The EU’s Proceedings Against Gazprom and Their Repercussions on EU Competition Law

Öz

Avrupa Birliği, Rusya Federasyonu’nun sahibi olduğu ve üye devletler nezdindeki pek çok enerji piyasasında aktif olan enerji devi Gazprom şirketini, siyasi dış politikasının bir parçası olarak kullanmasından dolayı rahatsızlık duymaktadır. AB Komisyonu 4 Eylül 2012 tarihinde, bu çerçevede Gazprom’a karşı, şirketin pek çok enerji piyasasındaki hakim durumunu, petrol fiyatı endekslemesi, al-yada-öde kaydı, altyapılara üçüncü kişilerin ulaşım hakkının engellenmesi gibi eylemler yoluyla kötüye kullandığı gerekçesiyle inceleme başlatmıştır. Rus devleti buna karşı olarak kısıtlayıcı düzenlemeler yoluyla, Gazprom’un ve alt şirketlerinin, Komisyon kararı doğrultusunda hareket etmelerini engellemeye çalışmaktadır. Komisyonun başlattığı inceleme AB rekabet hukuku kurallarının, merkezi AB sınırları dışında olan (St. Petersburg) Gazprom şirketinin yine AB sınırları dışındaki eylemlerine karşı uygulanmasını öngörmekte olup, bu çerçevede AB hukukunun sınır-aşırı uygulanmasını gerektirmektedir. Rusya’nın kısıtlayıcı düzenlemeleri ise karışmazlık ilkesinin savunma aşamasında Gazprom tarafından ileri sürülmesinin planlandığını göstermektedir. Komisyon, 24 Mayıs, 2018 tarihinde Gazprom’a yönelik bazı yükümlüler getirdiğini açıklamıştır ve henüz Gazprom tarafından bu karar aleyhine Avrupa Birliği Adalet Divanı’nda herhangi bir iptal davası açılmamıştır. Fakat, tarafların karar öncesine kadar yaptıkları tartışmalar, AB rekabet hukukunun devlet politikası niteliğindeki şirket eylemlerine karşı sınır-aşırı uygulanması hakkında ortaya çıkan önemli hukuki çıkarımlar açısından çok önemlidir. (The European Union is concerned with the Russian policy of using natural gas resources as an instrument of expanding its influence over the EU Member States through the state-owned giant Gazprom, a super dominant energy company, operating in the EU with assets in upstream, midstream and downstream energy markets. On 4 September, 2012, the European Commission announced that it has initiated proceedings against Gazprom on the grounds that the Russian giant abused its dominant position in several EU energy markets through practices such as oil price indexation, take-or-pay clauses, refusing third party access rights, etc.. In response, Russian state enacted blocking legislations to prevent Gazprom and its subsidiaries in the EU from complying with the enforcement decisions that would be taken by the Commission. The Commission’s proceedings constituted an extraterritorial application of EU competition law to certain practices perpetrated by Gazprom in its domicile, St. Petersburg, Russia. Blocking legislations indicated that the Russian Government sought to provide to Gazprom, a legal basis, the principle of non-interference, the company would rely on in dismissing the enforcement decisions taken by the Commission. On 24 May, 2018, the Commission imposed binding obligations on Gazprom to ensure, inter alia, that natural gas provided by the Russian giant was priced at competitive levels through employing indices established in the EU. Even though the Commission’s decision was not challenged by Gazprom before the EU courts, the arguments raised by the parties prior to the decision had serious legal implications as to the extraterritorial application of EU competition law to market practices that were part of a political agenda.)

Anahtar Kelimeler

• rekabet hukuku
• gazprom
• enerji piyasaları
• avrupa birliği hukuku

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