Taklit Etmeden Taklit: Duns Scotus’un İnsanlarda Imago Dei Olarak Kendi Kendini Belirleyen Akıl Üzerine Görüşleri

Öz

Taklit kavramı, Duns Scotus’un düşüncesinde paradoksal bir paradigma oluşturur. Geleneksel çerçeveyi takip eden bu Orta Çağ filozofu, rasyonel gücü imago Dei, yani Tanrı’nın insandaki sureti olarak kabul eder. İnsanın sonlu aklı, bir tasvirin kendisini konu aldığı nesneye benzemesi ve onu taklit etmesi gibi, ilahi varlığı taklit eder. Teolojik bağlamla sıkı biçimde ilişkili olan bu yaygın Orta Çağ varsayımı, varlıkların ilkesi ile bizatihi varlıkların kendisi arasındaki ilişkiye dair tarihsel söylemi açıklığa kavuşturduğu için ontolojik bakımdan da önem taşır. Duns Scotus’un taklit kuramı, yalnızca zorunlu nedensel boyutu değil, aynı zamanda ilişkinin olumsal ve özgür unsurlarını da içerdiği için dikkate değerdir. Scotus, rasyonel gücü özgür irade ile özdeşleştirir. Bu kabul, düşünürün provokatif bir taklit kuramına ulaşmasına yol açar. Rasyonel sınırlı varlıklar için taklit etmenin yolu paradoksal biçimde “taklit etmemektir.” Önceden belirlenmiş doğalarını izleyerek taklit eden akıldışı irrasyonel varlıkların aksine, rasyonel varlıklar taklit etmeden ve iradî eylemlerinde özgür olarak taklit edebilirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Duns Scotus
• akıl
• taklit
• irade
• zihin
• imago Dei

The Imitation by Not Imitating: Duns Scotus on Self-determined Rationality as Imago Dei in Humans

Öz

The concept of imitation creates a paradoxical paradigm in Duns Scotus’ philosophy. Following the traditional framework, this medieval thinker considered rational power to be imago Dei, i.e., God’s image in humans. A human’s finite rationality imitates the divine being as an image resembles and imitates the object it depicts. This common medieval assumption—strongly connected with the theological context—is also interesting from an ontological point of view, as it clarifies historical discourse concerning the relation between the principle of beings and beings themselves. Duns Scotus’ theory of imitation merits consideration because it includes not only the necessary causal aspect but also the contingent, free element of the relation. Scotus identifies rational power with free will. This presumption leads the thinker to a provocative theory of imitation. For rational finite beings, the method of imitation is paradoxically “not to imitate.” Unlike all nonrational beings, which imitate by following pre-determined nature, rational beings can imitate by not imitating and being free in their volitional acts.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Duns Scouts
• rationality
• imitation
• the will
• the intellect
• imago Dei

Kaynakça

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