rolü içinde dengelendiğinden, aynı zamanda uyumun RPT'lerin kararı üzerindeki etkisini de vurguladı.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• İlişkili Taraf İşlemleri
• Kurumsal Yönetim
• Uyum Etkisi

ENTRENCHMENT EFFECTS AND RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS IN TURKEY

Öz

This research aimed to understand the important powers that affect Related Party Transactions (RPTs) decisions. It used the agency theory perspective to examine the effect of corporate mechanism, comprising variables of controlling ownership, the CEOs characteristics, and independent board of directors, on the decision of RPTs regarding potential conflicts of interest. A total of 310 financial reports of Turkish manufacturing listed companies in 2019 and 2020 were assessed. Subsequently, controlling shareholder and CEOs characteristics were discovered to play significant roles in the RPTs mechanism, while the independent board director variable had the highest impact. The strength of the independent board director effect on RPTs decision represents the function of corporate governance mechanisms. Although entrenchment effects occur in RPTs, the denial or approval of independent board directors was dependent on minority interest. It also highlighted the impact of alignment on RPTs’ decision, since the expropriation of ultimate power was balanced within the independent board director’s role.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Related Party Transactions
• Corporate Governance
• Alignment Effect

Kaynakça

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